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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uncovers the underlying causes of Dalit inequality and the necessary 
institutional reforms required addressing the impact of institutional barriers and 
biases, with a view to formulating and implementing socially just policies. The central 
thesis is that Dalit requires special measures to achieve participatory parity and 
institutional reforms to change long-standing injustices. Recognition of the devalued 
identity of Dalit together with the redistribution of state power and resources are 
indispensable for Dalits’ social and political equality. This thesis asserts the need for 
a group differentiated politics of recognition to counter the extant generalised 
understanding of Dalit assimilation in the society as their end goal. 
 
To understand the causes and effects of the ongoing hegemonic caste hierarchy and 
required institutional reform, this research is grounded in a two-dimensional—
redistribution and recognition— conception of social justice, drawing in particular on 
the work of critical theorist Nancy Fraser. The nature of extant injustices against 
Dalit as well the institutional barriers to Dalit in the recent political reform process 
is explicated through a phenomenological research methodology. Personal 
experiences of Dalit demonstrate that despite State anti-caste discrimination 
measures, changing the patterns of caste discrimination remains very slow, as 
evidenced by rampant everyday discrimination.  
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Furthermore, recent efforts to bring about political reform, including State 
restructuring and Federalism have been relatively ineffective in addressing Dalit 
issues. Due in part to their overemphasis on the ethnic identity discourse, 
fundamental issues faced by other marginalised groups like Dalit received 
inadequate attention. Nevertheless, Dalit demands have to some extent been 
recognised in the new constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly (CA) in 
2015, and as such, Dalit now needs to achieve internal unity and strategic action to 
continue their struggle. By studying the dynamics of Dalit inequality, hegemonic 
socio-political structures and institutional reforms, this research study has generated 
new empirical perspectives for Dalit that can be widely utilised by policymakers as 
well as academics for further research and policymaking processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
I still recall one specific incident of caste discrimination that occurred at my village. 
We used to fetch water from a public well (kuwa) which was almost half an hour 
walking distance from my house in the village. When I was around 15 years old, my 
cousin and I went to fetch water as usual. On that particular day, as we were filling 
our vessel higher caste women yelled out and thrashed us because I accidentally 
touched her vessel. Being a lower caste, I was not allowed to touch the water vessels 
belonging to people of other higher castes. 
 
This is just one story of caste discrimination that I have experienced and witnessed 
throughout my life. Being a member of the Dalit community, I have faced and seen 
my family and community face many incidents of caste discrimination, untouchability 
and injustice in Nepal. Growing up, degrading behaviour and hatred levelled against 
us, every day, were normal parts of our lives, and continue today. Like many Dalit, I 
am still not allowed to openly access public taps, temples and hotels in my rural 
village where people easily recognise me as a Dalit. The experience of higher caste 
students drinking water from the jug, and my waiting until they had all finished, at 
which point I hoped someone would pour water directly into my mouth (since I was 
not allowed to touch the jug) is still fresh in my mind. Bullying or degrading 
behaviour like other school children calling me achhut (untouchable), tallo jaatko 
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keto (lower caste boy) became normal for me. I simply had to tolerate such treatment 
as neither teacher, nor other children helped me to counter or confront such 
behaviours. Sitting separately during feasts and restrictions in entering temples, the 
houses of higher caste people or touching their water vessels (gagri) are just a few 
examples of the habitual way Dalit are treated in Nepal. Recently my neighbour, a 
lower caste man, was severely thrashed because he touched the vessel of higher caste 
people in my village.  
 
I have encountered this type of discrimination not only in rural villages, where one 
might think less educated or exposed people reside. It is, however, also common in 
the urban setting of Kathmandu. The caste-based hatred and discrimination while 
renting a room in Kathmandu is an unforgettable incident in my life. During my 
college time back in 2000 in Kathmandu, I was thrown out of a rented room because 
I am a lower caste man. Even when I came to Australia to commence my doctoral 
studies, I experienced a shocking moment when a higher caste Nepali refused to 
share an apartment with me. Indeed, throughout my time in Australia, my family 
and I experienced various less direct forms of discrimination, such as higher caste 
individuals’ reluctance to include us in group functions, cultural events or caste-based 
associations. 
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Because of such heinous forms of caste discrimination, from childhood, I always 
wished to act to change the situation and I realised the importance of education in 
doing so. Despite facing everyday discrimination and socioeconomic obstacles, I had 
a strong desire to undertake higher degree research that would produce empirical 
data, to provide material for evidence based advocacy for the rights of Dalit. In fact, 
this research is the result of my struggle, and I hope it will contribute to the larger 
struggle for the rights of caste affected Dalit in Nepal. 
 
1. Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis examines the underlying causes of the structural injustices that Dalit in 
Nepal face, and the institutional reforms currently being considered in the context of 
the social-political transformations occurring in the country. Specifically, it is 
concerned with the dynamics of hegemonic socio-political structures that cause and 
perpetuate the inequality and injustices that Dalit in Nepal experience, and with the 
institutional reforms that would be required to achieve social justice for this group. 
While the thesis is concerned with contemporary political transformations, because 
of the entrenched and historical nature of caste-based injustice, it deals with long-
standing inequality in Nepal and against this background, tries to assess how well 
and in what ways contemporary efforts address or fail to address such inequality.  
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While the principal objects of study are formal political transformations, including 
state restructuring and federalism, the study includes a survey of the historical 
trajectory of Dalit resistance and the Dalit struggle for dignity and justice. This 
background is important for understanding how Dalit have been fighting, and how 
despite their attempts to bring about reform, their rights and freedoms have been 
limited and excluded from mainstream politics and democratisation processes in 
Nepal. Despite Dalits’ consistent attempts to participate in the processes of political 
transformation, their voices have largely been unheard in broader processes of 
political contestation and transformation.  
 
Dalit are suffering from deeply entrenched caste-based hierarchy and discrimination. 
Previous research (Kisan, 2005; Bhattachan et al., 2008; Ahuti, 2010; BK, 2013; 
Maharjan and Kisan, 2013) has identified Dalit as the group that experiences the 
greatest socioeconomic, educational and political exclusion and disadvantage in 
Nepal. These studies also indicate that even though anti-caste discrimination laws 
that formally protect Dalit from caste discrimination exist on the books, the 
implementation of these laws has been ineffective (Ahuti, 2010; Bhattachan et al., 
2008). Such studies paint a stark picture, but they are often fragmented across 
different issues that Dalit face, and none explicitly explores the comprehensive 
institutional measures that would address social justice for Dalit in Nepal.  
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The persistence of this situation poses the question of what type of reform is required. 
In different parts of the world, other groups that have experienced entrenched 
injustice and marginalisation, including women, African Americans, ethnic 
minorities and Indigenous peoples, have been fighting for equality. One of the lessons 
from their experience has been that liberal theories of justice, which say that social 
justice is achieved through equality of opportunity, have not worked for them (Young, 
1990:26). They also have demonstrated that formal laws outlawing discrimination 
are not sufficient. These experiences have given rise to some ideas about social justice 
– structural injustice, group and collective rights, and identity politics. Specifically, 
they have shown that because of the persistent effect of structural injustices, even if 
members of those groups are given equal opportunities, they are not able to compete 
against better-off groups, as they are systematically disadvantaged and consistently 
excluded from social benefits and opportunities (Young, 1990:41; Manderson, 
212:414). Because the structural foundation of injustice undermines the rights of 
members of particular groups, attending solely to individual rights will be insufficient 
to achieve social justice for them (Calhoun, 1982; Young, 1990; Williams, 1998). 
 
Thus, an approach that recognises rights at the level of groups has been critical to 
addressing entrenched structural injustices. Group based structural interventions 
such as affirmative action and guaranteed representation for particular groups, 
collective rights such as protection of minority cultural rights and recognition of 
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group identity, as well as recognition of the rights of peoples to self-determination 
have been some of the alternatives to individual welfare approaches (Jones, 1999; 
Preda, 2013). Group based interventions such as affirmative action, also known as 
reservations or quotas in fields such as the public service, education and other sectors 
have been recognised as critical to ameliorating the socio-economic situation of 
marginalised groups. At the political level, different mechanisms have been 
developed to try to provide marginalised groups with political representation, 
including using proportional representation or race conscious districting, or more pro-
actively, reserved or quotas (Williams, 1998:215). Moreover, as evidenced in 
contemporary new social movements, marginalised groups have specifically sought 
positive recognition of their distinctive identities (Buechler, 1995:452). For Dalit 
similarly, group rights based approach will be significant to rectify structural 
injustices and promote social justice. 
 
For Dalit, the severe forms of caste hierarchy and its discriminatory practices 
manifest across their social, economic, education and political experience. From the 
Dalit perspective, social injustice is experienced as caste-based discrimination, caste-
based violence, social exclusion, restriction of access to resources, and a range of 
human rights violations. Based on contemporary social theories concerning 
structural injustice, and empirical research on the situation of Dalit in Nepal, this 
thesis argues that there needs to be are the distribution of state power and resources, 
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and recognition of Dalit identity at a collective level. Multidimensional forms of 
structural reform, the substantive elimination of all forms of caste-based 
discrimination, and other programs in the fields of the economy, education and 
politics will be fundamental to creating equality and justice in the end. In 
institutional terms, this means that special measures and the recognition of group 
rights will be required to achieve equality and remedy long-standing injustices. To 
achieve such special measures, Dalit should, I argue, assert a group differentiated 
politics of recognition. The difficulty, as I show through the historical survey (Chapter 
Six) is that, despite long-standing Dalit resistance, they are still struggling to have 
their voices heard or registered in the mainstream. This situation has been 
exacerbated by a vicious cycle of internal division and a lack of strong leadership, 
perpetuating the ineffectiveness of Dalit movements to achieve substantial 
institutional reforms for justice. 
 
Drawing on my analysis, three principal conclusions about the way forward are 
proposed. First, drawing on my analysis in Chapter Five, I conclude that status 
inequality is embedded in structural injustices, underpinning the extreme forms of 
oppression as exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and 
violence that Dalit experience. As such, reform must be multidimensional, address 
the structural basis, and not only seek to redistribute resources. Second, drawing on 
my analysis of Dalit movements in Chapter Six, I argue that Dalit should be united 
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in their agenda and struggles, even though they may be divided by their political 
ideologies and internally along caste lines. Third, as I argue in Chapter Seven, Dalit 
should assert group differentiated politics of recognition to achieve participatory 
parity, even though to date they have been unable to use the process of federalism to 
establish separate Dalit political units or states.  
 
In this Introductory Chapter, the research background and problem will be outlined, 
along with a brief survey of existing legal provisions concerning discrimination 
against Dalit. This chapter will also set out the key research aims and associated 
research question that the thesis seeks to address. It concludes with a brief overview 
of the structure of the thesis.  
 
2. Background of the Research 
Today, Nepal finds itself in the process of political transition with the aim of bringing 
about greater equality and justice. While much of the world has moved past the 
industrial age into the information age, and social movements contest capitalism, in 
Nepal, it is the semi-feudal nature of the socio-economic structure and a fragile 
political system that mostly contribute to socioeconomic and political 
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inequality.1Underlying social ordering along the lines of caste, ethnicity, gender, 
religion, and region have resulted in poverty, illiteracy, and exclusion.  
 
Nepal is one of the poorest countries in the world, with per capita income at $US703, 
more than 35%of people are illiterate, and 25% of people living under the extreme 
poverty line (CBS, 2011). Poverty is higher in rural areas (27%) than urban areas 
(15%), and in the mid and far west, there is a higher incidence of poverty. Dalit have 
a much higher incidence of poverty, at 46%, compared to the advanced ethnic group 
Newar, at 14 % (CBS, 2011). As measured by the UNDP, Nepal ranks 144th in the 
human development rank, with a 0.558 index as its human development indicator 
(UNDP, 2017). To get a sense of how low this is, we can compare it with the first 
ranked country, Norway, with its index at0.949. This index combines measures of 
health, education, income, inequality, gender equality, poverty, work, human security 
and other sectoral indicators (UNDP, 2017).Caste, ethnic and gender discrimination, 
violations of human rights, underdevelopment, the disparity between urban and 
rural areas, and the failure of state mechanisms to address these differences have 
been identified as significant factors contributing to political instability and 
inequality across different socioeconomic dimension (Bhattachan et al., 2008; 
Pyakurel, 2011). 
                                                          
1This does not mean that Nepal is not affected by global capitalism or the global economy, as demonstrated by the 
extensive labour migration from Nepal.  
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Beyond such domestic considerations, Nepal has been caught up in the geopolitics of 
its neighbouring countries, specifically India and China. Historical relations, 
including socio-cultural proximity with India have been a key reason for Indian 
influence across a range of areas, from Nepali politics to the economy. India Nepal 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 1950 has been political issue for its timely 
reconsideration (Pandey, 2010). This treaty has wider implications for the Nepalese 
economy as it impedes Nepal's extending its trade relation to other countries except 
India. As a result of such factors, Nepal rarely acts outside Indian interests, and is 
tied to India, including for larger development projects. The evidences indicates, 
however, that the projects controlled by Indian companies, for example, hydropower 
and road building are often either not completed on time or cancelled altogether. The 
negligence upon the projects shows Indian domination to Nepal. It is considered that 
hidden interest behind not completing projects timely is to influence Nepalese politics 
by creating political and developmental transitions in Nepal (Pandey, 2010). India 
does not want to lose its grip in Nepal by increasing Chinese trade and development 
relations with Nepal. India has, for example, been cautious toward the Nepalese 
initiative to build up trade relations with China by engaging in Chinse initiatives 
such as the One Belt and One Road (OBOR) even though there is wider assumption 
that Nepal could benefit from this Chinese development initiative. Extending its rail 
network from the east to west range could assist in propelling Nepal’s development. 
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However, the heavy influence of India in Nepalese politics and its economy has had 
an adverse effect on the development of Nepal.  
A further contextual issues is that Nepal has adopted a liberal open market economic 
policy. Increasing privatisation including open market system has affected to the 
state owned industries (Raut, 2012). Several state owned industries have been closed 
and this has directly affected to the employment of local people and national growth. 
Nepal has few exports but is heavily rely upon the imports from India and other 
international markets. The impact of modernisation and the open market system is 
specifically marked for the most disempowered such as Dalit. For example, Dalit used 
to make leather shoes, but this source of income has been completely replaced by 
cheaper shoes produced in the mass production sector. As pointed out by Caplan 
(1972) in relation to the situation of Cobblers in the western hill district of Nepal, 
Dalit are now unable to continue their profession, as they cannot compete on the 
global and open market. 
  
Despite the fact that Nepal has been going through political instability, sustained 
under development, and specific economic crises, the political changes and reform 
process has brought some hope in Nepali people. The abolition of autocracy in 1950, 
the reinstatement of democracy in 1990, and the removal of a 240-year long Monarchy 
and the declaration of a republic in 2008 are amongst the key political landmarks in 
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this long reform process. These changes were expected to significantly scale down all 
kinds of inequality and injustices (Hachhethu, 2011:2). Nevertheless, in many 
respects, the attempts to establish a democratic system did not bring substantial 
changes, especially for highly disadvantaged groups like Dalit, not least because of 
the tenacity of caste discrimination (Dahal, 2011:39). As evidenced by the 
parliamentary elections held after the 1990s, that failed to secure even a single Dalit 
representative in the parliament, despite the implementation of reform measures for 
Dalit and other minorities (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013), reforms to date have been 
insufficient. Moreover, despite having legal reforms, caste-based discrimination is 
still rampant all over the country because of deeply entrenched caste stratification 
and its multi-dimensional nature. 
 
The recent political changes have brought some hope to the Nepali people. The 
promulgation of a new constitution has institutionalised a republican federal system. 
The recent election of local government which was due for almost 20 years, including 
the election of provincial and central government has aided the implementation of 
new constitution. The inclusive policy adopted by the new constitution has resulted 
in increased numbers women, Dalit and other marginalised groups being elected as 
the representatives at the local level. The Local Level Electoral Act 2017 had reserved 
two seats on each of the nearly 7,000 ward committees for women, one of which is for 
women of the marginalized Dalit caste. In addition, political parties that present 
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candidates for both the positions of Mayor and Deputy Mayor in municipalities, and 
Village Chairperson and Village Vice Chairperson in rural municipalities, have been 
mandated to include at least one-woman candidate among the two. This mandatory 
electoral policy resulted the 14339 women being elected as mayor, deputy mayor, and 
ward members, including6567 Dalit women as a ward member in 753 local level 
government structures in Nepal (The Record, 2017). 
 
However, there remain various other social stigmas, superstition, discrimination, 
which have not been significantly reduced in spite of the new constitution including 
its subsidiary laws condemning such behaviours and attitudes. There are evidences 
of killings, human rights violations and discrimination based on caste hierarchy. 
Dalit continue to suffer from the deeply rooted caste based discrimination as 
discussed in later chapters.  
 
2.1. Genesis of Caste System and Untouchability 
Caste hierarchy and discrimination are the primary reasons for inequality and 
disparity amongst the Nepali people. A caste is a form of social stratification based 
on the cultural notion of purity and pollution (Marglin, 1977:255). Caste systems 
maintain social hierarchies in Hindu societies that enforce untouchability behaviour 
against Dalit (Dumont, 1970; Ahuti, 2010). The foundation of Caste was developed in 
the Varna system. Varna was primarily originated on the Indian continent as a form 
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of so called ‘colour’ distinction amongst different groups of people (Prashit, 1999). As 
legend has it, about six thousand years ago, the people of Dravid and Astrik origins 
used to live in the humid, flat lands of the Indian continent and were said to be ‘black’, 
‘red’ and ‘yellow’ in skin colour (Ahuti, 2010:8). Later, a group of people of Aryan 
origin said to be ‘white', encroached and defeated the local inhabitants. The extent of 
colour discrimination later turned into the labour based division of the fourfold Varna 
system (Ahuti, 2010:8-10). The fourfold classification system came to refer to four 
castes: Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra. Shudra were the slaves who were 
captured in war and the children of slaves, sold to provide services to other categories 
of Varna (Cameron, 1998).  
Historically, there is no universally accepted date for the origin of the caste and 
practices of untouchability. It is believed that the Brahmin King Manu imposed 
untouchability against the Shudra in around 200 BC. However, this differs with the 
evidence of Buddhist religious manuscripts. The description of Chandal in Buddhist 
religious manuscript evidence the existence of Untouchability practice as far back as 
almost 2600-3000 years ago (Ahuti, 2010; Prashrit, 2015). Itis said that when the 
Vaishya and Shudras protested against the massive repression they experienced, 
they were punished and excluded from society (Ahuti, 2010). The form of punishment 
and social boycott was subsequently developed as the practice of untouchability, 
meaning that they were considered impure and had to be excluded. 
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In Nepal, the Varna system, including untouchability was developed under the 
Lichhabi rulers in the6th century (Prashrit, 2015). However, Jayasthiti Malla (rulers 
of the Malla dynasty) formalised the caste system around the12th century, and it 
became law under Ram Shah in the15th century. Later, the King Prithvinarayan 
Shah imposed the Varna system over the Indigenous ethnic people in the 17th 
century. Under the National Code of 1854, introduced by Janga Bahadur Rana, all 
caste and ethnic groups were incorporated within the fourfold Varna—Caste—
structure and the law, with all forms of life regulated by the division, including legal 
punishments being based on who belongs to which of the four categories (Ahuti, 2010; 
Bhattachan et al., 2008). The legal code was discriminatory with lower caste 
individuals receiving severe punishment, as distinct from higher caste people who 
went either unpunished or receiving a lesser punishment for crimes that they 
committed. Unlike those of lower castes, Brahmins were not subject to capital 
punishment for their certain offences including incest, murder, and rape (Cox, 1994: 
91). The following Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchical order of Nepali society 
established by the 1854 code, where Dalit fall at the bottom of the social structure.  
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Figure 1: The Caste Hierarchy in Nepal (1854 Civil Code-Muluki Ain) 
 
Source: World Bank/DFID, 2006 
 
Caste discrimination is a severe form of human rights violation based on caste 
hierarchical order of ‘high’ and ‘low’. The perfect illustration of institutional rules and 
regulations that subjugate fundamental human rights of Dalit, and have done so for 
hundreds if not thousands of years across the South Asian sub-continent (Ahuti, 
2010:1). Because of the manifestation of lower social status and structural injustice 
in social, economic, educational and political sectors, Dalit occupies the lowest rank 
according to various social indicators of human development in Nepal.  
 
The forms of discrimination recorded in these incident records vary—including denial 
of access to public places, beating, verbal abuse, domestic violence, and violence about 
inter-caste marriages. For example, the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC) has 
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documented the persistence of caste discrimination—untouchability in the record of 
incidents that it keeps, set out in the Human Rights Year Book (2014). According to 
this yearbook, 88 Caste discrimination incidences occurred in Nepal in that year. 
 
Untouchability is a key form of caste discrimination which refers to the humiliations 
imposed, from generation to generation, on a particular but sizeable section of the 
population that relates to impurity and pollution (Soorya Moorthy, 2008). It is the 
extreme and vicious aspect of the caste system, prescribing severe social sanctions 
against those placed at the bottom of the caste structure invoking terrible 
punishments, fatal attacks, and atrocities (Ibid). The major dimensions of the 
prevailing practices of untouchability are exclusion, humiliation-subordination, and 
exploitation as emerged by interview data. They—the untouchables—are excluded 
from much of social life, including from everyday activities like sharing sources of 
drinking water and participating in religious worship and festivals. The prohibition 
into Temples and Cultural functions is also another form of caste discrimination. 
Evidence of discrimination shows that even today, temples are not open for Dalit. 
Although they follow similar religious beliefs to members of higher caste groups, they 
are barred from entering and worshipping in temples. Dalit are alienated from the 
socio-cultural functions.  
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Moreover, the restriction in intercaste marriage is also manifestation of caste 
discrimination. Marriage between Dalit and dominant groups is de facto prohibited 
although there is no formal legal regulation to this effect. Couples who marry outside 
of their caste face social sanctions, economic hardships, societal disrespect, exclusion 
from religious and cultural events, exclusion from their families and villages, and 
they might face difficulties in obtaining birth and citizenship certificates. Similarly, 
restriction in public services fundamental problems faced by Dalit. Dalit are 
prohibited from freely using public services being lower caste in Nepal. For example, 
they are not allowed to use public water taps, wells, to enter temples or to access 
general health services. Most of the incidences of overt caste-based violence or 
harassment occur at public taps, wells or temples because these are the places Dalit 
access services they use, even in the face of the risk of being thrashed, scolded or 
dehumanised. 
 
Dalit ghettoisation and restriction community participation occurs partly because of 
being Dalit. Dalit have their homes in fairly remote places, such as either at the top 
of a hill or slightly outside the main village in the rural hilly areas, and this lack 
equal access to basic resources such as electricity. In the Tarai, the pattern of Dalit 
settlement is determined by access to land. As most Dalit do not own land, they often 
reside on the side of riverbanks or near the jungle (Ahuti, 2010:26). This means that 
Dalit settlements lack basic infrastructures such as road access, tap water and 
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electricity. The geographical remoteness is exacerbated by the way in which caste 
hierarchy and access to power determine access to these forms of resources. 
 
Untouchability is the most extreme and vicious aspect of the caste system, 
prescribing severe social sanctions against those placed at the bottom of the caste 
structure (Gorringe, 2006; Shah et al., 2006). The touch of untouchables was said to 
pollute others, invoking terrible punishments, fatal attacks, and atrocities. From the 
prevailing practice of untouchability, Shah et al., (2006) infer that exclusion, 
humiliation-subordination, and exploitation follow.  
̔Dalit are excluded from much of social life that includes the sharing of 
drinking water sources and participating in religious worship and 
festivals. Humiliation-subordination is evident in the imposition of 
gestures of deference like carrying footwear in the hands, bending 
forward with a bowed head and not wearing clean or bright clothes. 
Impositions of forced, unpaid or underpaid jobs and confiscation of 
property are some forms of exploitation̕ 
(Soorya Moorthy, 2008:285). 
 
It is estimated that even today; caste discrimination affects around 260 million people 
worldwide, but largely in South Asia (UNGA, 2016:7). Among 170 million caste 
affected people in South Asia, a huge proportion of lower caste people lives in India. 
In Nepal, as claimed by Dalit leaders, there are around 4 million people affected by 
caste hierarchy and discrimination.  
 
In the face of these inequalities, the struggle of Dalit movement has succeeded in 
influencing Nepalese governments to adopt anti-caste discrimination laws, including 
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proclaiming Nepal as free of caste discrimination. The new civil code, 1963 formally 
outlawed caste discrimination, which was progressively adopted by the Constitution 
of Nepal, 1990 and the interim constitution, 2007. On 19 March 2002, the Prime 
Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba announced Nepal as a caste discrimination and 
untouchability free nation (LANCAW, 2006). Later, a meeting of the Parliament on 
4 June 2006, proclaimed Nepal again as discrimination and untouchability free. By 
bringing Dalit and other so-called backward groups into the mainstream of the 
nation, this declaration was expected to act as a significant breakthrough in creating 
an equitable society (IDSN, 2013). As this thesis will demonstrate, this has not 
transpired.  
 
Anti-caste discrimination laws, as described later, establish caste discrimination, and 
untouchability as serious social crimes and the level of punishment has been 
increased as compared with previous anti-caste discrimination provision. 
Nevertheless, as I will show in Chapter Five, the lack of effective implementation of 
existing laws, policies and programs, has meant that there have not been significant 
changes in the patterns of discrimination and injustice. The socio-cultural, political 
and institutional barriers negatively affect the effective implementation of existing 
policy provisions. The degrading forms of caste based discrimination—untouchability, 
exclusion, misrecognition, gender biases and violence, underdevelopment, poverty, 
illiteracy—persist in the society. 
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2.2. Dalit in Nepal: Injustice and Struggles 
As indicated above, the term Dalit has been adopted to refer to the group of people 
who are at the lowest stratum of the society. Dalit is derived from the Hebrew root 
Dal meaning broken or crushed (Muthaiah, 2004:397). In Sanskrit, it means 
downtrodden and oppressed or exploited (Ibid). It was used in India as the Marathi 
translation depressed class to denote the untouchable groups and those broken from 
and living outside the society (Ibid). Dalit means crushed underfoot, broken into 
pieces or the oppressed (Ghose, 2003). Dalit are those who have been broken and 
ground down by those above them in a deliberate way (Zelliot, 1996).  
 
The Dalit terminology emerged as a form of political identity in 1927when renowned 
Indian Dalit leader Dr Ambedkar used it to address caste groups who were oppressed 
under the untouchability practices of the Varna system (Ahuti, 2010:31). The Dalit 
term entered into more formal and regular use during the emergence of the Dalit 
Struggle in India (Zene, 2010). There were some efforts to rename untouchable groups 
in India, for example, Mahatma Gandhi renamed them Harijan (children of God) 
(Shrestha, 2014:82). The term Dalit was increasingly used after the 1930s, and Dalit 
is the contemporary preferred term (Ahuti, 2010). However, there have been 
contestations regarding both termsHarijan and Dalitsince 1917 in India (Shrestha, 
2014:82). Although the term Dalit still refers to the group formally known as 
untouchable and oppressed, by taking on this formal name and identity, members of 
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these groups are taking up a collective identity for political struggle (Ahuti, 2010). 
Today, the term Dalit has become a site of resistance and a reason for the struggle 
(Zene, 2010:11).  
 
Despite being a commonly used term in the Indian context since 1927, in Nepal, the 
term Dalit was not used for naming the organisation formed by these groups until 
1966 (Ahuti, 2010:31). When the resistance movement began in 1947, simultaneous 
with the anti-Rana democratic movement, organisation occurred using terms such as 
Pariganit, untouchable, Harijan. However, the Dalit term was frequently used after 
the 1990spolitical transformation to democracy (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013; Kharel, 
2007). Today, Dalit is a commonly known identity in the socio-political spheres, 
especially since the new constitution of Nepal has recognised this term.  
 
Dalit identity remains disputed, particularly among the younger generation, because 
stigma and derogatory meanings have attached to it (BK, 2013:20). Some members 
of the group argue that using this term dehumanises them in the long term and one 
sees a quest for an alternative term. A Dalit wing of the Sanghiya Samajwadi, a 
relatively small political party, is advocating for replacing the word Dalit with the 
term Shilpi (skilful). Because Dalit lacks a separate culture and language and are 
part of the Hindu religion, there is also an argument that they should simply be 
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assimilated within Hindu social structure. Others argue that being a separate social 
group, due to distinct traditional professions, social inequality, and discrimination 
(Kisan, 2005, Ahuti, 2010, Bhattachan et al., 2008), the retention of a distinctive Dalit 
identity in the short term is required. As I will argue in Chapter Seven, Dalit leaders 
of the major political parties are against the idea of dissolving this collective identity, 
and argue that the common identity as Dalit is not imposed; rather it is assumed as 
a common identity for the movement. 
 
Nevertheless, Dalit identity is distinct when compared with other forms of group 
identity. For example, using Kymlicka’s (1995:12) definition of ethnic groups, Dalit 
are neither an ethnic nor a poly-ethnic group, but a national group that suffers from 
historical marginalisation. ̔Antonio Gramsci’s notion of subaltern subordinated 
groups, those excluded from any meaningful social, economic or political 
participation, and rendered incapable of speaking because of the hegemony of ruling 
classes is more illuminating̕ (Onazi, 2009:3). Thus, whereas recent discourses on 
identity politics emphasise the preservation of ethnic cultural and linguistic identity 
in the processes of state restructuring, the stakes for Dalit are different. Dalit identity 
is better understood within a short-term strategy to unify subordinated groups under 
an umbrella that is effective at this stage (Ahuti, 2010; Nepali, 2013).  
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In fact, Dalit of Nepal is not a homogenous group but is segmented into26 separate 
sub-caste groups (see Table 1) as identified by the National Dalit Commission of 
Nepal, and they have a hierarchical caste relationship to each other. At the same 
time, Dalit are broadly categorised into two broad groups, Hill Dalit and Tarai Dalit.  
Table 1: List of Dalit Caste Schedule 
A) Hill Dalit B) Terai Dalit 
1. Gandharba (Gaine) 2. Pariyar (Damai, 
Dargee, Suchikar, Nagarchee, Dholee, 
Hudke) 3. Badi    4. Bishwokarma (Kami, 
Lohar, Sunar, Od, Chunanra, Parki, 
Tamata) 5. Mijar (Sarki, Charmakar, 
Bhool) 6. Pode 
(Deula,Pujari,Jalari)    7.Chyame 
(Kuchikar,Chyamkhal) 
8. Kalar   9. Kakaihiya    10. Kori     11. Khatik    12. 
Khatwe (Mandal, Khang) 13. Chamar (Ram, Mochi, 
Harijan, Ravidas) 14. Chidimar    15. Dom (Marik) 16. 
Tatma (Tanti, Das) 17. Dushadh (Paswan, Hajara) 18. 
Dhobi (Rajak) Hindu    19. Pasi   20. Bantar    21. 
Mushar    22. Mestar (Halkhor) 23. Sarbhang 
(Sarbariya) 24. Natuwa   25. Dhandi     26. Dharikar/ 
Dhankar 
 
Source: National Dalit Commission, 2017 
 
Together, Dalit occupy 13.56% of the total national population (See Table 2). 
According to census, 2011 total population of Dalit is 3593825 this includes the 
population of unidentified Dalit groups. 
Table 2: Dalit Population by Caste 
S.N. Dalit Caste Total Population 
A Hill Dalit   
1 Kami 1258554 
2 Damai/Dholi 472862 
3 Sarki 374816 
4 Gaine 6791 
5 Badi 38603 
B Tarai Dalit   
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6 Chamar/Harijan/Ram 335893 
7 Musahar 234490 
8 Dusadh/Pasawan/Pasi 208910 
9 Lohar 101421 
10 Tatma/Tatwa 104865 
11 Khatwe 100921 
12 Dhobi 109079 
13 Halkhor 4003 
14 Kisan 1739 
15 Pattharkatta/ 
3182 
16 Kushwadiya 
17 Kalar 1077 
18 Natuwa 3062 
19 Dhandi 1982 
20 Dhankar/Kharikar 2681 
21 Kori 12276 
22 Sarbaria 4906 
23 Chidimar 1254 
24 Bantar 55104 
25 Dalit Others 155354 
    3593825 
(Source: CBS, 2011) 
 
The practice of caste based discrimination and untouchability is not only imposed 
against Dalit but also found within and amongst these sub-caste groups. Moreover, 
the development pattern varies by sub-caste groups. According to the United Nations 
Human Development Report (2014) among identified castes and ethnic groups, the 
Madhesi Dalit have the lowest human development score at 0.400 as compared to the 
highest rate of Brahmans score at 0.557. The Hill Dalit are found to be more 
developed regarding education, economy and political representation relative to the 
Tarai Dalit. Hill Dalit, such as Bishwakarma and the Pariyar are more empowered 
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than other sub-caste groups of Dalit. As a result, they dominate the patterns of Dalit 
inclusion in different institutions (Sharma, 2011). 
 
2.3. History of Political Transformation in Nepal 
In Nepal, the period since 1950 has remarkable political changes. In pursuit of 
democracy, freedom, good governance, development and ending authoritarian rule, 
people or social movements in Nepal have significantly contributed to bringing about 
these political changes.  
 
The authoritarian Rana regime governed Nepal until 1950, at which point it was 
abolished by a citizen revolt. During the almost 104 years long Rana regime, freedom 
of speech was highly restricted, and Nepali citizens were denied their fundamental 
human rights (Hachhethu, 2011, Parajulee, 2000:36). The challenge to this 
monarchical system occurred against the backdrop of the political changes around 
the world in the aftermath of the Second World War, including independence of India 
from British colonisation (Parajulee, 2000:179). After this change, however, apolitical 
stalemate remained until the first democratic parliamentary election in 1959.  
 
King Mahendra began his autocracy by dissolving the first ever-elected government 
on 15 December 1960, declaring the party less Panchayat political system 
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(Hachhethu, 2011).2This regime continued for almost 30 years, also undermining the 
people’s rights by, for instance, restricting political freedom, and implementing a 
unitary single language, single religion and single culture assimilation policy, which 
denied the linguistic and ethnic diversity and promoted exclusion by caste, gender, 
and region (Lawoti, 2007:9). The growing inequality induced underground political 
parties to protest against the Panchayat system. As a result, a referendum was held 
to choose between Panchayat and Multi-Party Democracy in 1980 (Khanal, 2007). 
The referendum retained the Panchayat system though it did not last long. The 
tyrannical reign was overthrown by the peaceful citizen protest in 1990, which 
reinstated democracy in Nepal.  
 
The reinstatement of democracy in 1990 was one of the major political changes in 
Nepal. It established multi-party democracy and ushered in a new era, as well as 
raising hopes for change and development (Parajulee, 2000:75). The formal 
establishment of democracy provided a platform for an emerging social justice 
movement, which in turn expanded the space for excluded groups like Dalit, 
Indigenous nationalities, Madhesi and Women to find a political voice (Lawoti, 
2007:2). Regrettably, the political leaders were heavily involved in power politics and 
corruption and despite their protests; the issues of the marginalised and local 
development were not a specific priority.  
                                                          
2Panchayat is a political system without parties in which the people could elect their representatives, while real 
power remained in the hands of the monarch. 
44 
 
 
The new democratic government did not fulfil People's expectations for change 
(Hachhthu, 2011:71; Baral, 2011:50; Lawoti, 2007:10). People were frustrated by the 
increasing political instability, lack of good governance and inequality in this period. 
Not a single party managed to sustain a government throughout its five-year term 
(Hachhethu, 2011). The intra-party feuds led to the collapse of the majority 
government and governments were charged with corruption, exclusion of 
marginalised groups, lack of good governance and underdevelopment (Baral, 2011).  
 
Increasing corruption, discrimination, and political instability were key factors 
leading to an insurgency by the revolutionary communist party, known as the 
Maoists, in February 1996 (Onesto, 2007:120). The Maoists also raised systematic 
exclusion of marginalised communities as one of the key issues of their demands, and 
these issues gained some public sympathy in both the pre- and post-insurgency 
periods. Over-centralization of politics also contributed to the emergence and growth 
of the Maoist insurgency (Lawoti, 2007). ̔Over centralization had political salience 
because it relates to the centralised and hegemonic state structure, domination of a 
few central leaders, power remaining in the hands of a small group of political elites 
(Brahmin and Chhetri) and exclusion of marginalised people̕ (Onesto, 2007:122). 
Within five or six years of its armed struggle, the Maoists had won significant popular 
support and gained control of much of the countryside (Ibid).  
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The government of Nepal attempted to resolve the conflict provoked by the Maoist 
insurgency through peaceful dialogues, but on various occasions, this failed (Upreti, 
2006:45) and the insurgency rapidly expanded all over the country, impacting the 
socio-economic and political development of Nepal. In the end, the Maoist insurgency 
claimed the life of thirteen thousand people, destroyed physical infrastructure, 
caused mass internal migration and disappearances and devastated the lives of 
thousands of people during the ten years of its insurgency (Upreti et al., 2010). 
 
Nevertheless, the Maoist insurgency provoked a significant political transition. In 
October 2002, King Gyanendra dismissed the Deuba government and appointed 
Lokendra Bahadur Chand as Prime Minister, who initiated peace talks with the 
Maoists. Following the failure of the initial peace negotiations, there was a further 
change of Prime Minister to Surya Bahadur Thapa, and again to Prime Minister Sher 
Bahadur Deuba in mid-2004, but none of these governments managed to resolve 
(Upreti, 2006: 46). In 2005, King Gyanendra took over the government by dissolving 
the democratically elected Prime Ministership (Hachhethu, 2011:1). This was hardly 
a solution to the deeper problems. Indeed, within the overall political ecology of 
Nepal, the monarchy had always been perceived as one of the key causes of repression 
and underdevelopment (Bill, 2015). Moreover, the royal coup against democracy in 
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2005 itself became a key catalyst for protests against the continued rule of the 
monarchy. 
 
In 2006, a citizen protest and significant street demonstrations broke out, backed by 
a seven party alliance, consisting of the main political parties including the Maoists, 
forcing King Gyanendra to step down from his direct rule (Hachhethu, 2011:76). The 
reinstated parliament and the government led by Girija Prasad Koirala initiated 
peace talks with the Maoists, and on21 November 2006 formally signed the 
Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), ending the ten years long insurgency in Nepal 
(Einsiedel et al., 2012:2). The CPA laid the foundation for the socio-economic and 
political reforms that were to follow, including the adoption of a policy of social and 
political inclusion, the enforcement of an interim constitution, the establishment of a 
Constituent Assembly (CA), and commitments to state restructuring (Hachhethu, 
2011:2). Particularly important here was the interim constitution of Nepal, which set 
out progressive provisions for social transformation and formed the basis for the 
election of the CA in April 2008, delivering the first ever historically inclusive 
assembly. Among other several landmark policy decisions, the first meeting of the CA 
on 28 May 2008 decided to abolish the 237 years long monarchy formally and 
instituted a Republican system (Hachhethu, 2011:73). The process of reform 
continued to prove difficult though, and first CA failed to agree upon a new 
constitution as per its mandate. In 2013, a second Constituent Assembly also tasked 
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with writing and adopting a constitution was elected, and after two years of political 
wrangling, on20 September 2015, it promulgated the new Constitution.  
 
2.4. Key Legal Reforms for Dalit Rights 
Although the situation of Dalit remains highly problematic and inequality remains 
trenchant, there has been a history of at least some formal legal reform. Legal reforms 
began with anew civil code in 1963, outlawing caste discrimination and 
untouchability. By this Act, King Mahendra amended the old country code of 1854 
and introduced a new country code (Kisan, 2005; Bhattachan et al., 2008; Ahuti, 
2010). Despite this momentous formal change, the implementation of the law was not 
effective (Bhattachan et al., 2008:61). 
 
Further legal instruments in this journey include the Constitutions of Nepal—1990, 
2007, and 2015.The 1990 Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal included the first 
constitutional provision that abolished caste discrimination. The Interim 
Constitution of Nepal, 2007 also included several positive provisions directly or 
indirectly addressing issues of concern to Dalit. By this constitutional spirit, the 
Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability Prohibition Act, 2011was introduced 
and explicitly declared caste discrimination as a criminal offence and prohibited all 
forms of discriminatory practices. The latest effort on this legal road to abolishing 
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caste discrimination was a declaration of the new Constitution of Nepal, 2015. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, recent developments in anti-caste discrimination law have 
led to a strengthening of the sanctions against discrimination. In addition to domestic 
laws, Nepal has ratified a number of international human rights instruments, 
including the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD), 1965, which are relevant for Dalit and marginalised groups. Article 2 of 
ICERD, for example, specifically obligates state parties to eliminate all forms of racial 
discrimination.  
 
Beyond the promulgation of formal laws to address discriminatory behaviour, 
particularly after 1990, governments have taken some initiative to use the law as an 
instrument to change the socio-economic, education and the political situation of 
Dalit. Among them are affirmative action policies in the public service, army and 
police administration and the abolition of bonded labour (Haliya). In the education 
sector, the latest amendment to the Education Act, 1971, is another initiative, which 
enshrines the rights of free school education for Dalit students. The government’s 
three-year national plans guiding social and economic development in Nepal have 
also prioritised the inclusion of Dalit as part of national development. In the political 
sphere, the election of Members of Constituent Assembly Act, 2007, specifically 
addresses the representation of Dalit and other marginalised groups in Nepal.  
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Although positive, the above-mentioned legal provisions are in fact mostly confined 
to paper and are hardly put into practice (Bhattachan et al., 2008). What we see in 
practice is the absence of a comprehensive action plan and appropriate methods for 
the implementation of policies. The implementation of comprehensive and practical 
policies and practices remains the main hurdle to inclusive, sustainable development. 
Moreover, law enforcement mechanisms are not proactive in preventing caste-based 
discrimination.  
 
3. The aims of this research 
It is against this background that the current research takes place. As I will discuss 
at greater length in the next chapter, although the caste system and Dalit situation 
has been well studied in India, there has been less research on the social injustice 
experienced by Dalit in Nepal. Within the literature relating to Nepal, the caste 
system and practices of untouchability were not the objects of significant academic 
research until the 1990s, arguably then driven by political change. Where research 
has occurred, it has rarely been guided by Dalit themselves and has not adequately 
captured the voices of Dalit. Dalit scholars have mainly focused their research on 
Dalit identity and the discourse of federalism, but without the broad context of 
historical and persistent patterns of injustice.  
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The political transformations that have been underway in recent years, including 
state restructuring processes, have been perceived by many as the principal means 
for eliminating all forms of injustice, including against Dalit, Women and other 
minority groups (Khanal, 2007). For Dalit, the primary concern has been to influence 
issues to eliminate the injustices they suffer and establish their equal rights in a 
changing political context. 
 
Accordingly, the core aim of this research is to work out the types of institutional 
measures that would be required to achieve social justice for Dalit in Nepal. To 
achieve this overall objective, the thesis aims to understand the underlying causes 
and nature of injustices against Dalit. It will also analyse contemporary political 
transformations, including state restructuring and federalism processes with a view 
to making specific findings on the required institutional reform measures. 
 
The principal research question is: ‘What institutional reforms would achieve social 
justice for Dalit in Nepal?’ Within this large question, sub-questions include the 
following: 
a) What are the Dalit experiences of injustices and their struggles for 
justice?   
b) What State legal and institutional responses would be required to 
address Dalit injustices?  
c) What are some strategic ways forward for Dalit justice?  
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In line with my aim of ensuring the inclusion of Dalit voices, an in-depth 
phenomenological interview method has been employed to understand the deeply 
rooted caste-based discrimination and experiences of Dalit. Apart from interviews, 
secondary literature has been extensively used to substantiate the arguments. The 
details of the research methodology are discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
The key significance of this research is to provide a comprehensive picture of Dalits’ 
multi-dimensional exclusion, richly informed by what Dalit themselves say. Another 
key importance of this research is to evaluate current reform efforts from the 
perspectives of Dalit and to generate key policy recommendations. The findings on 
Dalit inequality should supplement and inform the contemporary restructuring 
process in Nepal. This study also arms Dalit and policy reformers with information 
and vision.  
 
4. Thesis outline 
Chapter One introduces the overall thesis, background of the research such as caste 
system, Dalit, history of political changes and key legal reforms for Dalit in Nepal. 
This also outlines the key aims and research questions including the                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
significance of the research.  
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Chapter Two provides a review of the literature, principally focusing on research 
concerning caste stratification, the types of discrimination faced by Dalit and 
institutional reform processes in Nepal. Prominent studies on caste in India are 
reviewed to provide some background to the main discourse on caste in the South 
Asian context. I draw two key conclusions from this literature review. First, there has 
been a relative neglect of the voices of Dalit themselves, including Dalit scholars. 
Second, the analyses of contemporary reforms have not been sufficiently located 
against the background of a discussion of the types of injustices faced by Dalit or 
theorised regarding social justice.  
 
The research methods employed in this study are described in Chapter Three. This 
chapter outlines the participatory and advocacy philosophical worldview that 
underpins the research and discusses how phenomenological interviews were used. 
The details of research sites and participant selection are included in this chapter. I 
also discuss data coding and analysis, research ethics, and the research limitations.  
 
The theoretical framework that informs this study is elaborated in Chapter Four. The 
chapter examines classical liberal conceptions of justice and their emphasis on 
equality of opportunity and individual freedom and then analyses such approaches 
through a discussion of structural injustice. Drawing on Nancy Fraser's (2003) theory 
of redistribution and recognition for contemporary social justice, as well as Iris 
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Marion Young's (1990) politics of difference, I consider the importance of examining 
the structures and meanings that underline injustice. The chapter also considers 
debates concerning group and collective rights and identity politics. Some of the policy 
interventions that have been developed in response to calls for structural theories of 
injustice, such as affirmative action and political representation are also described. 
The chapter concludes that attention to individual rights is not sufficient to address 
the structural injustice, and an approach that attends to group rights will be 
necessary for rectifying the injustices faced by marginalised groups.  
 
Chapter Five documents the different dimensions of the deeply entrenched social, 
economic, education and political inequality manifested in the life cycle of Dalit in 
Nepal. The first section of this chapter outlines caste-based discrimination and 
untouchability practices and their impact on Dalit in the socio-economic, education 
and political sectors. Practices of untouchability penetrate public and private spheres 
restricting Dalit from accessing public taps, temples, schools and other resources. 
Different forms of bonded labour including the Balighare, Haruwa, Charuwa systems 
imposed on Dalit are detailed in this chapter. Finally, the chapter focuses on political 
exclusion and how this contributes to the entrenchment of injustice in Nepal.  
 
Chapter Six provides a historical survey of Dalit social and political movements. 
Here, I explore how the Dalit movement emerged and developed, and I trace the 
54 
 
impediments to this movement's achieving its goals. This chapter shows that Dalit 
movements are as old as the broader democratic political movement in Nepal, 
however, Dalit have not made substantial achievements, and have failed to 
annihilate the caste system and practices of discrimination and untouchability. The 
survey of the Dalit struggle for justice tracks how initially fragmented initiatives 
later became a united Dalit movement. Nevertheless, differences in caste line and 
political ideologies among Dalit have negatively affected the joint effort and struggle 
for Dalit justice in Nepal.  
 
The last substantive chapter, Chapter Seven, is an overview of institutional reforms 
addressing inequality through political change in Nepal.  Here I discuss the basic 
principles concerning the formation of federal units and various proposals of the 
Constituent Assembly as well as some of the dissenting Dalit rights proposals. 
Different models for federalism, including Dalit identity-based models, proposed by 
different experts, are described in detail. The chapter then considers debates 
concerning the improvement of Dalit inclusion and representation in state 
mechanisms and policies.  
 
The Conclusion brings together the key findings and arguments of the research. I 
conclude that efforts to eradicate caste discrimination have largely failed due to the 
unresponsiveness of state mechanisms and the internal divisions and weakness of 
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Dalit movements. Although Dalit persistent efforts to bring reform to the70-yearlong 
social movement have brought some changes, these are far from sufficient. Social 
justice will only be achieved through multi-dimensional institutional reforms that 
attend to formal and informal institutional rules and practices along the dimensions 
of distribution and recognition. 
 
We are now living in a modern scientific age guided by technology and innovation; at 
the same time though parts of the world are still beset by age old stereotypes, a caste-
based social order and discrimination as we see in Nepal. Given how irrational, 
unlawful and condemnable such systems are, this research aims to expose the human 
cries of those who experience caste-based violations, to build the solidarity required 
to annihilate caste discrimination and to create peaceful, just and equitable societies. 
The thesis is inspired by the commitment to the dream of equality being fulfilled for 
the millions of caste affected untouchable Dalit people of Nepal and other parts of the 
world.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines a range of scholarly debates on the caste system, Dalit identity 
and Dalit resistance and efforts to combat injustice with a specific focus on Nepal. A 
review of the relevant material, by both Nepalese and international scholars, reveals 
certain gaps in the research and literature. My research specifically seeks to 
supplement existing research by considering the multi-dimensional nature of the 
injustices experienced by Dalit in Nepal and, against this background, analysing the 
suitability of the institutional reform strategies that have been proposed to deal this 
persistent problem. A further gap is a scholarship from Dalit themselves, researching 
their communities and in their situation. As those who have lived experiences can 
bring a nuanced, complex, textured phenomenological understanding that is likely 
missing from the work of others precisely because of the—Dalit in this case—are 
closest to the injustices.  
 
Similarly, existing research lacks phenomenological empirical research that captures 
Dalit voices and their first person experiences of injustice and views about reform. 
While there exists a significant body of research on Dalit, much of it remains 
fragmented because of the focus on distinctive issues, ranging from cultural and 
biographical research to research on Dalit identity formation. Existing research does 
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not explicitly explore the broad institutional measures that would address social 
justice for Dalit in Nepal. Drawing on existing research, this study then seeks to bring 
phenomenological research to explore the underlying causes of injustice, and on this 
basis assess what types of institutional reforms would be required to ensure 
sustainable social justice for Dalit in Nepal.  
 
This chapter is organised into four sections that deal with different themes of 
scholarly research on Dalit. First, I consider literature on caste hegemony and how 
caste is related to the social stratification in South Asia. Second, I look at the 
literature on Dalit inequality and discrimination. Here I include both scholarly 
literature and policy research conducted by a range of other organisations. In the 
third section, Dalit identity and resistance are reviewed. The fourth section 
highlights the existing studies on political reforms in Nepal that have considered the 
Dalit issues during state restructuring and federalism debates in Nepal. 
 
2.2. Studies on the Caste Hegemony and Dalit 
This section examines the literature on caste hegemony of South Asia generally and 
Nepal specifically. As the literature on caste is vast, I focus here in particular on 
research that has considered how caste works to stratify South Asian societies.  
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The caste system and practices of discrimination are intertwined in South Asia, and 
have been deeply entrenched into Nepali society (Ahuti, 2010). The origins of caste 
stratification and discrimination in South Asia were as early as three thousand years 
ago (Ahuti, 2010:10). The principle of purity and impurity continue to prevail within 
the context of the caste system with a profound impact on those at the lowest rungs, 
especially Dalit who have historically been considered as ‘untouchables’ (Bhattachan 
et al., 2008:14). While the study of caste in India has been extensive, social issues 
arising from caste discrimination and the untouchability of Dalit in Nepal has drawn 
only limited academic attention from national and international scholars, and indeed 
only a few Dalit scholars such as Ahuti’s writing in 2010and Kisan who published in 
2005. Here, I include a brief discussion of research on the caste system in India and 
then move to look at work that has focused on caste and Dalit in Nepal.  
 
As noted, given the extensive literature on caste in India, this review focuses on 
literature that has demonstrated how caste stratifies South Asian societies. While 
scholars have used a broad range of political, social and historical lenses to 
understand and interpret the caste system, and have had differing emphases and 
drawn particular conclusions about caste, there is universal agreement that caste 
functions as a principal form of social stratification and hierarchy in the society. In 
his sociological study of the caste system within India, Dumont (1970), demonstrates 
how the caste hierarchy principle divides different castes or social groups and places 
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them at certain levels within the hierarchy, placing Dalit at the lowest rank. His work 
indicates how inimical the presence of caste as a form of social organisation is to 
principles of democracy and social justice. Thus, he argues that the ‘principle of 
equality and hierarchy is a contrasting form of social and political life’ (Dumount, 
1970:3). In an anthropological study, drawing on interviews and observations, 
principally conducted in Uttar Pradesh (North India), Harold (1987) explored the 
origin of the caste system. He confirmed the origins of caste as a Hindu cultural 
system and was interested in how this stratification operated in a complex pre-
industrial society. Despite its Hindu origins, Harold’s which relates to the 
‘occupationalisation’ of the sacred order of caste system and social stratification in 
pre-industrial India. This research is a primarily anthropological study in North 
India mainly in Uttar Pradesh.  This research is based on interviews and 
observation in this location. This finds that the caste system as a cultural 
phenomenon which is typically Hindu social system. This also depicts the nature of 
Indian stratified and complex pre-industrial society. His research also revealed that 
caste stratification had been practised across other religious and cultural groups, 
such as Muslims.  
 
Beteille (1996), who argues that caste, class, and power are interwoven, with caste 
and class embodying the distribution of power, has drawn similar findings. In his 
research in the Tanjore District in India, he found that the caste structure divides 
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the population into groups who have highly unequal status. Specifically, caste is a 
determining factor for settlement patterns, with Brahmin segregated from members 
of other castes and Dalit are located in neglected geographical areas (Beteille, 
1996:3). Also emphasising the pervasiveness of caste, Omvedt (1994) characterises 
the ‘caste system as consisting of fragmented and unarticulated rules of behaviour 
employed to maintain hegemony in the society’ (1994:21), creating inequality, 
injustice and precluding equal opportunity. 
 
Other studies demonstrate the interaction between socioeconomic systems and caste, 
and how social and economic institutions reproduce caste hierarchies (Morton, 1980; 
Thimmaiah, 1993). Morton (1980) argues that the caste system is a by-product of the 
socioeconomic system intended to maintain differential access to resources and 
opportunities. Taking a historical lens, he concludes that ‘the emergence of caste 
structure should be traced back in history to when the technique and rewards of 
agriculture production became available to the population in South Asia’ (Morton, 
1980:187). Arguing that this pattern of labour distribution and rewards then shape 
caste, he further characterised caste as ‘social layers of classes characterised by 
status differences’ in the economic system (Morton, 1980:162). Such scholars thus 
contend that caste structure sustains differences between social groups in the overall 
system of production and serves broader economic functions. To the extent that this 
is the case, caste as a principle of social organisation can be seen to present a serious 
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impediment to economic and social reforms based on equality of opportunity, equal 
access or social and economic rights.  
 
As distinct from the extensive research on caste in India, there is relatively little 
research on the caste system in Nepal. Within the literature relating to Nepal, the 
caste system and the social and political implications of the practices of 
untouchability were not a central focus of academic research until the 1990s. Before 
this period, the principal focus was on the cultural life of Dalit, as well as biographical 
research (principally anthropological) focusing on specific Dalit castes in Nepal. The 
shift that we saw around this period was arguably driven by the political transition 
to democracy that took place in the 1990s.  
 
Typifying earlier research, Hofer (1976) for example explores the ethnography of the 
Kami caste of Dalit people. His work focuses particularly on their social position, 
lifestyle and their participation in sociocultural practices in the villages of the 
Sindhupalchowk district of Nepal.  Despite his primarily cultural focus, Hofer does 
articulate the hierarchical nature of the caste system and how caste maintains Kami 
at the lowest position of the hierarchy within the Nepali caste system. He argues, for 
example, that the exclusion of Kami from a range of social practices such as 
discrimination in cultural functions is mainly due to their caste status (Hofer, 
1976:354).  
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Another early cultural study focuses on auspicious music in changing society. The 
Damai Musicians of Nepal (Tingey, 1994) is an ethnographical study that explores 
the sociocultural dimension of Damai musicians. This research examines Damai 
music as a form of entertainment and a significant aspect of Nepali culture. Again, 
however, this apparently ‘cultural’ focus nevertheless has importance for this study. 
It provides a vivid example of how different categories of traditional activity and 
employment are rigidly allocated across caste. In this case, Damai historically 
inherits and are compelled to continue a particular activity, despite pervasive 
discrimination and unequal wages attracted by this occupation. As I will argue in 
Chapter Five, the tight hold that associates particular Dalit sub-castes with low 
paying occupations continues to impede their economic and social progress.  
 
Other scholars, Bech (1975) and Weisethaunet (1998), have studied the Gaine caste 
of Nepal. Both have explored a comprehensive account of the music and status of 
theGaine caste, who are portrayed as beggars in Nepal. In her study Nepal: The 
Gaine Caste of Beggar-Musicians, Bech (1975) depicts the older Gaine as survivors 
who identify as the professional musicians in Nepal. The Gaine view of life is strongly 
religious, and the art of music is connected with their religion. Similarly, 
Weisethaunet (1998) studied the performance of the everyday life of Gaines of Nepal 
by exploring the life, songs, and stories of Gaine from rural and urban areas. He found 
that despite playing a prominent role in folk songs and music, Gaines is left relatively 
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unexplored by scholars. His study depicts the hardship of life for Gaines themselves 
although they make songs of pain and sorrow of soldiers and other tragic events.  
  
Beyond the ethnographic cultural research, relations between Dalit and other castes 
and specific forms of discrimination faced by Dalit have been the main areas of 
research (see Cameron, 1998; Caplan, 1972; Borgstrom, 1980; Adhikari, 2011). 
Cameron (1998) is an example of a scholar examining caste and gender in complex 
hierarchical cultural relationships in the village of Bhalara in far western Nepal. She 
offers a comprehensive profile—often remarkably absent from ethnographic 
research—of the lives of people of lower caste throughout the remote western villages 
of Nepal. She proposes that explanations of social structures may vary between castes 
and between men and women, despite a commonly practised hierarchy (Cameron, 
1998:159). This research shows the connections between caste hierarchy and gender 
relations. It reveals that lower caste women are more vulnerable and their rights are 
undermined in the unequal caste hierarchical relationships. She illustrates that 
there is the difference between high caste and low caste families regarding land 
ownership, family, and work relations. Other studies such as those by Caplan (1972) 
and Borgstrom (1980) have focused on inter-caste relationships in rural villages of 
Nepal. Both scholars examine the relationship between high and low caste in the 
context of political and economic shifts.  
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The reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s brought substantial shifts in the focus 
of research on caste and Dalit issues. During this period, pioneering research on the 
Varna (caste) system and manifestations of caste in Nepal were undertaken by the 
Dalit scholar Ahuti (2010). This comprehensive study covers the history of caste, 
including the original Varna system, then moving forward to an analysis of socio-
economic developments and the political rights of Dalit.  Furthermore, the socio-
economic, educational and political problems of Dalit together with proposed 
solutions are outlined. Ahuti (Ibid) looks in detail at how untouchability is practised 
in Nepali society mentioning the caste practices in the Hill regions, Tarai regions and 
within the Newar community which is all different to each other.  
 
The study examines contemporary debates on Dalit rights such as social, economic, 
education and political rights, considers the options for Dalit empowerment and the 
eradication of discrimination. It also analyses some of the gaps and failures of Dalit 
social movements and divisions by caste and political ideology. This scholarly work is 
a leading contemporary Dalit academic study that has had a significant influence on 
the strategy of Dalit social and political movements.  Unambiguously categorising 
and including the evolution of the Varna system and caste discrimination in South 
Asia and Nepal, Ahuti asserts that ‘caste discrimination and class division have been 
deeply entrenched in the Nepali society as the form of historical fixity of social 
position and limits to any social mobility, and Dalit requires special rights for their 
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justice’ (Ahuti, 2010:20). Despite missing empirical facts in some sections, this work 
has been a reliable tool for Dalit advocacy in Nepal. For the first time in Nepalese 
history, the work of a Dalit scholar, Ahuti (2010) is incorporated in the sociology 
curricula of Tribhuvan University. Ahuti’s work is close to my project, and what I 
seek to do in this research is to update and supplement his research with a 
phenomenological perspective, and an analysis of the multidimensional nature of 
discrimination. Also, whereas Ahuti’s research lacks a specific theoretical framework 
concerning social justice, my work draws on contemporary social justice theory, in 
particular, emphasising structural understandings, the importance of group or 
collective rights and the need to combine recognition and redistribution to achieve 
social justice for historically disadvantaged groups.  
 
2.3. Studies on Dalit Inequality and Discrimination 
This section provides an overview of some of the studies related to Dalit inequality, 
injustice and efforts to eradicate such injustice in Nepal. The relevant literature on 
caste discrimination contributed by both Dalit and non-Dalit scholars, as well as the 
contributions of some non-government organisations are discussed here (see Koirala, 
1996; Dahal et al., 2002; Gurung, 2005, Bhattachan etal., 2008; Pyakurel, 2010). 
 
A small number of non-Dalit scholars within Nepal are also contributing to research 
on Nepali Dalit inequality themes, focusing in general on specific aspects of 
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discrimination. One of the non-Dalit scholar, Koirala (1996) studied schooling and 
Dalit in Nepal. Motivated by the widespread exclusion of Dalit from education in that 
particular period, the 1990s, this study explored the relationship between caste and 
education. Koirala studied the educational experiences of Dalit in the Bunkot village 
of Nepal. Through participant observation, individual and group interviews and 
discussion, the collection of life histories, and community surveys, he sought to build 
a detailed picture of educational experiences of Dalit. He found that schooling was 
beneficial as a way of enabling Dalit to understand their situation and question the 
status quo, but there are social and economic barriers for Dalit leading to their 
continued exclusion from schooling. He concludes that the existing school system does 
not significantly assist Dalit and that to do so, it would require substantial reform. 
Nevertheless, his study affirmed that where Dalit did have access to education, 
‘schooling began to ensure social mobility, economic betterment and other social 
awareness against discrimination’ (Koirala, 1996:55).  
 
Another non-Dalit scholar, Gurung (2005), has taken a broader focus on the overall 
situation of Dalit in Nepal, including an inventory of the nature of caste and its 
history. This study details the demography of Dalit and considers existing caste 
discrimination as well as efforts undertaken to eliminate it. Gurung's study considers 
the importance of having anti-caste discrimination law included in the Civil Code 
(Muluki Ain) and the impact of such laws on Dalit experiences in Nepal. Gurung 
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argues, however, that anti-discrimination laws are not sufficient, and that positive 
interventions such as affirmative action are required claiming that ‘since Dalit are 
unable to compete economically and politically due to social exclusion, constitutional 
provisions about equality of opportunity remains a mere rhetoric’ (Gurung, 2005:17).  
 
Also, attending to the expressions of caste discrimination, Bhattachan et al., (2008) 
have explored the forms of discrimination and untouchability comprehensively. The 
research includes people from eighteen Dalit sub-castes from seven districts. 
Employing a range of qualitative research methodologies, the study reviews the 
situation of Dalit and explores the different manifestations of caste-based 
discrimination. Their findings show 205 forms of caste discrimination of Dalit in 
Nepal that includes social, economic, education and political forms of discrimination. 
While this study is in many ways comprehensive, it lacks attention to the different 
experiences of discrimination within the twenty-six extant sub-caste groups of Dalit. 
This is relevant since there exist an internal caste hierarchy and practices of 
discrimination within those twenty-six Dalit groups. At the same time, this study 
insists on the importance of a unified and effective effort from all stakeholders, 
including different parts of Dalit civil society, working in cooperation with state 
actors and international organisations to eliminate discrimination in Nepal.  
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Guneratne (2010) examined the contemporary situation of Dalit in Nepal. Based on 
his research, he concluded that through its failure to counter systematic 
discrimination, Nepal is ‘wasting Dalit human resources, keeping them poor and 
uneducated and the political willpower to change the condition of Dalit is weak’ 
(2010:1). Amongst the factors, he identifies as contributing to this situation is caste 
hegemonic institutional structures, the difficulty that Dalit faces in accessing legal 
protections and institutional biases in the enforcement of the law. These combine to 
keep Dalit poor, powerless and uneducated.  
 
In a research report prepared by the Government of Nepal as part of an effort to 
create a national strategy for Dalit upliftment, Dahal et al., (2002) examined the 
situation of Dalit in Nepal and recommended a range of strategic programs such as 
educational scholarships, awareness raising of caste-based discrimination and 
modernization of Dalit traditional occupations. This research is important as it was 
conducted when the issue of Dalit inclusion was gradually gaining prominence, in the 
context of the changed political context following political activism during the 1990s. 
This report fleshes out the unequal social conditions Dalit face due to caste 
discrimination, illiteracy and poverty. The disadvantages and deficits Dalit face 
extend to their poor health and the complete absence of political representation. The 
report also briefly argued that the term Dalit is less sensitive than the term 
‘untouchable’ in Nepal. In a similar vein, Pyakurel (2010) analyses the situation of 
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Dalit concerning their unequal socio-economic, educational and political status, as 
well as examining the efforts that Dalit have made to address persistent 
discrimination in the changing political context. This paper also considers the major 
demands of Dalit in constitution making processes such as needing anti-caste 
discrimination provisions, affirmative action and proportional representation of Dalit 
in Nepal. The concluding recommendation is that Dalit needs special rights to be 
recognised by the constitution of Nepal considering their situation. 
 
The academic literature reviewed above has been supplemented by studies and 
publications from various non-governmental organisations, seeking to understand 
the Dalit problem and possible canvass solutions. Through working papers, position 
papers, policy papers and media publications various NGOs have contributed to 
raising awareness about the injustices faced by Dalit, and their work has frequently 
been taken up by Dalit as a tool for advocacy. Relevant publications on Dalit 
inequality and discrimination in this category include the Feminist Dalit 
Organisation’s (FEDO), Dalit in Nepal (2005) and Dalit access in public resources 
(2012), as well as the; Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organisation's (NNDSWO) 
Human Rights Situation of Dalit (2011).  
 
Examining the vicious cycle of non-representation, Electoral System and Dalit 
Representation in Nepal, (2011), is a policy paper published by the Samata 
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Foundation that explores Dalit inequality and their exclusion from political 
representation in Nepal. Focusing on the electoral system, this study provides an 
account of Dalit representation as well as offering recommendations for policy 
development, including details of Dalit political representation. It has mainly 
described the recent changes in electoral policies and their impact on Dalit 
representation. Although this paper covers the reality of Dalit non-representation, 
the research lacks primary empirical data.  
 
The Human Rights Situation of Dalit of Nepal, 2011, is a publication of NNDSWO 
that has explored human rights violations against Dalit in contemporary Nepali 
society. This report highlights four forms of human rights violation and 
discrimination: abuse (physical and verbal); segregation and domination (denial, 
restriction, displacement, rape, false accusation, inter-caste marriage); forced labour 
(social boycott, physical attack, arson, attempt to murder); and atrocities plus 
extermination (homicide, suicide) (NNDSWO, 2011:21).It found that despite legal 
provisions, Nepal has not been able to effectively protect and promote the rights of 
the Dalit community. Nevertheless, it insists that there need to be a continued effort 
to document human rights violations, and the Dalit situation, to track the 
implementation of anti-caste discrimination legal provisions.  
 
71 
 
Dalits in Nepal: Issues and Challenges (2002) is a collection of thematic articles 
related to the Dalit context in Nepal published by the Feminist Dalit Organisation 
(FEDO). Published also in English, this report has specifically sought to draw 
international attention to the situation of Dalit and to raise international awareness 
about issues faced by this group. This book includes material examining the Dalit 
situation of caste discrimination, education, political and empowerment aspects 
written by different Dalit and non-Dalit scholars. Additionally, FEDO (2012) studied 
how well Dalit have access to public and government services.  Based on a household 
survey conducted in four districts (Lalitpur, Kavre, Dhanusha and Bajura) with 600 
households, the research demonstrated the importance of Dalit participation for the 
successful implementation of targeted public service programs. It suggests that 
government service delivery needs to become more focused to reach Dalit effectively 
and that to achieve this, a greater level of awareness will be necessary.  
 
Dalit issues in Constitution: Struggle and Achievement (Sambidhansabhama Dalit 
Mudda: Sangharsha Ra Upalabdhi), is among the series of publications of the 
SAMATA foundation, and was one of the books setting out Dalit agendas that were 
raised and discussed during the first and second constitutional assemblies. This book 
has mainly raised the Dalit struggle for ensuring their rights in the constitution. 
There are accounts of Dalit issues guaranteed by the constitution as well as various 
issues such as additional compensation on Dalit political representation, Dalit 
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reserved seats for election, full proportional representation are not included during 
constitutional drafting process. It has made effort to accumulate information about 
Dalit struggle and their contribution in the lengthy debates and struggles in Nepal 
for the sake of a fair and inclusive constitutional assembly. It includes the 
commitments of leaders from the various political parties regarding a Dalit-friendly 
constitution. It also includes a discussion of the vicissitudes of Nepali politics and 
Dalit movements. This is collection of constitutional efforts made by Dalit leaders but 
it lacks the key concern of Dalit social justice.  
 
The book Affirmative Action and Social inclusion in Nepal: concept, experience and 
utility (Nepalma Sakaaratmak Upaye ra Samajik Samaawesikaran: awadharana, 
aanubhav ra upadeyeta) is written by Dr. Yam Bahadur Kisan and published by 
SAMATA foundation. The first Chapter illustrates the concept of affirmative action 
and social inclusion in Nepal. It has also examines the global experience of 
affirmative action in particular in India and South Africa, which are relevant for 
Nepal. Other remaining chapters reflect the Nepali context like discourses on positive 
discrimination and social inclusion, and the provisions made in Nepalese 
constitutions and laws, etc. The final chapter explains the necessary policies, methods 
and the procedures for its effective implementation. Giving policy directives in 
relation to affirmative action policy, this is a strong tool for policy formation and has 
countered the argument against affirmative action.   
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Everyone Counts: Dalit children and rights to education in Nepal is a report 
published by Save the Children US. This report describes projects in Siraha Nepal 
and their effectiveness in improving education opportunities and success for children 
in excluded Dalit caste groups. This report finds that specific Dalit incentives have 
had little effect in improving the education of Dalit children. It shows that exclusion 
in schools, poverty and their lower social status all perpetuate low school 
participation. The data collected from 27 schools in this district is indicative of the 
status of Dalit children in Nepal.  
Dalits and Labour in Nepal: Discrimination and Forced Labour published in 2005 is 
an important book published by International labour Organisation (ILO). This book 
provides an introduction to the concepts of Dalit and ethnicity in Nepal and focuses 
on the situation of Dalit in the labour force. It has also highlighted the existing legal 
policy framework for Dalit including potential recommendations. One of the 
strengths of this book is that it provides statistical evidence of Dalit in different 
sectors. It has argued that caste-based discrimination is one of the key factor in the 
socio-economical marginalization of Dalit in Nepal. Its strength is its empirical 
research, being based on 1454 household survey in 11 districts of Nepal. The survey 
data has been richly presented in this book; however, it lacks a basic theoretical 
orientation.  
74 
 
Another publication ‘Human Rights Situation of Dalit in Nepal’ is a situation update 
report prepared jointly by Dalit civil society organisations in Nepal. This is the most 
recent publication on Dalit human rights status and was prepared for submission to 
the United Nations, Human Rights Council to set out the condition of Dalit in Nepal. 
This includes the condition of Dalit in socio-economic, educational and political 
spheres and recommends various ways that the Nepal government should take action 
against human rights violation of Dalit. This report has been prepared based on some 
consultative workshops. Although this report covers the recent situation of Dalit, it 
is not clearly empirical research.  
What we can see in this literature is that scholars in Nepal have undertaken thematic 
research primarily on the socioeconomic, educational and political status of Dalit, the 
state of discrimination and the effectiveness of anti-discrimination law and strategies 
to empower Dalit. Caste discrimination remains the key factor causing injustice to 
Dalit in Nepal. This body of research has also found that Dalit needs 
multidimensional strategies and programs for their empowerment and the 
elimination of caste discrimination. The strategies recommended range from 
sensitisation against caste discrimination programs to the reservation in public 
service for Dalit in Nepal. From a methodological point of view, this literatures show 
that there is still a lack of empirical ethnographic and phenomenological research on 
Dalit inequality and discrimination in Nepal. 
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2.4. Studies on Dalit Identity and Struggle 
Beyond studies on Dalit inequality and caste discrimination, Dalit identity has been 
one of the key foci of recent research, particularly in the context of the recent upsurge 
of scholarly interest in identity politics. In the social and political sphere, this upsurge 
marked the moment, sometimes known as the moment of new social movements 
(Offe, 1985), to reclaim repressed identities and rights by social groups like Dalit, 
ethnic, indigenous and other minority groups. In the case of Dalit, there is still 
controversy whether the Dalit Social Movement can be considered a form of identity 
politics or not. There has, however, been no specific empirical research to find out 
whether Dalit movements in Nepal frame their politics around identity claims and if 
so, in what ways. There has also been a little scholarly reflection on whether their 
strategy should frame claims regarding identity or dignity politics, where identity 
politics seeks to reclaim devalued identities, and dignity-based approaches focus on 
eradicating discrimination imposed on the groups like Dalit. While dignity is an 
organising concept for claims concerning equality and justice of Dalit in Nepal, there 
are wider current debates on the politics of reclaiming identity. Such demands framed 
in terms of identity and the assertion of group rights indicates the need for further 
research and study.  
 
Before turning to Dalit identity debates in Nepal, it is worth examining how Dalit 
identity has been researched and understood in India. Several studies on caste and 
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Dalit in India have pointed to the political significance of shifting from the identity 
category of ‘untouchable’ to the category of ‘Dalit’. Scholars (see Muthukkaruppan, 
2014; Muthaiah, 2004; Rao, 2009; Gorringe, 2005) have presented compelling political 
rationales for using the Dalit identity as the basis for political contestation in India. 
Muthukkaruppan (2014) outlines the historical background for how Dalit identity 
has become politicised and taken up as the foundation for political organisation. This 
research argues that the social leader Ambedkar brought the shift in the 
identification of untouchables from ‘broken men’ to ‘Dalit’ as the subject of recognition 
politics. At the same time, it demonstrated that Dalit continued to be identified by 
different labels within broader Hindu society, including outcaste and depressed class. 
Muthukkaruppan nevertheless claims that the political reconstruction of Dalit from 
‘depressed class’ has had political significance for Dalit identity politics.  
 
Similarly, Muthaiah’s (2004) study deals with the Dalit struggle and argues that 
shifting identity to the unifying category of Dalit was a key factor in advancing 
advocacy for this group’s rights. This study also demonstrates the various strategies 
adopted by Dalit to build coalitions with other minority groups (Bahujan) such as 
Scheduled Tribes (STs) and Other Backward Groups (OBCs). These coalitions 
contributed to the capacity of Dalit to successfully demand proportional shares in 
education, employment and politics in India (Muthaiah, 2004). In addition, Rao 
(2009) illuminates how ‘untouchables’ became Dalit in India by presenting a 
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historical and contextual discussion of being (or becoming) Dalit and the 
transformation of identity. She examines strategies utilised by Dalit arguing for their 
rights, which have produced Dalit as a particular political subject. Rao demands Dalit 
social recognition and protection of their rights. Gorringe (2005) demonstrates that 
although the Dalit movement is driven by factionalism and personalism, consistent 
with the character of Indian politics, the term Dalit nevertheless connects the dots 
for their movement (2005:329). This research, focusing on Dalit movements in the 
context of democratisation, provides an in-depth account of the Dalit movement in 
Tamil Nadu. It explores Dalit demands for self-esteem, shares of resources, human 
rights and meaningful political participation.   
 
A number of studies also look at the Dalit Struggle or Dalit Social Movement in the 
Indian context (Guru, 1993; Puspendra, 1999; Rawat, 2013). Guru (1993) argues that 
Dalit protest is significant for Dalit rights because of the conservative Hindu tradition 
with its deep-rooted prejudices against Dalit. Guru claims however that ‘the 
movement is limited to achieving the objectives of advance in socioeconomic, civic and 
political fields within the existing order, without seeking a transformation of that 
society’ (1993:570). Guru also concludes that the Social Sciences must critically 
examine and attempt to study the Dalit movement from below. Some studies have 
also uncovered the shifting political priorities of Dalit in India (Puspendra, 1999; 
Rawat, 2013).  
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Puspendra (1999) has looked at Dalit affiliations with political parties and has traced 
their shifting loyalties. This study argues that the institutions have liberated Dalit 
from the role of the passive voter to actively shifting their traditional party loyalties 
to new parties. It has also shown that lower class Dalit are opting for exclusively 
scheduled caste-based parties to advance their rights (Pushpendra, 1999:2609). This 
shift is principally due to Dalit seeing that mainstream political parties have had 
nothing to offer them beyond traditional ‘loaves and rhetoric’ (Pushpendra, 
1999:1617). Another reason is the constitutional recognition of scheduled caste and 
their identity politics at the local and national level in India. Pushpendra's research 
shows that the popularity of Bahujan Samaj Party led by Dalit is an example of Dalit 
active politics for advancing their rights in India. However, it concludes that even 
though Dalit scheduled castes effort, they are opposed stiff by physically and 
politically in India (Pushpendra, 1999). 
 
Other scholars such as Rawat (2013) have considered how democratic institutions 
have affected the position of Dalit. His essay brightens the historical shades by 
bringing nuance to the current expansion of Dalit of Uttar Pradesh into the Indian 
political mainstream. While extending the argument of the evolution of Dalit identity, 
Rawat (Ibid) brings out the shifting account of caste-based political parties in which 
Ambedkar played a dynamic role as both an organiser and an ideologue.  
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In the Nepali context, despite the wider focus on identity politics recently, there are 
only a few studies that show the importance of Dalit identity and their current 
political efforts to gain political recognition (Cameron, 2007; Folmer, 2007; Pariyar 
and Lovett, 2016). Cameron (2007) demonstrates the importance of both identity 
politics, economic and social reform for justice. She has illuminated the contested 
identity politics of Dalit linking them to the local Dalit agency to resist discriminatory 
structures. Dalit agency as she understands it refers both to Dalit desire for equality 
and power sharing and to the way in which people engage in intercaste economic 
exchange through the Riti Maagney (interdependent farming and artisan) system 
(Cameron, 2007). She finds that the way in which Dalit has mobilised identity 
partially mirrors the discourse of modern identity creation. Consistent with the 
argument that I will make in this study, she argues that as well as identity politics 
and the claims for recognition, battles concerning rights for Dalit have also included 
demands for economic and social justice. The research does not, however, address 
how these demands can be located within broader political reforms and in particular, 
current restructuring processes. 
 
Several researchers (see Folmer, 2007; Pariyar and Lovett, 2016) have explored how 
Dalit have used the Strategy of Anonymity to resist caste-based discrimination at the 
micro level. Anonymity here means concealing one’s actual Dalit surname as a 
strategy to individually advance one’s interests. The Strategy of Anonymity is a 
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process of hiding caste identity as a means of avoiding caste as a form of social and 
economic stratification (Folmer, 2007:50). One question not answered by this 
literature is, even if anonymity can be effective in certain contexts, and for 
individuals, how can it be effective for collective transformation in the long run, in 
the absence of broader challenges to identity. Anonymity can harm Dalit in their 
claims for affirmative policies in the long term. Thus, I argue that the Anonymity 
Strategy is not beneficial for Dalit specifically in the context of identity politics.  
 
The everyday experiences of discrimination and identity formation amongst Dalit 
have been further explored by Pariyar and Lovett (2016). Pariyar and Lovett discuss 
the different processes of identity construction through religion and culture, shared 
social experiences, shared economic and power relation (2016:144). By asserting the 
importance of Dalit unification and acceptance of a common identity, Pariyar and 
Lovett’s research gives us insight into Dalit efforts of identity formation at the local 
level. However, they also find that de-Dalitaisation is a strategy at the local level. De-
Dalitisation, as they define it (Ibid),is a process of excluding oneself from the one 
generalised Dalit group and rather identifying as part of a separate Dalit sub-caste 
group. They argue that this process of some sub-castes of Dalit withdrawing from the 
broad Dalit identity group has broader implications, mainly for affirmative 
programmes, and that this approach is likely to have long-term consequences for 
collective identity, weakening the collective bargaining positions of Dalit (Pariyar and 
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Lovett, 2016:144). Nevertheless, they recognise that despite the challenges posed by 
instances of de-Dalitisation, arising from the historical demotion of the lowest caste 
and a relatively new consciousness, the concept of ‘Dalit’ remains an identity, which 
is in the process of creation (Pariyar and Lovett, 2016).  
 
In Nepal, there has been a persistent struggle by Dalit against caste hegemony, and 
that struggle aims to eliminate the foundation of caste stratification. The implication 
of this struggle regarding Dalit and the significance of identity for Dalit struggles for 
justice has been the subject of only a relatively small body of scholarship (Maharjan 
and Kisan, 2013; Kisan, 2005; Guneratne, 2010). These studies demonstrate the 
importance of Dalit identity for their unification and struggle as well as the history 
of identity formation. Maharjan and Kisan (2013) have documented the key events 
involved in Dalit struggles during the past seventy years. This is the only scholarly 
systematic study of the Dalit struggle, which encapsulates the history of Dalit 
resistance against oppression. The work highlights the effort of the Dalit Struggle, 
with its principal focus being on Temple Entry programs, constituting a form of 
symbolic cultural resistance for equal rights in public space. However, they question 
whether cultural resistance is adequate to achieve substantive social justice in Nepal. 
Different scholars have written separate chapters in this book mainly on historical 
events of caste-based discrimination in public places such as temples, hotels and 
public water taps, including the account of Bhagat Sarbajit who is known to have 
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begun the resistance to Dalit injustices. Sarbajit started the first initiative against 
caste discrimination and the Dalit Struggle to focus on Dalit rights in the constitution 
making process. Additionally, Kisan (2005) has documented Dalit social movements 
in Nepal. He emphasises the history of the evolution of Dalit social-political 
organisation in fighting caste-based discrimination. This account of how Nepali Dalit 
social movements organised into different social groups as far back as1947 under the 
banners of the Tailors Union, Peoples Association and Harijan Association all of 
which later adopted Dalit as a unifying identity.  
 
This body of literature demonstrates Dalit identity as both a key factor for Dalit 
struggle as well as a stigma for Dalit in Nepal. As claimed by Folmer (2007), at the 
local level, some Dalit adopted an anonymity strategy as a way of escaping short-term 
and immediate discrimination. At the same time, Dalit are collectively claiming that 
very identity as the basis for political claims. However, given the lack of 
comprehensive research particularly on the significance of Dalit identity and identity 
politics, it is difficult to assess the value of Dalit identity for advancing a united 
struggle.  
 
2.5. Studies on Political and Institutional Reforms 
The trend of publications on political transformation, mainly focusing on state 
restructuring and federalism, increased dramatically after the political change in 
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2006 in Nepal. As State restructuring and federalism brought important agendas for 
political change, in response, scholars expanded their studies into this area. There 
are several working papers, books and media pieces on federal design, identity 
politics and federalism. However, the federalism discourse has been driven by the 
ethnicization of politics in Nepal, and as such, there remains little academic research 
by non-Dalit scholars specifically into Dalit identity politics and the demands of Dalit 
in the federalism process. However, several non-academic working papers are 
instructive.  
 
The literature on the reform process has primarily focused on state restructuring and 
federalism in Nepal, with the greatest emphasis lying on the federal restructuring 
process and debates surrounding this process (see Baral, 2007; Khanal, 2011; 
Hachhethu, 2011; Anderson, 2007; Singh, 2006). Baral (2007) seeks to lay out a 
detailed argument for why federalism is necessary for Nepal. Highlighting the 
importance of a federal system in Nepal, Baral argues that ‘federalism is a system 
which provides wider access to people in power and resources’ (2007:2). Federalism, 
he argues, is required for restructuring Nepal to address the concerns of diverse 
ethnic groups and to ensure that government becomes genuinely inclusive.  
 
Similarly, Hachhethu (2011) discusses the political transformation, state 
restructuring and constitution building in Nepal. Since the constitution building 
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process represents a key landmark for institutionalising the change made available 
through political transformations, he argues that identity-based state restructuring 
is necessary to address the issues faced by ethnic minorities in Nepal. Khanal (2011) 
also highlighted the need for state restructuring in Nepal, considering the unequal 
pattern of development, historical discrimination and unequal power sharing. Other 
relevant research conducted by Anderson (2007) details the basic principles involved 
in federalism. It covers the meaning, types, functions and current functioning of 
federal states. This research also discusses the demarcation of federal, provincial and 
local governing powers, resources and inter-governmental relations management. 
Singh (2006) has addressed questions concerning state restructuring from the 
Madhesi perspective and argued for the need for a federal system in Nepal to address 
the issues of exploited Madhesi groups.  
 
Some other scholars, predominately from the Dalit community, have put forward 
dissenting opinions on the formation of territorial provinces in the federalism debate 
in Nepal. While the federal structuring in Nepal directly affects everyone, it has 
particularly important implications for the rights of marginalised people including 
Dalit. Here, I note the key debates and return to the larger part of the discussion in 
Chapter Seven.  
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Dalit identity debates within the federalism process have focused on the creation of 
Dalit federal units. Among them, the scholars and activists (Bk, 2012; Nepali, 2012) 
have focused on Dalit territorial units. Some scholars have argued for Dalit federal 
identity-based territorial sub-units to recognise Dalit identity, even though this has 
not been politically endorsed. Contributing to this discourse, Bishwakarma et al., 
(2012) has proposed the possibility of both territorial and non-territorial provinces 
based on Dalit identity. This is a comprehensive analysis of the territorial and non-
territorial model of federalism outlining contemporary discourse and Dalit 
perspectives. Included are discussions of financial development, natural resources 
and reservation concern in the federal system and Dalit concerns. Importantly the 
interests of Dalit women and prerogative political rights for Dalit communities are 
included.  Another scholar (see Pyakurel, 2012) argues that as opposed to Dalit 
identity-based territorial units an alternative proposal for Dalit is non-territorial 
Dalit units. Such scholars make the argument that Dalit identity-based territorial 
units create a long-term untouchable identity.  
 
Another study aimed to explore the possibility of a territorial, or non-territorial, 
federal province for Dalit (BK, 2012). BK argues that ‘Dalit need both non-territorial 
and territorial mechanisms to address the historical problem they face. This further 
demonstrates the requirements of the holistic package for Dalit’ (BK, 2012:119) and 
ranges from making Dalit viable federal units to providing special representation 
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rights. This research presents the data of Dalit in different districts and has served 
as the basis for the formation of a Dalit federal unit.  Considering the particularly 
scattered nature of the issues faced by Dalit, this research also asserts the creation 
of a non-territorial federal mechanism, which can address problems at the national 
level. Similarly, Nepali (2012) also strongly argues for the importance of establishing 
a Dalit territorial, federal mechanism by demonstrating that ‘without recognition of 
Dalit identity, Dalit is not able to achieve their rights and cannot be free from 
exploitation̕ (2012:64). He also claims that Dalit unity is essential for recognition and 
to avoid continuing domination and exploitation by elites (Ibid). A further conclusion 
from the author claims that a territorial federal Dalit unit would be claiming political 
power. Despite being a very provocative study, the lack of primary empirical data to 
support the argument is regrettable.  
 
A range of approaches offers a non-territorial model of federalism. Pyakurel (2012) 
provides a non-territorial federal model for Dalit. Indeed, he strongly argues that 
there is no alternative for Dalit except demanding a non-territorial federal 
mechanism. The main reason behind this claim is that the federalism discourse has 
been dominated by the recognition of ethnic identity that does not relate to Dalit as 
they are geographically dispersed. Among the reasons offered that this model is 
unsuited to Dalit are included: the scattered nature of Dalit settlements, non-
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territorial units provide a particular focus for Dalit, and there is an opportunity for 
Dalit power politics. He argues that  
̔Dalit are spread all over the country, and the federal territorial unit is not 
viable rather non-territorial is most effective. This non-territorial can focus 
only Dalit legislation, and Dalit can exercise power politics since they are 
elected and have equal power as to other members of the territorial province̕ 
(Pyakurel, 2012:75). 
 
 
Despite this is being a strong argument, this alternative was not discussed during 
the constitution making process.  
 
In contrast to the debate of territorial and non-territorial federal units, Kisan (2012) 
proposes local autonomous regions for Dalit. He has highlighted the three most 
important agendas of Dalit communities in federalism as the elimination of caste-
based discrimination and untouchability, issues of Dalit representation, access and 
control of state governance. The Kisan (2012) study reviews the possibility of creating 
a Dalit territorial and non-territorial federal model in Nepal. He argues that creating 
both territorial and non-territorial federal units for Dalit do not serve or solve the 
problem, rather there should be local autonomous regions for Dalit. However, the 
argument of creating local autonomous regions for Dalit was not discussed in the 
constituent assembly. Other proposals are neither for territorial or non-territorial 
federalism, but a mix of both. According to Ahuti (2010), Dalit problems will not be 
solved only by creating territorial or non-territorial units rather Dalit should seek 
multi-dimensional packages including special rights with additional compensation. 
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The core demand of Dalit in the federalism debate, as argued by Ahuti (Ibid), is 
proportionate representation with compensatory provisions and special rights. The 
literature relating to political transformation particularly relies on a proposal for 
designing Dalit federal units that contrast with each other.  
 
There is also a broader literature on other types of institutional reforms, mainly 
focusing on affirmative action debates. Here, one finds a lot more literature on 
reservations and affirmative action in the public sector in India, but in Nepal, there 
is little relevant literature (see Kisan, 2010; Pyakurel, 2011; Deshpande, 2013; 
Galanter, 2011). Kisan (2010), a Dalit scholar, described the principles of affirmative 
action and its advantages for Dalit in Nepal. Through a detailed account of the 
history, principles and modalities of affirmative action, he concludes that the fast 
track approach for the implementation of affirmative action can be effective for Dalit 
inclusion in Nepal. The example of a South African fast track implementation model 
is relevant to consider while implementing the affirmative action. In the fast-track 
approach, targeted programs such as additional training is conducted for the targeted 
groups. Similarly, Pyakurel (2011) argues that the denial of equal access to education, 
jobs and political representation for marginalised groups is an endemic problem 
found in the unequal Nepali society and that to address this issue; affirmative action 
constitutes one of the positive measures to have been introduced in Nepal. He argues 
that caste is the main hurdle to overcome before making Dalit equal to their 
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counterparts. He argues, nevertheless, that affirmative action policies in the form of 
reservations and preferential treatment are necessary but not sufficient in 
annihilating caste’s effects on society (Pyakurel, 2011:77).  
 
A few international scholars such as Despande (2013) and Galanter (2011) have 
researched affirmative action in the context of Dalit. Deshpande’s (2013) policy paper 
focuses on affirmative action in the private sector in India. In Nepal, there is a general 
understanding that affirmative action should only be applied in the public sector, but 
Deshpande’s research has questioned this assumption and highlights the urgency of 
introducing affirmative action policies in the private sector also, as a significant 
number of Dalit are working in the private sector (Deshpande, 2013). As a 
contemporary debate about affirmative action, this research has argued that 
‘affirmative measures in the private sector are necessary to provide access to the 
economy’ (Deshpande, 2013:25). Although this study is purely based in India, as 
noted, there are strong similarities with the situation of Dalit in Nepal. Indeed, this 
research is certainly a new perspective on the discussion of affirmative action in 
private sectors.  Further expanding the debate on affirmative action, Galanter (2011) 
has contributed to thinking about the theoretical aspects of affirmative action— 
mainly considering its assumptions, different choices, and problems—thereby 
providing a conceptual understanding for and of, affirmative action in Nepal while 
exploring its institutional design.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
There has been significant research documenting the impact of caste on access to 
basic rights and how caste stratification impedes social justice. Until the political 
transformations of the 1990s, an important part of the research on Nepal focused on 
the cultural life of Dalit. Nevertheless, research on Dalit in Nepal demonstrates 
significant discrimination and injustice across various dimensions of life, including 
in socioeconomic, educational and political sectors. Research also indicates that in 
India, in particular, the formation of Dalit as a political identity has been necessary 
forthe effective political organisation.  
 
Research on Dalit in Nepal has looked to some degree at how Dalit organised their 
social movements and politically. What is missing in the literature is a comprehensive 
analysis that draws together an empirically grounded multi-dimensional analysis of 
the types of injustices that Dalit faces with an analysis of contemporary institutional 
reform. Also missing is a discussion that considers Dalit experiences against theories 
of social justice. Moreover, there is insufficient scholarship by Dalit themselves that 
provides a rich phenomenological analysis of Dalit experience. To close the gap, as I 
will discuss in the next chapter, this research includes phenomenological interviews 
with Dalit to explore their experiences. Diverse Dalit representatives from 
parliament, political parties, civil society and community provided their insights into 
the caste discrimination, its implications and the required reforms in Nepal. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methods employed in this study to obtain data on the 
underlying causes of structural injustice, institutional bias and barriers experienced 
by Dalit community of Nepal. Included are details of the rationale for the 
methodology, sampling methods, and the strategy for inquiry, interviews and the 
limitations of this methodology. In the first section, I describe the advocacy and 
participation worldview as an underlying approach taken in my primary research. In 
the second section, I review some of the relevant literature on the phenomenological 
interview approach I adopted as my empirical research method. In the final section, 
I discuss the sampling approach, characteristics of participants, research ethics, and 
research limitations. 
 
3.2. Research Approach 
The empirical research for this study has been conducted utilising qualitative 
methods, guided by a‘constructivist’ including‘advocacy and participatory’ worldview’ 
(Creswell, 2009:7). Within the constructivist worldviews, the social constructivist 
worldview is more frequently used in qualitative social science research, and here the 
researcher seeks to understand the worldview of the individual or group with which 
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the research is carried out (Creswell, 2009:8). In this approach, the researcher 
attempts to rely upon the personal meaning of participant experiences. Open-ended 
questions are employed in interviews, and the information is set within a cultural 
and historical context. It is mostly an inductive process to create meaning from the 
data. This constructivist research approach helped to generate meaning from the 
research data.  
 
Creswell describes another worldview in social science research relevant to my study:  
the advocacy and participatory worldview (Creswell, 2009:7-9). This approach 
emerged in the 1980s to fill a gap in existing methods, which often did not prove 
effective in advocating for the agenda of marginalised people. It holds that the 
research should contain ‘an action agenda for reform that may change the lives of the 
participants, the institutions in which individuals live and work, and even the 
researcher's life’ (Creswell, 2009:9). This type of research addresses issues of 
empowerment, inequality, oppression, domination, and alienation, and seeks to 
produce a united voice between the researcher and the research subject for reform 
and change. However, this research has not specifically based on ‘action research’as 
advocacy and participatory research worldview focus on.  
 
The present study on political transformation in Nepal and Dalit inequality and 
justice has been guided by the advocacy and participatory worldview as described by 
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Creswell. As this study has been designed to propose institutional reforms required 
to achieve the social justice of Dalit in Nepal, this approach was the most appropriate. 
As I shall discuss below, consistent with the advocacy and participatory paradigm, I 
have used a qualitative phenomenological research approach to explore the lived 
experiences of Dalit in Nepal. 
 
3.3. Overview of Research Methods 
This study is based on qualitative descriptive types of research design. Descriptive 
types of design help to document and describe the phenomena of interest (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999:33). Many qualitative studies are descriptive and exploratory 
because they build rich descriptions of complex circumstances that are unexplored or 
under-explored in the literature (Ibid). In this study, the combination of a critical 
literature review and phenomenological interviewing allowed me to form a 
substantive analysis of the socio-political context and experiences of Dalit.  
Literature Review 
The literature review, presented in Chapter Two, is an integral part of this research. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the literature review uncovered various gaps in 
understanding the injustice experienced by Dalit in the Nepali context. A particular 
gap was research reflecting the voices of Dalit themselves. The literature review 
utilises an analytic approach known as critical literature review. As Grant and Booth 
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(2009) write, ‘a critical review provides an opportunity to take stock and evaluate 
what is of value from the previous body of work’ (p.93). It aims to establish the broadly 
studied literature and provide a critical perspective on that literature. A useful 
critical review, Grant and Booth continue, presents, analyses and synthesises 
material from diverse sources (Ibid).  Hodges et al. (2008) further argue that ‘the use 
of critical analysis helps to encompass a wider sphere that includes all of the social 
practices, individuals, and institutions that make it possible or legitimate to 
understand phenomena in a particular way’ (p. 570). The use of a critical literature 
review, in this sense, is necessary to find out research gaps and the significance of 
these deficiencies. The critical literature review for this study helped to draw the 
theoretical and methodological gaps in the existing literature, which justify the 
significance of this research.  
 
This study has used both interview data and secondary literature to analyse the 
nature and forms of injustices, current initiatives towards political reform, and the 
required measures. While my literature review included a range of scholarly 
materials, I have also incorporated non-scholarly literature, especially where there is 
a gap in scholarly research. Formal and informal types of documents from different 
organisations— meeting minutes, logs, announcements, formal policy statements, 
letters, reports—are all useful for developing an understanding of the setting and 
groups to be studied (Grant and Booth, 2009:97). In line with this use of non-scholarly 
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materials, I have used progress reports, papers, books, annual reports of different 
Dalit civil society organisations, national and international non-government 
agencies, United Nations organisations and government census. I have also used 
several government documents accessing from online sites. The working papers 
presented at the various seminars, conferences, and programs have been utilised to 
refer the Dalit injustices, state restructuring and federalism process in Nepal. Online 
sites such as opinion pieces, information on Dalit organisations, governments 
programs and discussion on Dalit issues have also been used. A broad range of 
secondary resources has been instrumental in building a rich understanding of the 
character and development of Dalit injustice in Nepal. 
 
Interviews 
A phenomenological interview method was employed to collect the data from the field.  
Phenomenology is the study of lived experiences and the ways those experiences 
develop a person’s worldview (Marshall and Rossman, 1999:112). The fundamental 
crux of this method is to explain the meaning of a concept or phenomenon that several 
individuals encounter and share (Ibid). The phenomenological interview method was 
developed by Seidman (1998) and comprises in-depth interviews focusing on 
individuals’ experiences. The interview method focuses on past phenomena of 
interest, for example, historical events or incidences, and can include discussion of 
forms of injustice or discrimination. The interview were more focused on exploring 
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their experiences of discrimination, implementation of laws and what they believe 
needs to improve on such policy. Thus, it was focused on phenomenological 
interviews. 
 
The phenomenological interview provides a useful method to approach the issues of 
concern here because the phenomena of interest are based on individuals’ 
experiences. The researcher relies broadly on the in-depth interview as a 
conversation with a purpose (Seidman, 1998:16). The interviewees’ experiences are 
important to understand the contexts for injustice and discrimination. The primary 
advantage of this type of interview is that the researcher can use participant 
experiences as research data (Seidman, 1998:17). Participants’ experiences and the 
meaning of social phenomena help to guide actions and interactions, and these 
meanings ideally emerge through the interview process (Ibid). In this study, the 
phenomenological interviewing method is used to explore the experiences of Dalit 
injustice, policy provision and its state of implementation in Nepal.  
 
Included the lived experiences of Dalit in this study involves the inclusion throughout 
this study of my experiences and my worldview. I also belong to Dalit of Nepal, and 
as such, I am Dalit researcher, who is researching Dalit experiences of injustice with 
the background of my own experience of injustices, as mentioned at the beginning of 
the Introduction. Being Dalit, I have my own experiences of caste discrimination, and 
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this identity background and expertise affords both advantages and disadvantages in 
the research. As a community member, I am an insider; but as a researcher, I am an 
outsider, since I am trying to make empirical findings rather than findings based on 
my perceptions. Chavez discusses this advantaged position of the insider researcher: 
̔As an insider they have unique methodological advantages in the 
research process. Some have claimed that their closeness and familiarity 
to the group provided a nuanced and unique insight about 
underrepresented and colonised groups to which they belonged̕. 
(2008: 476) 
 
In line with this argument, in some respects, my lived experiences allowed me to 
bring a unique perspective to the research. There are a few other advantages for an 
insider. Being in some ways at least from the same group of the interview 
participants, there is a greater likelihood of rapport building, greater legitimacy and 
ease of access to information and data̕ (Chavez, 2008:479). Being Dalit, I also realized 
that I easily accessed participants contact information and accessed different sources 
of data, which may not be available to the external researcher. However, I was equally 
aware of the disadvantages of being insider. There is potential criticism that an 
insider may have a bias over issues and the selection of the participants (Ibid). I tried 
to minimise possible bias by maintaining professional ethics in research methods, so 
that the selection of participants and issues were based on a sound analysis of 
selection processes and the literature. 
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3.4. Sampling Approach 
A purposive sampling method has been applied to identify research participants. As 
Palys and Atchison argue, the purposive sampling method is particularly ‘useful in 
the context of research and policy analysis, this strategy involves identifying who the 
major stakeholders are and who participates in designing, giving, receiving or 
administering program or services being evaluated or who might be otherwise 
affected by it’ (2014:10). In the context of this study, purposive sampling helped to 
select representatives of Dalit leaders from different sectors, which uncovered the 
voices of Dalit for policy analysis.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, Dalit comprise 26 different sub caste groups in the 
hierarchical social system of Nepal. They occupy 13.56% percent of the total national 
population being35,93,825 in total number in 2011. The per capita income of Dalit is 
US$361 as compared to US$712 for other Nepalese, and 43.6% Dalit still live below 
the poverty line (CBS, 2011).The statistical evidence shows that Dalit have a 
significantly lower literacy rate than other groups in Nepal. Nepal has 65.9% literacy 
rate whereas literacy rate of women 57.4% and Dalit 52.4% (CBS, 2011). Dalit are 
deprived from other source of opportunities such as political and other social 
enterprises. These statistical evidences justify the rationale of researching Dalit 
subject. Thus, it is important to select an appropriate and representative sample from 
different sub caste groups of Dalit for this research. 
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In choosing appropriate participants, I consulted with stakeholders such as Dalit 
organisations and leaders. To seek their views and advice, I sent an email seeking 
information. The Dalit Commission and Dalit non-government organisations were 
the key sources for identifying targeted participants. I considered diversity in identity 
(gender and caste group), leadership and personal experiences as the primary criteria 
for identifying potential participants. While selecting Dalit participants, I focused on 
selecting them from different Dalit sub-caste groups such as Bishwakarma, Nepali, 
Pariyar, Gandharba, Deula, Paswan, Mahara, Harijan and Dom to ensure the 
inclusive voice of Dalit sub-caste groups. Similarly, as much as possible, I also focused 
on including Dalit women leaders as participants for this research. I include more 
detail on these aspects of my research design below.  
 
In this study, I have included Dalit leaders and experts with a range of perspectives, 
including current members of parliament, ex-members of Parliament, political 
leaders, civil society leaders, Government officials and community Dalit leaders. The 
study has focused on the representatives of Dalit community assuming that they are 
comparatively experienced in policy formulation, implementation, and reform 
processes.  
 
Interviews conducted with the members of parliament and government officials from 
the Dalit community contribute to clarifying the experiences of these members 
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concerning issues such as institutional barriers, bias, and gaps in policy and law. The 
data from these interviews help to identify to what extent the government 
institutions, such as police administration, hinders the implementation of the policies 
and provisions and what types of reforms these stakeholders believe would resolve 
these problems. Interviews with social, political and community leaders have 
provided a deeper level of experiential understanding of the nature and causes of 
injustices. Also, experts from the non-Dalit community were interviewed to explore 
the contemporary debate on political transformation, including federalism and state 
restructuring. Four academics were interviewed specifically on the political changes 
such as state restructuring, federalism, and Dalit justice to provide a scholarly 
perspective. To more deeply investigate the experiences of Dalit at the community 
level, and in the light of research indicating significant differences between these sub-
groups, I interviewed representatives of the sub-group of Tarai Dalit and Hill Dalit 
(see below for more information on this study’s research sites) to explore their 
experiences of caste discrimination and implication in their socioeconomic, education 
and political condition. 
Selection of  Interview Location  
Interviews were conducted in the Kathmandu, Gulmi and Siraha districts of Nepal. 
The capital city, Kathmandu, was selected based on the fact that many of the targeted 
participants—current Ex-Members of Parliament (MPs), Government Officials, 
Political Party Leaders and Civil Society Leaders from Dalit community—reside 
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there. Two other districts have been selected based on purposive selection method to 
represent the Hill Dalit and Tarai Dalit (lowland) issues. Broadly, Dalit are 
categorised into two groups as demarcated by the geographical regions, e.g. Hill Dalit 
and Tarai Dalit (Dalit from flatland). As outlined in Chapter Five although they have 
similar linguistic and cultural patterns, their socioeconomic structure and the 
patterns of discrimination they experience appear different (DCSO and IDSN, 
2015:14). As such, I felt it would be useful to interview a sample from each of these 
groups. These two districts represent the broad geographic areas as well as the areas 
where the Dalit population is densest. The local settings of the interview location and 
selected districts for this research have been outlined in detail in the following sub-
sections.  
 
Interview Location: Nepal 
Nepal is a South Asian country located in between India and China. It is a landlocked 
country bordered by India to its south, east and western and Tibet, and China in the 
North. Nepal is recognised as the country of Lord Buddha and for the highest 
mountain—Everest. Nepal has mainly three types of geographic patterns: High 
Mountain, hills and Tarai (flat land). Administratively, Nepal has been categorised 
into 75 districts and five development regions. However, this has been recently 
changed into new three tier federal governance. According to the new structure, there 
are 744 local levels, seven provinces, and a Central government (MOFALD, 2017). 
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Nepal is a diverse and multicultural country containing a total population of 26 
million with 126 caste and ethnic groups and more than 123 languages (CBS, 2011). 
Despite being multicultural, Nepal is dominated by Hindu religious people with 81.3 
percent of the entire population among ten different religious groups (CBS, 2011).  
Nepal has 65.9% literacy rate whereas literacy rate of women 57.4% and Dalit 52.4% 
(CBS, 2011). The culture and ethnicity of people differed by the geographical location 
of Nepal such as the ethnic people culturally proximate to Tibet are located in 
mountain regions (Bennett et al., 2008:1). The Aryan clan is found more in the middle 
hills regions.  However, the people culturally proximate to India are found mostly in 
the Tarai area of Nepal (Bennett et al., 2008:2).  
 
Relevant to my study, and as described in detail in the previous chapter, people 
within Nepali society have been categorised by their caste identity, with Brahmin 
and Chhetri at the top and Dalit comprising the bottom layer of society. Dalit is not 
only the bottom structure of the society but also excluded, neglected and 
discriminated against based on caste and untouchability practices as described in the 
Introduction Chapter. This research focuses on the Dalit of Nepal, interviewing the 
representative participants from Kathmandu, Gulmi and Siraha Districts. Among 
three districts, Gulmi district represents the Hill Dalit and Siraha represents Tarai 
Dalit whereas Kathmandu has amix of Dalit from all districts and regions of Nepal.  
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Map 1: Nepal Map with Interview Locations 
 
 
 
Kathmandu: 
The largest proportions of interviews were undertaken in the capital city, 
Kathmandu. With a high density of population and high concentration of 
administrative and official engagement of various sectors in Kathmandu, this has 
proved a useful location to locate sample of expert leaders and activists from different 
sectors. As Nepal had a unitary governance structure, local and national stakeholders 
and leaders concentrate in the capital.  
 
Kathmandu has a diverse composition of caste and language. Almost all the caste 
groups live in Kathmandu, the capital city of Nepal. It is densely populated. 
According to 2011 census, there is 17,44,240 populations in Kathmandu district 
Siraha 
Kathmandu 
Gulmi 
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comprising (female: 8,31,239; male: 9, 13,001) (CBS, 2011:40). Despite Kathmandu 
being a multi-caste, multi-lingual based district, Newar caste groups are in the 
majority. Apart from Newar caste groups, there are living Brahmin, Chhetri, Magar, 
Kami, Sarki, Damai, Gaine, Badi, Newar, Sanyasi, Thakuri, Gurung, Gharti, Majhi, 
Muslim, Chhantyal, Thakali, Sherpa, Tamang, Rai, Yadav, Paswan andothers 
(Subedi, 2010:187). Tamang originating from the surrounding hill districts can also 
be found in Kathmandu.  According to the 2011 census, there are Newar (29.6%), 
Kirat, Gurung, Magar, Tamang, Sherpa all (50.7%), Khas Brahmins (20.51%), and 
Chettris (18.5%) (CBS, 2011). 
 
Gulmi District: 
As this research seeks to understand the underlying causes and nature of injustice 
experienced by Dalit in Nepal, it was important to explore the current situation with 
a focus on the districts, especially in view of previous studies indicating that the level 
of discrimination is higher in rural areas than at urban (Pandey et.al, 2006:11). The 
Gulmi district represents the Western Hill district in Nepal.  
The Gulmi district is one of the hill districts in the Western Development Region 
placed in the northern belt of the Lumbini zone. In the Sanskrit language, a land 
where the army or its regiment lived was known as Gulam during Lichhibi reign and 
the medieval period, and later it was named as Gulmi (DDC, 2007). According to 2011 
census, there is a total population of 296654 (female:162883; male:133771) (CBS, 
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2011). It contains 1.22% of the entire population of Nepal. Gulmi is a multi-lingual 
and multi-caste district. The majority of people speak the Nepali language as their 
mother tongue. According to 2011 CBS report, 21 languages are spoken. Among them 
the major 5 languages are Nepali (94.70 %), Magar (3.30 %), Newar (1.08 %), Gurung 
(0.38%) and Majhi (0.09 %) (CBS, 2011).  
Despite the Gulmi district being multi-caste and multi-lingual, the Brahmin and 
Chhetri caste groups are in the majority. Apart from them, there are Magar, Kami, 
Sarki, Damai, Gaine, Badi, Newar, Sanyasi, Thakuri, Gurung, Gharti, Majhi, 
Muslim, Chhantyal, Thakali, Sherpa, Tamang, Rai and others living in the district. 
According to the 2011 census, Brahmin 25.31%, Chhetri 22.56%, Magar 20.73%, 
Kami 11.94%, Sarki 4.80%, Damai 3.68% and others are the major six caste groups 
(CBS, 2011:104). There are several surnames for every caste groups in this district 
too.  
This district is based on Hindu religious patterns. The majority of people practice 
Hindu religious norms and values as their prime culture. According to the 2011 
census, Hindu religious people comprise 96.10 %, Buddist 3.69%, Muslim 0.14 %, 
Christian 0.04% and others. As discussed in Chapter Five, Hindu people practice 
different rituals such as marrying by identifying the surname of similar caste groups 
which impacts on inter-caste marriage between Dalit and non-Dalit.  
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Siraha District:  
Siraha is the smallest district in the area of the Sagarmatha zone, which comes under 
the Eastern Development Region of Nepal. Its neighbouring districts are Sindhuli 
and Udayapur in the north, Dhanusha in the west, Saptari in the East, and Bihar 
and India lie to its south. There are two municipalities and 106 village development 
committees. This district is also divided into five election constituencies. 
 
The majority of the population in this district is dependent upon land and subsistence 
production. Dalit relies on forests and natural resources for their livelihood. Siraha 
is known as a different district regarding the caste and ethnic composition. According 
to the 2011 census, the total population of Siraha is 6,37,328 (female: 3,27,227; male: 
3,10,101) (CBS, 2011:68). The caste and ethnic groups of Yadav, Muslim, Musahar, 
Koiri, Teli, Tharu and Musar are larger in number respectively, but the Dominant 
caste and ethnic groups are Yadav, Muslim, Teli, Tharu, Chhetri, Brahman-Hill, 
Brahman-Terai, Newar and Koiri. There are mainly Yadav 24.2%, Muslim 7.2%, 
Mushahar 5.5% and Koiri 5.5% (CBS, 2011:176).  
 
This is also a heterogeneous district regarding the use of language. Almost 86 percent 
people speak Maithili, which is the local language in this district. Only 5% speak 
Nepali, and 3% speak Tharu (CBS, 2011:176). Although Maithili is the primary 
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language in this district, different castes of this area use the Nepali language as their 
lingua franca despite their mother tongue and dialects of their households. Hinduism 
is the main religion followed by the various caste and ethnic groups in this district 
(CBS, 2011). However, they follow diverse cultural practices. According to the 2011 
census, Hindu religious people comprise 90.02%, Muslim 7.46%, Buddist 1.73%, 
Christian 0.06% and others (CBS, 2011:280). 
 
Categories, composition and distribution of interview participants 
As discussed above, phenomenological research with Dalit community members was 
a priority for this research. Table 2 shows participants by different professional 
categories interviewed. This Table indicates the seven categories and the percentage 
of people from each interviewed during the field research. As this Table shows, there 
is more emphasis given to the members of parliament; these participants proved 
highly productive because they are more familiar with the history of caste 
discrimination, Dalit struggles, initiatives and institutional reforms required than 
other interviewees. 
 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
Table 3: List of Interview Participants by Profession 
 Profession Number Percentage 
1 Dalit Political Leaders 5 12.5 
2 Dalit CA Members 9 22.5 
3 Dalit Ex CA Members 3 7.5 
4 Dalit Government Officials 2 5 
5 Dalit Civil Society Leaders 6 15 
6 Dalit Community Members 7 17.5 
7 Experts on Dalit and Justice 8 20 
 
Total 40 100 
Source: Authors Compilation, 2017 
 
Table 3 provides an outline of the composition of interview participants by Dalit 
status and region. Within Dalit, the categories of Hill Dalit and Tarai Dalit have been 
identified. This Table shows the number of Dalit interviewed from Hill and Tarai. 
During research, most of the interviews were conducted with Hill Dalit CA members 
and due to availability issues; I experienced a lower participation of Tarai Dalit in 
my study.  
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Table 4: List of Interview Participants by Dalit and Non-Dalit 
 Category Number Percentage 
1 Tarai Dalit 6 15 
2 Hill Dalit 26 65 
3 Non-Dalit 8 20 
 
Total 40 100 
Source: Authors Compilation, 2017 
 
The Table 4 shows the gender distribution of the participants interviewed for this 
research. Fewer female participants were included, principally because Dalit women 
are less represented in leadership roles in and across different sectors, including 
parliament, political parties and civil society. As my research sought contact with 
institutional leaders, this affected the participation of women in this research. 
However, I have attempted to overcome this inequality of representation by giving 
priority in my discussion and analysis to the voices of women who were interviewed 
to help highlight their experiences.  
Table 5: List of Interview Participants by Gender 
 Category Number Percentage 
1 Female 6 15 
2 Male 34 85 
 Total 40 100 
Source: Authors Compilation, 2017 
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Chart 1 indicates that seven sub-categories of Dalit caste were interviewed for this 
research. Although there are 26 sub-caste categories of both Hill and Tarai Dalit in 
Nepal, due to limited resources and time, it was not feasible to interview each caste 
category, since they are spread all over the country. However, the emphasis was given 
to interview representative participants both from Tarai Dalit and from Hill Dalit 
because the views from both Tarai and Hill Dalit are important, as the level of caste 
discrimination and its nature differs by geographical location in Nepal.  
 
Chart 1: List of Interview Participants by Dalit sub-caste category 
 
Source: Authors Compilation, 2017 
 
There is a wide assumption that the experiences of caste discrimination and its 
intensity differs in Tarai than in the Hill regions of Nepal. Thus, the experience of 
the lowest caste category of Dalit known as Marik (Dom) has been included to explore 
the real perspective on how Tarai Dalit are facing an appalling level of caste 
Bishwakarma
44%
Nepali
20%
Pariyar
17%
Gandharba
3%
Chamar
10%
Paswan
3%
Badi
3%
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discrimination. As identified by the UNDP human development report 2014, Dom is 
the least developed Dalit group in its category of the human development index. Dom 
falls at the lowest rank in the different dimensions of development such as income, 
literacy and gender empowerment (UNDP, 2014).  
 
3.5. Data Interpretation and Analysis 
The interview data have been systematically tape-recorded and transcribed into 
English by the researcher, noting that the interviews were conducted in the Nepali 
language. The transcribed interview data were manually coded and grouped into 
central themes such as Dalit injustices, Dalit struggles, institutional reforms and 
measures for social justices. The coded and thematically grouped data was used while 
writing the substantive chapters. The following were key steps taken for the data 
management, interpretation, and analysis.   
 
Reflexive Memo 
During the fieldwork and in particular after each interview, a reflexive summary 
memo was written. This process provided the researcher with freshly captures 
insights into the context and issues. This process also helped to understand the key 
findings that resulted from the interview data. Willis (2006:259) argues that reflexive 
memos are important to contextualise the interview process. They are also important 
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to understand the key themes and issues raised in each interview. Birks et 
al.,(2008:68) also argue that the ‘memo serves to assist the researcher in making 
conceptual leaps from raw data to those abstractions that explain research 
phenomena in the context in which it is examined’. They can be used as a procedural 
and analytical strategy throughout the research process (Ibid).  
The use of reflexive memos helped me to understand the key research themes to be 
inequality, caste discrimination, injustice, struggles, and political transformation. 
‘Thematic analysis aims to identify themes within the data. The ‘thematic analysis is 
more inductive because the categories into which themes will be sorted are not 
decided before coding the data’ (Ezzy and Ebrary, 2002:88). I reviewed the reflexive 
memos, categorised the repetitive issues and information, and tried to create key 
themes. However, these themes were further finalised while coding and analysing 
the interview data.  Apart from these key themes, the reflexive memos were helpful 
in getting a sense of key Dalit debates and priorities such as dignity vs identity 
debates, the rationale of Dalit identity and group politics. The memos also helped to 
find out that Dalit leaders were focusing on the importance of political representation 
during interviews. The short reflection memo after each interview contributed to 
capture the richness of the research in a variety of ways (Willis, 2006:261).  To get 
into the depth of the analysis of the data, the interview tape recording was also 
repeatedly listened to as part of the transcription process.  
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Data Coding  
After transcribing the interviews, the transcribed data were carefully read, divided 
and categorised into meaningful themes. Ezzy and Ebrary (2002) argue that ‘coding 
in the thematic analysis is the process of identifying themes or concepts that are in 
the data. The researcher attempts to build a systematic account of what has been 
observed and recorded’ (p. 86). I coded themes and symbols in a word document by 
highlighting the relevant ideas. According to Willis (2006) ‘coding is the marking of 
segments of data with symbols, descriptive words or category name’ (p. 266). Coding 
also refers to the ‘identification of topics, issues, similarities, and differences that are 
revealed through the participants’ narratives and interpreted by the researcher. This 
process enables the researcher to begin to understand the world from each 
participant’s perspective’ (Sutton and Austin, 2015:228). In line with this perspective 
on coding, I read thoroughly the transcribed documents to understand the topics, 
issues and used a coloured pen to highlight the categories that emerged while coding. 
I also developed several categories, which I later re-grouped to construct the main 
themes. 
 
I used both a priori codes and inductive codes during the coding process. ‘A priori 
codes are those that you either develop through your understanding of the literature 
or that you have already deemed as significant’ (Willis, 2006:266). While inductive 
codes are those that ‘emerge from the data you are analysing’ (Ibid). As I had 
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interviewed thematically, the themes I used provided me some of the a priori codes 
such as Dalit, Inequality, Struggle, Caste Discrimination and Political 
Transformation that emerged from the initial literature review process. I also used 
inductive codes, which emerged during the data coding process including particular 
sites of injustice that became Temple Access, Discrimination in School, Inter-Caste 
marriage, Shilpi as an alternative Dalit Identity, Territorial and Non-Territorial 
Federal Units. Using these codes, the materials were organised by thematic 
categories and analysed.  
 
Approach to Analysis  
The themes that I generated then formed the basis for analysis and constructing 
inferences. The themes that emerged from the data were thus systematically 
analysed. The substantial reading on the interview data and secondary literature was 
done for thematic analysis. Similarly, the themes were explored and analysed from 
the data (Willis, 2006:271). While interpreting and analysing interview data, I 
carefully presented the participants’ perspectives and contrasting ideas from the 
thematic categories of data that emerged during coding and key themes recorded in 
the reflexive memos. I have also used selected quotations from interviews to add 
meaning. I examined issues and described them carefully and appropriately to 
explain the situation. As argued by Ethridge (2004) descriptive research is considered 
‘as simply the attempt to determine, describe or identify what is, while analytical 
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research attempts to establish why it is that way or how it came to be’ (p. 24). Thus, 
the substantive chapters of this research include a description of the existing Dalit 
problems and injustices, with contextual analysis provided by the secondary 
literature.  
 
A critical analysis approach was employed while writing the substantive chapters. As 
argued by Grants and Booth (2009:93) ‘an effective critical review presents analyses 
and synthesises material from diverse sources’, and in this research, materials from 
various sources were gathered, compared, and critically analysed. For analysing data 
and information, the relevant literature was reviewed and analysed critically in 
writing Chapters Five, Six and Seven. The empirical data were used in the 
substantive chapters as per its thematic relevance to support and contradict the 
analysis. The combination of phenomenological interviewing and critical literature 
reviewing enabled me to form a meaningful analysis of the socio-political context.  
 
3.6. Ethics 
In general, the researcher is considered an individual who should be able to analyse 
issues based on evidence and facts, without introducing particular biases or personal 
inclinations. In one sense, this research is no different, as I am a researcher 
principally seeking to analyse the data based on facts and evidence. However, 
belonging to the Dalit community, I have my own experiences of injustices and my 
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interest in this issue. This has influenced the research in complex ways. As discussed 
in Section 3.3 above, as a community member, I am an insider. However, as a 
researcher, I am an outsider in this investigation insofar as I am trying to make 
empirical findings rather than findings based on my perceptions. In some respects, 
this allowed me to bring a unique perspective to the research. Being Dalit, my real 
life experiences of caste discrimination allowed me to access different data and to 
explore perspectives of Dalit, which would not be available to an outsider researcher. 
As the literature review also uncovered, there are very few Dalit scholars who unfold 
the injustices of Dalit in Nepal: my research thus also uniquely offers a Dalit 
perspective. 
 
This study has been subject to a rigorous Human Research Ethics approval process. 
After the final human ethics approval, based on the purposive sampling technique 
described above, the identified participants were initially contacted by sending a 
contact letter via email with details of my research (see Appendix, Letter of 
Introduction). I requested participants to keep our email correspondence confidential 
and made clear that the participants were under no obligation to take part in the 
research. During the interview, I mentioned the research aims and its potential 
implications for participants. A consent letter was also signed by all the participants 
and data has been safely stored in the principal supervisor’s office. I note that 
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although research participants were provided with the opportunity to remain 
anonymous, all were happy to be identified.  
 
Different participants have different power proximity with the state and even with 
me. My focus in the interviews was not only to ask questions but also to 
chronologically discuss and sensitise participants to the themes of interview 
questions. The advocacy and participatory research worldview would also emphasise 
the potential for the research to be used to advocate for marginalised people. Based 
on this philosophical worldview, I tried to sensitise vulnerable and or disempowered 
participants concerning relevant policy provisions, processes, and how they might be 
able to realise their rights. However, I was equally aware of research ethics during 
my fieldwork and the need not to interfere with the participants’ expressing their 
views. 
 
The interview participants were provided with monitory incentive to compensate for 
their time for an interview. As per ethics approval, AUS$10.00 (equivalent to 
Nepalese Rupees, NR800) was given to all the participants who took part in 
interviews. The payment level was determined on the basis that this amount would 
compensate for two hours of interview and travel. There are certainly implications 
for paying participants to be part of the research. According to Head (2009:335) 
‘making payments in research projects and the important function that payment can 
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have in gaining access to interviewees and in encouraging participation’. Similarly, 
Edwards et al., (2002) also conclude that a monetary incentive more than doubled the 
questionnaire response in his research. I too realised that the payment encouraged 
participation in this research. There is criticism that the higher or lower level of 
payment can potentially coerce potential interview participants (Head, 2009). 
However, there are also negative implications for not making payments to 
participants. To reduce the potential coercion, the payment amount was carefully 
planned (neither too high nor low) relative to local market values. 
 
3.7. Scope and Limitations 
There were some scope and research limitations related to the sampling, qualitative 
approach, and lack of political stability within my research location.  
 
Dealing first with scope, the sample size of interviewees constrained the ability to 
include all possible perspectives. This study was not able to cover the perspectives of 
many people of various districts, such as the Dalit residing in the mountainous 
geographical regions, where Dalit could have divergent views and experiences. The 
experiences of Dalit from mountain areas could have differed from the Lowland 
(Tarai), and the prevalence of discrimination differs in the far west from the eastern 
belt of Nepal. Due to the scope of my study, I was unable to provide such fine-grained 
detail on different Dalit experiences. Similarly, I have not been able to include an 
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equal number of non-Dalit participants as the focus of research was to reveal the 
experiences of injustice from Dalit community. However, I have included eight non-
Dalit experts (see table 3 above) and interviewed them to explore their perspectives 
on Dalit injustice as well as the measures required to address injustice. The 
interviews with non-Dalit, though less in number have been instrumental to 
triangulate the research data and analysis.  
 
There are certainly a wider range of sectors that could have been included, such as 
representatives from NGOs, aid organisations and political parties. However, limited 
resources and the research timeframe prevented the study including these sectors. 
Moreover, during research period in 2014, there was no elected local government. 
Further, the all-party mechanism was dysfunctional and their representatives were 
unavailable during the short period. But the participants highlighted the importance 
of having elected local representatives as they listen and pursue the issues of 
injustice. The importance of local representative was felt while discussing the pattern 
of discrimination.   
 
This is a qualitative study. I have used this approach to focus on conceptual questions 
such as the experiences of injustice, Dalit struggles, institutional reforms and their 
inter-relationships to identify the required measures for social justice of Dalit in 
Nepal. As a researcher, I was aware of the different research instruments that might 
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have been used, such as participant observation and household surveys. In the case 
of caste discrimination, participants observation in short time would not grasp the 
nature and depth of discrimination. It is difficult to observe the discrimination since 
higher caste generally do not directly discriminate particularly if there are external 
in presence.  
 
The household survey is a quantitative method. It is effective to collect the statistical 
information. Use of this method was not possible due to limitations of resources. 
Moreover, gathering quantitative data on a very small number would not not 
represent the injustices of millions of Dalit. These limitations meant that the study 
could not produce new quantitative data. Quantitative information is often of high 
importance as a way to measure injustice and track trends. Certainly, the literature 
review shows that there are very few mixed method or purely quantitative based 
studies of Dalit injustice. While this study does not provide new quantitative data, I 
acknowledge that there is a strong need for large-scale population studies to improve 
data on Dalit injustice.  
 
Finally, during the period of research, the political situation was volatile.  This 
affected my research in a number of ways. There were several changes in the political 
efforts towards a consensual model of federalism, which meant my research goal was 
constantly evolving. Also, there were several changes to different provisions for Dalit 
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and other marginalised groups after the declaration of the new constitution of Nepal 
in 2015 (mainly because most of the issues mentioned in the interim constitution and 
CA thematic committee reports were curtailed during Constitution declaration). 
Thus, the fluidity of the political situation was also a limitation, or perhaps a 
difficulty, for this research process.  
 
3.8. Conclusion 
As discussed above, the methodology adopted here assumed an advocacy and 
participation worldview, employing a critical literature review and phenomenological 
interviews. The research site and the interview participants were selected based on 
purposive sampling method and were mainly the Dalit leaders from political parties, 
parliament, civil society and the general population. The research sites were chosen 
to capture areas where Dalit leaders and both categories of Dalit, Hill Dalit and Tarai 
Dalit, reside. The interview data were transcribed and analysed thematically, and 
the analysis was simultaneously supplemented and expanded with a critical analysis 
of the secondary literature. Limited resources including time and volatile politics 
have posed limitations on my research. However, as I shall describe in the subsequent 
chapters, the methods used in this analysis have provided new perspectives on Dalit 
injustice in the context of Nepal. 
  
122 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter looks at how the phenomenon of social justice has been conceptualised 
in contemporary social and political theory, as well as how theorists have addressed 
the question of redressing injustice. As its basic theoretical framework, this study 
will draw on Fraser’s (2003) notion of social justice encompassing the 
interrelationship between two dimensions of justice: recognition and redistribution. 
This theory and the theoretical positions and problems to which it is responding are 
set out in this chapter. I argue that a conception of social justice adequate to deal 
with the Dalit situation in Nepal needs to be one that recognises the importance of 
identity and group rights and one that ensures the representation of minority 
perspectives. I argue that for Dalit, the most productive or useful concept of social 
justice is one that recognises group specific difference and the distinct differences that 
identity brings to questions of justice, as well as the need for redistribution, as 
theorised by Nancy Fraser (2003) and Iris Marion Young (1990).  
 
Although this thesis uses a number of theoretical concepts including terms such as 
Dalit, community participation, recognition, redistribution, procedural justice, 
oppression, rights, institution, politics, reform, marginalisation, hegemony, identity, 
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social movement and oppression, it notes that the understanding of these concepts is 
contested. These concepts are always framed in certain contexts and are understood 
differently in different contexts. For example, ethnic identity may be taken to refer 
to the preservation of culture and language but in the context of Dalit it is understood 
as relevant to addressing injustice. In this thesis, while noting such context 
differences with respect to meaning, concepts are generally understood relative to 
Dalit social justice perspectives. That is, these theoretical concepts are used to 
analyse Dalit injustice and assist in identifying potential ways forward for their 
greater social justice. 
 
The first section of this chapter discusses the basic concept of social justice and then 
moves to traditional liberal conceptions of justice. This is followed by a discussion of 
structural approaches to social justice, focusing particularly on Iris Marion Young’s 
(1990) and Nancy Fraser’s (2003) conceptions of structural reform and recognition. 
The following sections then look at the idea of group rights, identity and minority 
rights. This includes a discussion of the types of institutional arrangements to 
recognise group rights. 
 
4.2 Overview of Social Justice 
According to Brian Barry, at the heart of the idea of justice is the fundamental 
requirement to treat people as equals (Barry, 2005:22). Broadly understood, the 
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concept of justice has several branches, including retributive justice, concerned with 
justice in response to wrongdoing, and distributive justice, concerned with the 
distribution of goods and benefits across society (Miller, 1976:7). As Miller defines it, 
distributive justice is concerned with different relations among individuals or groups, 
specifically economic inequalities and social discrimination (Ibid). Within this study, 
and using this inventory, distributive justice is the principal focus, although patterns 
of systematic distributive injustice also affect the way that retributive justice 
implemented.  
 
At the broadest level, social justice is concerned with how advantages and 
disadvantages are distributed amongst the members of the society. More specifically, 
social justice is concerned with resolving persistent inequalities, as well as with the 
full participation and inclusion of everyone in the major institutions of society (van 
Rensburg, 2004:1). It is connected with the ways social institutions and practices 
influence the share of resources that different people can obtain. Moreover, social 
justice is a political matter because, as Miller argues it is primarily the State that 
plays a vital role in ensuring that policies and practices contribute to social justice 
and stem injustice (Miller, 1999:11). 
 
At the most general level, theories of social justice seek to establish a set of principles 
that can be used to choose among various social arrangements that determine the 
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division of advantages and disadvantages, concerning the proper distribution of social 
goods.  These principles provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic 
institutions of society, and they define the appropriate allocation of benefits and 
burdens of social cooperation (Rawls, 1971:4). As Miller puts it, social justice aims to 
specify the institutional arrangements that allow each person to contribute fully to 
social well-being (Miller, 1999:4). Although conceptions of social justice differ, as a 
concept, it can be understood as occurring across three dimensions, mal-distribution, 
exclusion, and disempowerment, each of which requires some form of justice to rectify 
it (Bufacchi, 2012). 
 
Social justice can also be conceptualised as the remedy for oppression and 
domination, two central terms with overlapping meaning. According to Kukathas and 
Pettit,social justice refers primarily to the principles of ‘guaranteeing fundamental 
individual liberties and ensuring that social and economic inequalities are arranged 
to offer the greatest possible benefit to the worst-off in the society while upholding 
fair equality of opportunity’ (1990:36). According to Young (1990:38), oppression 
refers to the institutionalised social processes that prevent individuals expressing 
their feelings and perspectives in their social lives; it includes material deprivation 
and maldistribution. Domination implies an institutional condition that inhibits 
people from fully participating in social and political life and determining their 
actions (Young, 1990:38). Hierarchical social structures create domination of people 
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who then enjoy limited support for expressing their preferences and viewpoints and 
for being heard (Ibid). 
 
In contemporary societies, increasing competition over resources, historically 
unequal distributions, persistent discrimination and entrenched patterns of 
exclusion have led to increasing demands for social justice (Young, 1990). Powerless 
and disadvantaged groups are excluded from acquiring scarce resources and positions 
unless there are fair procedures and mechanisms, and as such, social movements of 
groups who have been historically excluded, such as women, people with minority 
sexualities, and ethnic groups have sought to address systemic injustices. In this 
sense, the ideal of justice and principles of social justice provide the basis for anyone 
to criticise common practices and local institutions, which endorse discrimination, 
exploitation, and oppression (Barry, 2005:37). While social justice theory is designed 
to achieve fairness in distributions, the theory itself does not produce equality unless 
there exist appropriate institutional arrangements and a sense of moral obligation 
among the members of the society.  
 
As noted, social justice refers to the allocation of benefits and burden in society, and 
here we need to recognise that there are different types of benefits. These can be 
classified as tangible and intangible. Tangible benefits are social goods (money, assets 
and other resources) and positions, while intangible benefits include goods such as 
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prestige and respect (Miller, 1999:7). In struggles for social justice, we see groups 
seeking to address both types of benefits (Ibid).  
 
While theorists agree with the core issues that social justice addresses, they disagree 
about what constitutes an unjust social arrangement, what causes injustice, and 
what types of remedies will be just. In particular, as I will discuss below, theorists 
disagree about how much it is just for the State to intervene to address unequal 
distributions, and how much of this inequality needs to be left alone at risk of 
interfering with individual freedom. That is, most theorists of social justice agree that 
a just society must be one where people are treated fairly, regardless of gender, racial, 
religious or other differences in their identity. They disagree though as to whether 
justice stops at overt and explicit non-discrimination, or requires addressing broader 
structures and systems that discriminate more indirectly. In the next section, I look 
at classical liberal theories of social justice, which emphasise individual freedom.  
 
4.3. Classical Liberalism 
Liberal approaches to social justice are within a category of egalitarian philosophy 
because they assert the equal moral worth of persons. This principle of moral worth 
means that hierarchical distinctions between people based on birth or social identity 
need to be rejected (Anderson, 1999). Rather, every person should have the equal 
opportunity to develop and achieve his or her good. Within this liberal view, people 
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need to be free to participate and enjoy the goods of the society to live in an egalitarian 
society (Anderson, 1999:315). Recognising equal moral worth does not mean though 
that all individuals have similar virtues or talents (Ibid). Rather, equal moral worth 
means individuals enjoy an equal moral status and have access to the same 
opportunities to participate in society. 
 
The overarching conception of liberal justice emphasises individual freedom and 
choice (Sandel, 1984:1; Barnett, 1998:13). It emphasises and prioritises individual 
freedom of choice above all other values (Sandel, 1984). Liberals claim that the State 
should not impose a preferred way of life, but should leave its citizens as free as 
possible to choose their values and ends (Sandel, 1984:1). The emphasis on liberty is 
the liberal understanding of equality as an equality of opportunity. The key aim of 
the equality of opportunity principle is to provide equal opportunity to everyone 
regardless of caste, gender, religion and other forms of identity. Processes that 
liberals endorse to ensure equality of opportunity are not concerned with outcomes 
because, as stated above, individuals differ in their talents and the effort they are 
willing to put in, and freedom requires that the state not interfere with outcomes that 
will be produced because of these types of differences. 
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In contrast to the idea of equality of opportunity, some social justice theorists argue 
for equality of outcome (Phillips, 1995). Equality of outcome is a principle which looks 
into the results that are achieved after certain procedures for distributing 
opportunity have been undertaken (Miller, 1999:94). Where the outcomes are 
significantly different, particularly across collective or group identities, for example 
across gender, or race, or caste, this is taken to suggest that the opportunities were 
not genuinely equal, because of different structures or other types of impediments. 
As such, this particular school of thought argues that to achieve genuine equality, 
there may need to be differential distributions of opportunity based on the 
individual’s capacity and disadvantages (Miller, 1999). If someone is oppressed and 
marginalised, for example, based on caste, he or she should be ‘compensated’ by 
specific forms of treatment so that he or she genuinely has the same opportunities as 
people belonging to better off groups. For example, in situations where a marginalised 
group has historically had poor representation in a democratic body such as a 
parliament, mechanisms ensuring a proportion of overall representation are intended 
to boost participation. Such special action enhances the capacity of disadvantaged 
groups so that they can fairly compete with others.  
 
This view of equality is not acceptable from the perspective of classical liberalism 
because the liberal precept of equality requires treating everyone in the same 
manner, despite inequality among individuals along the lines of caste, race, gender 
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or religion.  Liberalism, in this sense, adopts a negative view of freedom, where 
freedom is understood as not being prevented from doing something due to some 
irrelevant individual characteristics such as caste, gender or religion (Miller, 
1999:14). According to this strict view, liberalism holds policies that explicitly seek to 
shape social processes (like Affirmative Action or quotas) as impediments to 
individual freedom. As distinct from this view, others insist that justice as fairness 
mean ‘treating like cases alike and different cases differently’ (Bloomfield, 2008:40).  
 
Another way of understanding the liberal conception of justice is regarding the idea 
of meritocracy. Meritocracy implies a social system in which social positions, benefits, 
and outcomes such as wealth, jobs, and power are distributed based on an individual’s 
merits, and particularly their talents and effort (Son Hing et al., 2011:433; Young, 
1990:200). According to meritocracies, outcomes are supposed to be determined by 
appropriate inputs, e.g. abilities and effort, but not by irrelevant ones, such as 
ethnicity or gender (Son Hing et al., 2011:433). As meritocracy focuses on individual 
ability, it does not support the idea of providing special treatment for historically 
disadvantaged social groups and thus has been accused of legitimising hierarchical 
divisions that already exist in the society (Young 1990:200). Moreover, this conception 
can be criticised for its emphasis on talents, which are not distributed evenly but are 
largely the outcome of nature and thus arbitrary. As Rawls argues, because the talent 
is an issue of natural luck, the distributions that follow talent will not be just (Rawls, 
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1971:73). Moreover, the ability to develop talents is constrained by structures and 
social institutions, such as gender or unequal access to education. As such, 
meritocracy allows for positions and goods to be distributed by factors that should 
not, according to justice, be the basis for outcomes in distribution and inequalities.  
 
Another way of framing this objection to meritocracy is luck egalitarianism. Anderson 
(1999:300) understands luck egalitarianism as the principle that individuals should 
be rewarded according to the things for which they are responsible (effort, hard work) 
but not penalised by the things for which they are not liable (gender, race, talent). As 
noted, the classical liberal idea suggests that social injustices exist where individuals 
are treated in a discriminatory way, and thus suggests that if explicit discrimination 
is removed—if there exist equality of opportunities—then the outcomes that resulted 
will be just (Ibid). Luck egalitarianism would insist however that if outcomes are 
produced by natural disadvantages, or as a matter of bad luck, they should be 
addressed through social interventions. In this regard, Anderson (1999:336) 
separates between two types of disadvantages, natural ones and social ones. For 
example, a natural disadvantage may be that one is not a fast runner and so cannot 
reap the rewards that follow from this talent. A social disadvantage might be that 
one is a woman in a gendered society. A person born into a low-income family is 
another example of bad social luck. Thus, distributive justice would stipulate that the 
lucky should transfer some benefits they gain by luck to the unlucky (Miller, 1999). 
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Liberal approaches criticise this type of interference, as it would stop people being 
rewarded for their talents or efforts and so would interfere with freedom (Barnett, 
2000).  
 
As distinct from this liberal approach, structural approaches insist that special 
treatment is required to address injustices that have resulted from unjust rules, 
regulations and social processes and that impede the individual from competing and 
achieving equality of outcomes. The next section focuses on the structural approach 
to social justice.  
 
4.4. Structural Approach to Social Justice 
As discussed above, liberal conceptions of social justice seek to address inequalities 
through ensuring equality of opportunity. Theorists such as Young (2001) criticise 
the limitations of this focus on individual injustice and insist on widening the focus 
to the broader mechanisms of social injustice, thereby recognising that individual 
adjustments are not sufficient. The injustice lies at the level of larger institutional 
relations and processes (Young, 2001:16). By moving the analysis from the individual 
to the group and institutional relations and processes, we can see that injustice is 
also structural. This approach provides a way of addressing injustices experienced at 
the individual level by addressing the structures that generate them. Critics of 
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classical liberal approaches have also argued that the persistence of inequalities 
based on race, gender, caste and so on, points to the limits of liberal conceptions of 
justice and the limits of treating the unequal equally. As Radu (2013) argues, if we 
treat the unequal equally, or treat different types of persons, in the same way, this is 
not equality of treatment. Equality and justice, thus, requires that we treat people 
according to their differences. The differences and the persisting discrimination based 
on the race, gender, caste, and inequalities point to the need for clear actions for 
equality and justice.  
 
Different scholars have used the concept of structural injustice to explain the 
oppression of marginalised groups (Young, 1990, 2001; Calhoun, 1990; Fraser, 2003; 
Kymlicka, 1995; Williams, 1998). Although there is a range of perspectives, in this 
chapter, I primarily focus on the theories of Young and Fraser as they reflect the 
approach, which I take in this thesis. Young (2001:16) defines structural injustice as 
an unequal condition of individuals underlined by institutional rules and relations 
and a by-product of sociocultural, economic inequality and social hierarchy. 
Structural injustice refers to systems of oppression and marginalisation that 
systematically exclude particular groups from social benefits and opportunities 
(Young, 1990:41). For example, the caste-based hierarchy is a systematic historical 
imposition of institutional barriers to Dalit, which prevents them from enjoying equal 
rights. The structures that generate injustice are not, however always explicit or 
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overt and can be more indirect and implicit. Institutional social structures and 
background conditions prevent particular groups from being equal in the society. 
Social structure is a multidimensional space of different social positions that play a 
vital role in increasing inequality and constraining individuals’ freedom and material 
well-being (Calhoun et al., 1990:69; Young, 2001:41). This structure consists of the 
connection between the position and the relationship among people. It exists in action 
and interactions of persons, rules, and resources (Calhoun et al., 1990:70). Because 
of structural injustices, even if members of those groups are given equal 
opportunities, they are not able to compete against better-off groups and remain 
systematically disadvantaged in the society.  
 
Structural injustice occurs ‘when social processes put large categories of persons 
under a systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and 
exercise their capacities’ (Schiff, 2014:31). Structural injustice can also be described 
as the relative constraints some people encounter regarding their freedom and 
material well-being as compared with others who in their social positions have more 
options or easier access to benefits (Ibid). What follows from this understanding is 
that justice is not just a matter of distribution and redistribution because the 
relations that generate injustice are what need to be changed. If relations are 
oppressive or dominating, that is what needs to be addressed (Young, 1997:30). In 
this sense, domination also exists through the structural or systematic phenomena 
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that exclude people from participating in shaping their activities or the circumstances 
of their lives (Young, 1990:31). In contemporary society, social position is a 
determining factor in creating structural injustice as it is predefined by the social and 
cultural norms and institutional arrangements. In the literature developed in the 
Anglo-American world, the major forms of domination that have been discussed are 
racism and sexism (Ibid), and increasingly gender identity more broadly. 
 
Oppression is a structural concept as it also refers to systematic constraints placed 
on groups due to underlying institutional rules and practices (Young, 1990:41) and is 
related to the enormous and profound injustice some groups suffer. According to the 
traditional or simplistic view, oppression refers to the exercise of tyranny by the 
ruling class, which indeed causes disadvantage and injustice, experienced by some 
people as engendered by everyday practices in a liberal society. Oppression is better 
understood, however, as systemic constraints on groups; the product of structure 
rather than the choice of few people (Young, 1990:41). 
 
According to Young (1990:40), there are five different faces of oppression: 
exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence. She 
explains that exploitation is a steady process whereby the results of the labour of one 
social group are transferred to benefit another. Exploitation demonstrates structural 
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social relations between different social groups that determine who does what and 
who receives what. This extends to the relation of power and inequality, for example; 
gender exploitation is the primarily patriarchal institutional structure of society.  
 
Marginalisation occurs where a whole category of people is excluded from useful 
partaking in social life and may entail severe material deprivation and even 
extermination (Young, 1990:53). A third aspect of oppression is powerlessness. Being 
powerless, members of the group lack authority, status, a sense of self, and are 
excluded from advantageous social positions. The fourth face, cultural imperialism, 
involves universalising the culture of dominant groups as a norm, which in turn 
negates the cultural values or forms of expression of other groups (Ibid PAGE). This 
domination is not only material; as cultural domination creates injustice for 
particular groups. Culturally oppressed groups are socially segregated, stereotyped 
and internalised in the society. Finally, violence is another form of oppression 
wherein a group suffers from the systematic violence that is inflicted with the purpose 
of degrading, humiliating or stigmatising. Oppressed groups suffer systematic 
attacks to their persons or property with the aim of damaging and humiliating them 
(Young, 1990:61).  
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Nancy Fraser’s social justice approach integrates the cultural and distributive 
dimensions. According to Fraser (2003), economic and cultural burdens 
simultaneously underpin injustices experienced by group members in society. As 
such, she defines injustices in economic and cultural forms. Economic injustice is 
primarily rooted in political and economic structures and concerns exploitation, 
economic marginalisation, and deprivation of basic goods (Fraser, 2003:13). Cultural 
and symbolic injustice is rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, 
and communication such as being excluded, invisible and being subject to deprecating 
stereotypes and cultural representations (Ibid). Economic injustice refers to 
socioeconomic maldistribution deeply rooted in the economic structure of society. 
Institutionalised social norms create status subordination and misdistribution, and 
these are themselves the result of economic structures, e.g. unequal distribution of 
labour, whereby certain classes are placed in a position where they can be exploited 
(Ibid). The outline of cultural injustice is primarily concerned with non-recognition, 
such as cultural domination within the culture, non-representation, and disrespect.  
 
Accordingly, in proposing the remedies for injustice, Fraser claims that ‘justice today 
requires both redistribution and recognition, as neither alone is sufficient’ (Fraser, 
2003:10). Justice is not only achieved by redistributing resources, but it equally 
involves addressing recognition. This is because cultural norms can also produce 
unfair outcomes.  In contemporary society, she claims that redistribution is not 
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enough because injustice occurs at the structure level that requires recognition of 
social group difference and their identity.  
 
Fraser argues that the remedy for economic injustice is redistribution or economic 
restructuring, for example, reorganising the division of labour, restructuring property 
ownership and other essential economic structures (Fraser, 2003:13). At the same 
time, the dimension of recognition focuses on cultural changes such as revaluing 
disrespected identities, the transformation of the pattern of representation, and 
equality to the subordinate groups (Ibid). The appreciation of cultural practices, the 
identity of the group and equality in political representation through specific 
affirmative policy are further examples of cultural changes for recognition (Fraser, 
2003:13). Arguing for recognition as a matter of justice, Fraser claims that it is a 
concern of justice since institutionalised patterns of cultural value create status 
subordination, resulting in some people being held as inferior, excluded and deprived 
of social interaction. According to Fraser (2003:10) ‘redistribution produces political 
and economic changes that result in greater economic equality. Recognition redresses 
the harms of disrespect, stereotyping and cultural imperialism’. For Fraser (2003:10) 
both redistribution and recognition are essential elements for the social justice of a 
group in the age of identity politics.  
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Fraser argues that within each—distribution and recognition strategies—there are 
approaches that we can call ‘transformative’ and ‘affirmative’ (Fraser, 2003:74). 
Affirmative strategies for rectifying injustice aim to right the inequitable outcomes of 
social arrangements without disturbing the underlying social structures (Ibid). For 
example, an affirmative strategy seeks to redress mal-distribution through income 
transfer. The affirmative approach also helps to redress disrespect by revaluing the 
devalued identity. However, transformative strategies aim to correct unjust outcomes 
by restructuring the underlying structures. Thus concerning distribution, the 
transformative approach insists upon altering the division of labour, the forms of 
ownership, and other basic economic systems (Fraser, 2003:74). However, as Fraser 
points out, these two types of strategies can come into conflict. A transformative 
approach to the economy could mean eliminating a group as a separate group, but 
the transformative dimension of culture could mean keeping the group difference and 
revaluing it. Fraser describes a transformative approach to recognition as a 
‘deconstructive’ strategy (Fraser, 2003:75). The deconstructive strategy restitutes-
status subordination by deconstructing the patterns of cultural value or in another 
sense by raising the self-esteem of the recognised groups. For example, in the anti-
racist movement, it aims to establish the value of black identity. Again, the 
transformative approach to recognition might be in tension with an affirmative 
approach, which could work by seeking to dissolve differences. 
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Different thinkers recommend various strategies to attain social justice, also varying 
within their distinct social contexts. Young (1990:8) argues for the need for 
redistribution; however, this cannot simply be a surface redistribution but requires 
an analysis of the institutional relations that structure decision-making power, the 
division of labour and culture (Ibid). In her view, justice means eliminating the 
institutionalised patterns of injustice through fair redistribution.  When it comes to 
the question of substantial justice, distributive justice is not, adequate for 
marginalised groups and requires special measures that affirm social group 
difference (Young, 2001:31). Young (1990: 157) supports special treatment for social 
groups as a strategy for social justice.  
 
Political power is also a matter of justice. Verma (2008: 282) argues that increasing 
the political power of minorities makes a real difference in the distribution of scarce 
resources that creates political equality. Because the State has prime responsibility 
for shaping and enforcing the distribution of resources for fairness and equality 
(Fleischacker, 2004), the more the balance of political power favours the interest of 
marginalised groups, the greater the chances of increasing their weight in democratic 
decision-making (Verma, 2008).  
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The above mentioned structural approach focus specifically on the reform of formal 
institutions, an approach that has been criticized. While critically analysing the 
limits of formal institutional reform Andrews (2013) book on the limits of 
Institutional reform in development: changing rules for realistic solutions crystalizes 
the problems of donor driven institutional reforms in developing countries. Since the 
late 1990s, loans, grants and technical assistance by the World Bank and other 
donors to support the reform of public institutions have risen sharply. Much of this 
support has focused on reorganizing the civil service, restructuring the public sector, 
and establishing anti-corruption commissions. As argued by Andrews, institutional 
malfunctioning is a prominent cause of poor economic and social development 
(Andrews, 2013:74). Such malfunctioning requires reform of the institutions of 
government to achieve better developmental outcomes. However, with few 
exceptions, this has not been translated into results, and huge amounts of public 
money have been wasted as a result. 
 
Andrews concludes that existing modalities of designing public sector reform 
programs and delivering technical assistance need to be rethought (Andrews, 
2013:45). The main reason behind the failure, he argues, is that shipping in 
international experts with little local knowledge for short periods generally adds little 
value. Instead, more regular and sustained support could have better results. 
Approaches to reform that start with a consideration of problems rather than leaping 
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immediately to solutions, and reforms that are internalized and ‘embedded’ in local 
officials, are also much more likely to be successful and sustained.  
As argued by Andrew, it is easy to focus on formal institutional content such as laws, 
policy and mechanisms, whereas the informal aspects such as beliefs and practices 
are hard to change (Andrews, 2013:76). This suggest a mode of institutional change 
that is context-specific to the problem and driven by local agents. Unless it is locally 
owned, and involves both formal and informal institutional reforms to eradicate the 
social stigmas and discrimination, efforts will not succeed.  
In summary, the structural approach particularly Fraser’s theory is relevant to 
understanding the injustices Dalit have been facing since Dalit face injustices of both 
recognition and redistribution. However, Fraser does not explicitly address the Dalit 
context in Nepal. To achieve Dalit justice, I argue that; both elements of justice 
according to Fraser should be addressed in the policies and programs. As later 
chapters will show, Dalit experience economic, cultural, political and social 
oppression and to meet these issues requires socio-economical, structural and 
political transformation. Either cultural or economic change would only bring about 
a limited form of transformation in the Dalit context as they suffer from the unequal 
distribution of state resources and a systematically devalued identity. At the same 
time there is question of informal institutions such as culture and peoples' attitude 
towards discrimination. Andrews (2013) rightly points out the limits of formal 
institutional reform approach. The formal institutional approach if driven by external 
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actors and without an understanding the context would fail. Formal institutional 
reforms needs to be brought about by stakeholders from within the relevant groups 
and with an understanding of the broader context. Thus, this thesis highlights the 
importance of reforming both formal and informal institutions. The informal 
institutions such as beliefs and culture should be changed through advocacy 
interventions that will help to sensitize against deeply rooted social stigma. The 
advocacy interventions are, for examples interaction, meetings, street drama, public 
service announcements, television drama and trainings. These means of advocacy 
contributes to reduce and or eliminate social stigmas. However, the reformation of 
formal institutions should be done making pro-Dalit institution, reforming laws and 
making responsive institution of its implementation. 
 
4.5. Conception of Group Rights 
As discussed above, theorists who point to structural reasons for social injustice also 
argue for approaches including differential allocations that go beyond individual level 
equality of opportunity (Calhoun, 1982; Young, 1990; Williams, 1998). They argue 
that attending only to individual rights will be insufficient to achieve social justice 
for members of different social groups because the structural foundation of injustice 
undermines the rights of all members of the identity group. Some scholars contend 
that reaching substantial equality among individuals can only be achieved by the 
recognition and protection of group-specific rights (Kymlicka, 1995:117). Thus, group 
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difference has been conceptualised to redress structural injustices that relate to the 
larger institutional relations and processes beyond the individual level (Young, 1990; 
Kymlicka, 1995; Williams, 1998). Williams for example, focusing on race and gender, 
argues that in a hierarchical society where inequality is structured along the lines of 
race and gender, group difference must be taken into account (Williams, 1998:4). 
Thus, justice requires that redistributions and measures readdressing misrecognition 
be based on group membership rather than allocations occurring solely on an 
individual basis.  
 
When social justice theorists argue for distribution or recognition at the level of 
groups, they are, of course, not speaking about just any group. Young defines a group 
‘as a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural 
forms, practices, or way of life. Members of a group have a specific affinity with one 
another because of their similar experience or way of life’ (1990:43). Correspondingly, 
a group becomes a group through the process of its members’ experiences. As Miller 
puts it, a group comes into being ‘as categories of people become more aware of their 
common interests and common concerns. Very often some group of people turns into 
groups due to the experiences of oppression or discrimination’ (2002:179). Gay rights 
groups are an example of a group where members have come to be part of a distinct 
group by their fight against stereotypes and discrimination. Members’ needs and 
interests lead them to join and become members of the group (Jones, 2016:354). This 
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model of a social group may be a collective of individuals separated from others by 
their experiences and way of life. In this sense, social groups differ from other types 
of groups because it is through social processes that they come to be distinguished 
within the broader society (Young, 1990:43).  
 
Theorists have distinguished different kinds of groups and drawn these distinctions 
in various ways. Amy Gutmann categorises groups as interest, cultural, ascriptive, 
and religious groups (Gutmann, 2003:8). Interest groups are voluntary groups formed 
through shared interests among group members. Cultural groups can be recognised 
as identity groups because of their distinct cultural identification, such as language 
and way of life. A cultural group is one whose identity isrelated to is separate and 
inherited culture (Alcoff et al., 2006). Ascriptive groups are formed by characteristics 
such as race, gender, class, ethnicity, sexual orientation or other socially stereotyped 
identities over which group members do not have control. However, in general, it is 
dominant groups that assign a negative identity to the members of ascriptive groups, 
and as such, ascriptive groups have a shared identification around some specific and 
negatively valued characteristic that brings them together, and they are formed as a 
result of social stereotypes or discrimination (Gutmann, 2003:118).  Religious groups 
are formed based on their common religious beliefs and practices. 
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Building on the broad category of ascriptive groups suggested by Gutmann (2003), 
Williams (1998) describes what she calls marginalised ascriptive groups, a distinction 
that is particularly relevant to the study of Dalit in Nepal. Williams (1998) suggests 
that marginalised ascriptive groups can be distinguished from other kinds of groups 
by four distinct features. First there is a pattern of structured social and political 
inequality; second, group membership is not usually voluntary; third, membership is 
not changeable; and fourth, society or the dominant culture assigns negative 
meanings to the group identity (Williams, 1998:15-16). Moreover, marginalised 
ascriptive groups retain these characteristics over multiple generations.  
 
As noted above, the defining factor for ascriptive groups is some shared social marker, 
which establishes the distinctive identity, such as gender, race, class, ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, disability or sexual orientation (Gutmann, 2003:9). While this 
identity is, for marginalised ascriptive groups, the source of its oppression, it also 
becomes an essential factor in the process of disadvantaged groups ‘combatting 
injustice (Gutmann, 2003:3). Williams (1998:6) argues that for marginalised people, 
the primary reason to create a separate group is to address the similarity in their 
social position and to represent the concerns and interests of those groups. In this 
sense, the very identity that is the ‘problem’ also helps members to feel protected and 
provides them with a sense of belonging, as a response to the stereotype and the basis 
for their developing respect within their groups (Gutmann, 2003:2). Similarly, Alcoff 
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et al. (2006) argue that marginalised groups believe their identities are often 
resources of knowledge especially relevant for social change, and their identity helps 
them to unify and struggle for justice. 
 
The shared practices within the group also help members to have a sense of group 
membership, as one sees where ethnic groups identify their cultural practices 
(Dundes, 1984:149). Shared social markers are a characteristic expression of group 
cultural identity, and social markers help to create the collective identity of the group.  
Indeed, some scholars argue that without shared identity markers individuals are 
not able to become a collective agent (Du Preez, 1980:3). Gutmann (2003:10) argues 
that shared social markers, albeit stigmatising, are also elements that can assist 
groups collectively organising and protesting to transform their identity. 
 
At the same time, it would be a mistake to see the group as simple or static. Moya 
argues that identity is ‘socially significant and context-specific, ideologically 
constructed in the social world’ (2006: 97). This definition points to the important fact 
that identity varies according to its social context and the interest of group members. 
Thus, while identity is in some ways unified, it is also multiplein the sense that there 
are many social identities for any individual (Dundes, 1984:149).  
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According to Williams (1998:14), we can think of group identity as having objective 
and subjective dimensions. Objective forms of group identity are those where the 
identity has been produced through a history of state-supported discrimination 
against the group and the persistence of contemporary patterns of social, economic 
and political inequality (Ibid). Subjective group identity involves the shared memory 
of past discrimination and belief of shared political interest in the present (Williams, 
1998:14). These two dimensions of group identity are both necessary for groups to 
make compelling claims of political recognition and their co-presence provide power 
to the group to become stronger (Williams, 1998).  
 
In recent years, the politicisation of ascriptive groups, or groups’ claiming that their 
identity has political salience, has led to the rise of what is known as ‘identity politics’. 
Identity politics ‘refers to the activism or status-seeking that is based on categories 
like gender, class, ethnicity, tribe, clan, sexuality, cultural orientation, race, caste or 
political identification’ (Wiarda, 2014:146). In one sense, identity politics is centrally 
concerned with maintaining or imposing an identity, but as ‘political activism rather 
than cultural activism’ (Bernstein 2005:48). The identity in identity politics is more 
about the ‘consolidation of interlocking symbols, which provides a sense of integrity 
and continuity of action’ (Du Preez, 1980:3). Identity politics is seen as a way for 
people who face discrimination or non-recognition to fight for their rights of equality, 
freedom, and justice. 
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Taking identity as the basis for political claims-making can be understood about 
Fraser’s (2003) argument, discussed above, that injustice can involve misrecognition, 
and that this structural and cultural injustice must be countered by a revaluation of 
the culture and identity. The revaluation of destigmatised identities provides positive 
recognition to groups, alongside struggles for the redistribution of resources (Ibid).  
 
This shift to a politics based on identity is associated with the so-called new social 
movements, where identity forms the basis of challenges to unequal power relations 
in society (Bernstein 2005). The term identity becomes a symbol and a force for 
political change and challenges unequal power relations (Sagar, 2009). For example, 
in the 1960s and 70s, social movements such as the civil rights and women 
movements emerged, concerned with culture and identity as the basis for injustice, 
rather than challenging class structures, as associated with the old social movements 
(Bernstein, 2005:49). Importantly, though, Young (1990) argues that the key aims of 
identity-based movements such as feminism and black liberation not to achieve 
recognition of their group’s suffering, but to seek the ability to fully and equally 
participate in social and political life (Ibid). In this sense, new social movements focus 
on identity to mobilise resources and challenge social and political exclusions.  
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There have, nevertheless, been criticisms of the use of identity as a political category. 
There is a suspicion that identity politics violates fundamental principles concerning 
freedom and equality (Gutmann, 2003:8). As well as pointing to the types of criticisms 
made above about the implications of treating some people differently (and thus 
arguably discriminating against non-members), the concern being expressed here 
also concerns the risk that identity politics creates constraints on group members. 
Identity groups have been criticised for systematically subordinating the freedom of 
individual members and creating an involuntary basis for membership, for example 
where group members are not allowed to leave the group (Alcoff et al., 2006:3). A 
related criticism is that political claims based on group identity can mask internal 
discrimination (Ibid). The situation of marginalised women of colour or minority 
sexualities within women groups or women within ethnic minority groups exemplifies 
this criticism. 
 
Identity politics have also been accused of becoming sectarian and making it harder 
to reach political compromises (Alcoff et al., 2006:3). Since identity groups have 
specific demands, this may mean that it is hard to reach political comprises 
(Gutmann, 2003:17). The identity politics that groups mobilise can lead to hostility 
towards others who are considered as inferior to members of the group (Gutmann, 
2003:1). Thus, whereas democratic politics relies on equality, understanding and 
compromise, identity groups can be sometimes inflexible. At the extreme identity 
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politics ‘may open up deep divisions or rifts in society …and can produce chaos, 
disintegration, and civil war (Wiarda, 2014:147).  
 
If we understand that identities are social constructions and are not natural, and 
often are permanently marked by severe conditions that gave rise to them, it has been 
argued that they should not be accorded so much weight or importance regarding 
political organisation (Alcoff et al., 2006:3). The stigma attached to identity groups 
provides unnecessary pain and sufferings (Ibid). Nonetheless, defenders of group 
identity politics argue that group identity is a tool to unite groups and fight against 
injustices and that they provide the mutual support necessary to help to combat past 
injustices (Gutmann, 2003:3; Berstein, 2005:53).  
 
Different Forms of Group Rights 
This section outlines various forms of group rights and some of the liberal criticisms 
levelled against group rights. Group rights are understood as distinct from individual 
rights as conceptualised within traditional liberal conceptions of rights. Two forms of 
groups rights have been distinguished: one held by individuals by their membership 
in a disadvantaged group, and one that is genuinely a collective right (Jones, 
1999:355). Whereas the former category still attaches to individuals, collective rights 
are those that can only be exercised by the group as a whole, and the holder of a group 
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right is the group rather than its members as separate individuals (Preda, 2013). The 
cultural rights of indigenous people are collective group rights (Haksar, 1998:31; 
Jones, 1999:355; Kymlicka, 1995:14), and specifically include self-determination, 
territorial rights and self-governance rights (Kymlicka, 1995:109). 
 
Liberals have been highly critical of group-based rights or allocations by group 
membership because they see such practices as directly impacting on individual 
equality and equal opportunity (Hayek, 1984:95). As discussed above, liberal theory 
pertains to the individual and asserts the moral supremacy of the person against the 
claims of the social collective (Ibid). It is also egalitarian in the sense that it confers 
the same moral status on all individuals and denies differences in moral worth of 
human beings according to identity features (Kukathas, 1992:108). From the 
perspective of classical liberals, for whom, as noted above, individual freedom and 
equal opportunity are core principles, distributions at the group level violate 
individual freedom and fail to respect the equal moral worth of individuals (Van 
Dyke, 1995:358S). Barry argues, ‘the individualistic nature of liberalism precludes 
any policies that provide unique benefits for people by their membership in some 
group’ (Barry, 2013:114). Beyond direct forms of discrimination or other failures to 
provide individuals equal opportunities, liberals insist that remaining differences are 
fair because individuals are responsible for those differences (Ibid). In this context, a 
liberal approach would be critical of an institution such as guaranteed 
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representation, which could be seen as undermining liberal democratic norms of 
individual rights and equal citizenship (Hayek, 1984:84). A further concern raised 
against group rights is that recognising the rights of one group can undermine the 
rights of others outside the group and create a permanent minority (Kukathas, 
2013:114). Liberals argue that treating people as individuals has a lesser chance of 
creating such harmful side effects. 
 
In response to the liberal critics of group rights, scholars such as Williams (1998), 
Young (1990), Fraser (2003) and Kymlicka (1995) have argued against narrowly 
focusing at the individual level. As already discussed, they insist that structural 
inequality cannot be addressed by ascribing equal opportunity to all individuals and 
the difference produced through structural injustice needs to be addressed by a group-
differentiated politics. According to Williams (1998), society has long been structured 
by oppression and inequality, and this can only be addressed through social difference 
or the claims of groups being recognised, specifically through the political 
representation of marginalised groups. Young (1990:3) similarly argues that policies 
need to counter group-based oppression and that this is best done through group 
representation in politics and group-differentiated policies. Again, Fraser (2003) 
claims that economic disadvantage and cultural disrespect are the results of 
structurally embedded injustice and that liberal equality does not specifically address 
either element of economic disadvantage or cultural disrespect. Preda (2013:263) also 
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argues that individual welfare not sufficient to address the structural problems, 
which need group based rights.  
 
As distinct from Young and Fraser, Kymlicka (1995) seeks to make an argument for 
groups’ rights within liberalism. He argues that for individuals to enjoy their rights, 
they need to be part of a viable group (p. 14). More specifically, he claims that ethnic, 
cultural and linguistic rights are necessary for groups to be sustainable, and as such, 
supports the recognition of group rights such as self-determination and autonomy 
(Ibid). Thus, contrary to those who argue for group rights against individual rights, 
Kymlicka (1995) claims that minority group rights might be necessary if individuals 
are in fact to enjoy individual rights. As asserted by Kymlicka (1996:35) the rights of 
minority groups such as self-governance and special group representation are 
essential as they are deprived of these rights. Collective rights are essential to 
advance the self-rule of groups that in turn also promotes individual autonomy (Wall, 
2007:235). 
 
Minority Group Rights in International Law 
Another way of thinking about group rights has been through the concept of minority 
rights. The notion of minority rights remains relevant in international law, which 
offers limited protection and promotion of the rights of minorities. That said, the term 
minority has been defined differently by United Nations bodies, international 
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agencies, and scholars, and there is no universally agreed, legally binding definition 
of the term. The United Nations Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities (1991) defined minorities as ‘a group of people having 
ethnic, religious or linguistic traditions or characteristic which differ from others and 
needs to be protected’ (United Nations, 1991:5). This definition rests on the numerical 
size of groups, referring to the number of people being smaller than within dominant 
groups. At the same time, the inclusion of the reference to the need for protection 
implies a differential in power and the risk of domination.  Indeed, some contend that 
the idea of the minority is inherently vague and imprecise, allowing many states to 
assume a restrictive definition (Khan and Rahaman, 2012:1).  
 
Historically, provisions for minority protection can be found written into different 
treaties already in the seventeenth and eighteenth century. Even before the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648, treaties between sovereigns sought to ensure protection for 
specific vulnerable groups (Castellino and Dominquez, 2006:2). Initially, the 
protected minorities were mainly religious, but with the Vienna Congress in 1815 we 
see evidence of a treaty provision recognising ethnic rights rather than religious ones 
(Capotorti& United Nations Centre for Human Rights, 1991:3). The process of 
international undertakings regarding ethnic minority rights was pronounced in the 
19thcentury, ‘a period during which the nationalities question was burning issue’ 
(Ibid).  
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After the end of the First World War, several treaties were established to safeguard 
the protection of minorities in the modern system of nation states. These treaties took 
various forms; some were treaties of peace signed at the end of the war, some were 
special minority treaties, and some, binding declarations (Kymlicka, 1995:1). 
Minorities were a particular concern for the League of Nations as the principle of 
territorial integrity led to the formation of states where certain nationalities or 
ethnicities dominated, and minorities were excluded and in many cases politically 
and socially marginalised (Macklem, 2008:541). This meant that minorities required 
special protections within the nation state to avoid ethnic or religious hostilities. 
After World War II, and in part because of the deleterious impacts of minority rights 
claims, there was a significant shift to relinquishing minority group rights, and the 
priority moved to protecting the rights of individuals.  
 
The modern international law protects and promotes minority rights in the form of 
cultural rights, in recognition of the particular oppression minorities can suffer. As 
Macklem argues, ‘international law values minority protection not only for reasons 
of universal value but also because it mitigates dangers of violence, cruelty, and 
political humiliation so often accompany ethnic pluralism and ethnic politics’ 
(2008:541). Within international human rights law, the International Covenant on 
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Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) of 1966 is one convention that explicitly recognises 
minority rights. Article 27 provides that: 
in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, 
persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practise their religion, or to use their language. 
(ICCPR, 1966: 179) 
 
Moreover, Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR), provides specific rights for minority groups to take part in cultural 
life. These rights extend universal human rights to ensure that cultural rights are 
protected and promoted. The International Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) of 1965 condemns discrimination based on 
race, language, religion and ethnic origin. In this regard, it obligates state parties to 
adopt all possible measures to eliminate racial discrimination. These international 
conventions have been ratified by most of the States, including South Asian countries 
(Castellino and Dominquez, 2006:8). Nepal has ratified the ICCPR, the CESCR and 
ICERD.  
Nevertheless, minority rights remain contested, especially when they are held to be 
the basis for claims of self-determination and autonomy rights. In general, States are 
reluctant to provide self-determination and autonomy for specific minority groups, 
arguing that this impact the rights of other individuals and may threaten territorial 
integrity (Anaya, 1995:323).  
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4.6. Models for Group Specific Rights 
This section deals with models of group-specific rights that would help to provide 
social justice to social groups. The models are mainly divided into two categories: 
special political representation and forms of structural intervention such as 
Affirmative Action.  
 
Special Political Representation  
Scholars including Williams (1998), Young (1990), Kymlicka (1995) and Calhoun 
(1999) have argued for guaranteed group representation rights. Such institutional 
arrangements see guaranteeing political representation to members of particular 
groups as a means of ensuring their political influence (Williams, 1998). The reasons 
for the importance of special representation include the value of symbolic 
representation, that is, members of disadvantaged groups seeing people who share 
their identities in power (Williams, 1995). Such special representation is also part of 
empowering disadvantaged groups in political decision making.  
 
Aside from any arguments about ensuring that institutions are put in place to ensure 
the representation of marginalised groups, the ostensibly neutral rules and 
institutions that regulate how voting takes place and how representation is decided 
based on voting can also influence the distribution of representation in a political 
system (Williams, 1998:22). As such, the proper representation of minorities in the 
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political sector is sometimes obstructed by unfair electoral laws even when they 
appear identity neutral (Ibid). It is argued that such electoral rules support dominant 
groups, especially when marginalised people lack resources to compete for power on 
an equal basis.  
 
Beyond explicitly unfair rules though, different types of counting procedures have 
different implications for minorities. Proportional Representation (PR), in particular, 
is seen as one way of providing minorities with greater access to political 
representation. Williams (1998:215) describes Proportional Representation as the 
allocation of shares of political power based on the percentage of the population. 
Theoretically, proportional representation means that the share of seats any party 
holds corresponds to the proportion of votes it receives (Canon, 1999:365). Canon 
(1995) argues that PR systems provide greater fairness than plurality systems, in 
which the absolute winner takes all, whereas PR is more inclusive of those who 
cannot achieve an absolute majority in any one electorate. Thus, PR promotes power-
sharing and consociational democracy, where consociational democracy is a process 
of elites eschewing decision making by the majority, thereby rendering democracy 
more stable by providing opportunities to other groups (Andeweg, 2000:511). More 
specifically, for traditionally excluded groups, this form of representation can ‘provide 
a greater voice for ethnic and racial minorities’ (Canon 1999: 365). Various states, 
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including Belgium, Cyprus, Lebanon, New Zealand, West Germany and Zimbabwe 
have proportional representation as the political arrangement (Lijphart, 1997). 
 
There are different types of proportional representation, such as party lists, 
cumulative voting and mixed systems. In the party-list system, political parties win 
seats in proportion to the number of votes cast for them (Williams, 1998:215). Party 
list systems can be closed or open. In a closed list system, the party creates an order 
and assigns seats to the candidates, whereas if the list is open voters can indicate 
their preferences. A different system, cumulative voting, is considered a form of semi-
proportional representation (Canon, 1999:365). Cumulative voting refers to a system 
where voters can allocate their vote to different candidates in multi-member districts. 
This particular system allows voters to focus on their preferences. This system also 
allows voters to allocate their votes between the candidates in any proportion (Ibid). 
The voters’ preference, especially when these are for candidates from minority 
groups, is helpful in promoting the selection of the members of a minority, and 
minorities can elect at least one of their preferred candidates (Canon, 1999:366).  
 
Other more explicit ways of increasing minority representation include race-
conscious districting and ethnic quotas. Race-conscious districting entails drawing 
the shape of constituencies based ethnic proportions to ensure that a particular ethnic 
group can become the majority (Williams, 1998:205). However, criticisms of race-
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conscious districting such as ‘labelling and separating citizens' according to race and 
doing a grave injustice to individual autonomy’ have led scholars to consider 
alternative solutions for electoral rules that would ensure the representation of 
minority groups (Williams, 1998: 206).  
 
One such system is ethnic quotas, sometimes referred to as the reservation of seats 
for certain ethnic groups. Reserved seats are seen as providing group members with 
a guaranteed voice and a means of preventing their chronic under-representation 
(KrookandO'  Brien, 2010:255). This measure typically sets aside seats that members 
of other groups are ineligible to contest. In some contexts, it is argued that a system 
of reserved seats may be the only way for minorities to obtain parliamentary 
representation due to their insufficient numerical strength, lack of territorial 
concentration or low level of political mobilisation (Hodzic and Mraović, 2015:419). 
Reserved seats may be administered in different ways, depending on the nature of 
the electoral system. This includes competitive elections in separate voting districts 
and separate voters’ rolls for minorities (Ibid). Studies have found that reserved seat 
mechanisms bring socio-economic and political benefits to disadvantaged groups 
(Pande, 2003; Hodžic and Mraović, 2015). 
 
Reserved seats directly increase the political representation afforded to minority 
groups in the legislature. This type of political reservation has, for example, had a 
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profound effect on the Indian political landscape, where a quarter of all 
representatives in India, at both the national and state level, come from reserved 
seats (Pande, 2003:1136). In Slovenia, there are two seats reserved for Hungarians 
and Italians. New Zealand has seven reserved seats for Maori groups (Williams, 
1998). 
 
However, critics have raised questions about the quality of representation in reserved 
seat systems and the influence of minorities in the decision-making process. Vasil 
(1990) argues that even if their places are guaranteed, minority representatives are 
not able to change the decision process in the parliament (p. 10). In the case of New 
Zealand, where the seats reserved for Maori are fewer than would correspond to the 
share of their population, it is argued that Non-Maori groups (Pakeha) feel that they 
are not responsible for Maori issues (Williams, 1998:209). As minority 
representatives, Maori are not able to determine the decision-making process, and 
under the influence of dominant groups, outcomes that favour minority group 
interests are unlikely to be produced (Williams, 1998:209). Despite this fact, Maori 
are reluctant to give up their reserved seats, which have at least guaranteed their 
legislative presence (Ibid).  
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Structural Interventions–Affirmative Action 
Structural interventions in the form of reservation or quotas in the public service or 
other sectors have also been advocated and used as policy interventions to address 
social injustice in different countries. Affirmative action or quotas are curative 
mechanisms to redress past injustices experienced by historically marginalised 
groups (Young, 1990:194; Mosley and Capaldi, 1996:64). As defined by Young 
(1990:173), Affirmative Action is a group conscious social policy intended to address 
the particular oppressive situation of a social group. Affirmative Action is a process 
to achieve equality and a mechanism to redress past injustices against historically 
marginalised people (Hassan, 2011). Crosby (2004) defines Affirmative Action as a 
‘policy designed to correct the wrongs of the past, as a quota system, or as a set of 
corrective programs aimed to compensate for the inadequacies of people…’ (p. 4). It 
is an ‘attempt to bring members of underrepresented groups, usually, groups that 
have suffered discrimination, into a higher degree of participation in some beneficial 
program’ (Rosenfeld, 1991:10). Affirmative Action has been understood as combining 
backwards-looking and forward-looking principles. The backwards-looking aspect 
concerns compensation for past harm based on preferential policies, whereas forward-
looking principles aim at future equality of opportunity (Goldman, 1976:178).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Historically, the term Affirmative Action first emerged in 1961 after the USA 
President John F. Kennedy instigated such a policy with the purpose of monitoring 
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hiring practices (Mosley andCapaldi,1996:64). The 1961 executive order helped to 
establish Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the USA and was 
consequently expanded by President Lyndon Johnson in 1965. Arguably, the 
foundation for this term was laid down earlier by then President Franklin Roosevelt's 
executive order of1941 banning discrimination in employment by the federal 
government and defence contractors (Mosley, 1996). Affirmative Action became 
contested public policy in the USA as it was intended to address racial injustices but 
did so by explicitly favouring minority applicants or students. 
 
In India, Affirmative Action ‘owes its origin to British rule, which, in addition to 
starting caste based quotas in some parts of the country, also resulted in the 
establishment of a nationwide legal system with the norm of equality before the law’ 
(Deshpande, 2008:160). Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Indian Constitution (1950) 
provide 22.5% quotas in state-run institutions and jobs for Scheduled Castes (SCs) 
and Scheduled Tribes (STs). The same proportion of seats is also reserved for SCs and 
STs at all the levels of governance. In 1990, 27%quotas for affirmative action were 
also provided to Other Backward Castes (OBCs) (Jayal, 2015). The Dalit in India is 
constitutionally known as Scheduled castes (SCs). In India also, Affirmative Action 
remains controversial.  
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Tylor (2009:478) has classified Affirmative Action into five categories based on the 
policy provisions offered to the disadvantaged community. The first type is formal 
equality of opportunity, which focuses on talents of relevant individuals but helps to 
eliminate legal barriers to employment and discriminatory practices (Ibid). One 
might question whether this is Affirmative Action at all and not simply liberal non-
discrimination. The second type is an aggressive formal equality of opportunity, 
which intends to help particular groups by providing training, external monitoring 
by the government. The third is compensating support to social groups, such as 
special training programs, financial backing or tutoring support (Ibid). The fourth 
category is soft quotas, a process of providing compensation in the selection process 
by, for example, adding bonus points in the calculation of merit. The fifth category is 
hard quotas, which provide quotas such as proportional representation to the 
historically disadvantaged group (Tylor, 2009:478).   
 
Despite the inclusion here of Tylor’s first category, Affirmative Action differs from 
equal opportunity policies. Although equal opportunity seeks fairness in opportunity, 
it is a reactive process, which does not provide any affirmative policy solution (Crosby, 
2004). Affirmative Action is a proactive stance, which requires institutional 
arrangements and interventions (Crosby, 2004:5). Moreover, Affirmative Action is 
specifically directed towards empowering those groups that have been adversely 
affected by past and present exclusionary practices (Mosley, 1996). The proponents 
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of the policy argue that ‘political efforts and social resources must be aggressively 
devoted to all the permissible interventions until the stains on our society are wiped 
clean, no matter how long it takes…' (Tylor, 2009:502).  
 
Recently, Affirmative Action discourse has moved to devise more creative approaches 
in the private sector, which is playing a noteworthy role in the development of these 
types of processes (Deshpande, 2013). As Deshpande (2013) argues, a large number 
of people are employed in the private sector, but historically businesses in the private 
sectors have in no way been bound by Affirmative Action policies.  
 
As a policy, Affirmative Action has been a widely debated and contested option to 
compensate for past discrimination. Critics of Affirmative Action object that it 
promotes stereotypes and causes intergroup tension (Tylor, 2009:478). Such critics 
also contend that it contravenes principles of equality and meritocracy (Mosley and 
Capaldi, 1996:3). Some argue that others who are not benefited could be victimised 
by those very policies (Ibid). Affirmative Action is sometimes labelled reverse 
discrimination, bringing a negative connotation and indicating that it attempts to 
disadvantage another group through its program. Critics have gone as far as to 
compare the affirmative action to giving bad medicine to a patient, arguing that it, in 
fact, promotes the stereotype that those who benefit from the system could not 
succeed on their own (Crosby et al., 2006).  
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In response, a counter argument prevails that the reason for negative reactions to 
Affirmative Action is that the recipients are members of powerless groups (Eberhardt 
and Fiske, 1994). Others criticise the preferential treatment as inadequate as it gives 
preference to individual members of groups and does not advantage the group as a 
whole (Rosenfeld,1991). Indeed, a further concern is that those who benefit from 
Affirmative Action are mainly the most advantaged within disadvantaged 
communities, otherwise known as the 'creamy layer' of the community, and as such, 
the policy does not help a larger portion of the group (Deshpande, 2008:161). At the 
same time, there are controversies over how long the policy of Affirmative Action 
should be retained, and at what point it ought to be curtailed (Ibid). 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed fundamental conceptions of social justice, focusing on a 
structural approach to justice, groups' rights and identity as key concepts for 
understanding what social justice might mean for marginalised groups.  It has 
outlined some theories that support the argument that social justice for marginalised 
groups requires recognising them as a separate group and both transformative 
redistribution and recognition. In this regard, Fraser (2003) insists that there is an 
interrelationship between redistribution and recognition, and that one alone cannot 
achieve social justice for marginalised groups. The redistribution of power and 
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resources and recognition of the identity of marginalised social groups make a real 
difference to the distribution of scarce resources, which turn provides the basis of 
equality and justice.  
 
At the same time, I have sought to demonstrate the contested approaches to the rights 
of minority groups. Liberals focus on the individual rights of freedom and choice, 
whereas, group rights theorists argue that recognition of group difference is 
necessary to address structural injustice since injustice is a by-product of 
institutional rules and regulations, which go beyond the individual level. As argued 
by Fraser (2003) institutional arrangements and policy reforms are the main factors 
that can remedy misdistribution and redress injustices.  
 
The theories discussed in this chapter are relevant to understanding the structural 
injustice and group rights required for social justice for Dalit in Nepal. These theories 
have conceptualised different approaches to redress the oppression and domination 
of marginalised groups as institutional arrangements and policy reforms. 
Nevertheless, none of these theories have been developed with Dalit explicitly in 
mind. This means that while the principles of redistribution and recognition provide 
a theoretical framework for this research, part of what is to be explored will be how 
they might need to be modified when it comes to the Dalit and Nepali context.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
PROFOUND DALIT INEQUALITY IN NEPAL 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter traces the marginalisation of Dalit socio-economic, educational and 
political status. I have already provided an overview of existing literature on Dalit 
inequality; in this chapter, I draw from my interview research and secondary data to 
deepen this perspective within these fields of analysis. The deeply entrenched status 
inequality reinforced by caste hierarchy entails multiple forms of oppression. The 
enforcement of caste discrimination and untouchability has undermined the basic 
human value of Dalit, inducing their inequality in every sphere of life. It can be 
argued that status inequality embedded in structural injustice underpin the extreme 
forms of oppression, manifested as exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, 
cultural imperialism, and violence to Dalit in Nepal. In this context, to obtain Dalit 
rights, as argued by Fraser (2003), both redistribution of resources and power, and 
recognition are significant.  
 
As discussed below, occupying the lowest social status within the caste hierarchy has 
multi-dimensional effects on the socio-economic, educational and political situation 
of Dalit in Nepal. Unequal status underpins unequal distribution of power and other 
resources (Olsen,2011). Evidence shows these different dimensions have a reciprocal 
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relationship to each other. For example, the places or settlements where Dalit live 
tend to lack basic infrastructure, such as road access, tap water and electricity, which 
in Nepal are provided based on individuals’ social status. The caste hierarchy and 
access to power thus influence access to these very basic resources. Dalit status 
inequality similarly is directly related to their economic marginalisation. Forced or 
bonded labour and landlessness are a common phenomenon for Dalit. Similarly, 
status inequality affects the education of Dalit, who have a literacy rate of 52.4% as 
compared to the higher caste Brahmin's literacy rate of 81.9% (Sharma, 2014). Status 
inequality also has detrimental effects in the political dimension, with Dalit not 
represented sufficiently either in political party structures or other governance 
mechanisms. In turn, the impacts of these various deprivations and exclusions, in 
health, in education, in economic autonomy and the availability of resources and 
political power reinforce the marginalised caste position.  
 
The first section of this chapter explores how caste-based social structures and 
practices of untouchability produce social inequality for Dalit, with the major 
dimensions of the prevailing practice of untouchability being exclusion, humiliation-
subordination, and exploitation. The second section is an anatomy of the current 
economic status of the Dalit community and analyses the types of economic 
marginalisation Dalit experience. The unequal patron-client relationship, forced 
labour, landlessness, unemployment, and restrictions in access to entrepreneurship 
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and financial institutions are the principal forms of economic marginalisation and 
inequality. The third section considers the situation for Dalit concerning education.  
It explores the question of what forms of inequality exist in the education sector as 
well as the causes and effects of these inequalities. The final section of this chapter 
focuses on political inequality and the exclusion of Dalit from political party 
structures and other governance mechanisms.  
 
5.1. Status Inequality  
Status can be deﬁned as the position of a group in the social hierarchy of a given 
society or, more speciﬁcally, as the prestige and advantages associated with the 
group’s position in intergroup comparisons, such as disparities in prestige, material 
goods, inﬂuence and access to resources (Siem et al., 2013:43). In the context of racial 
stratification, Harris (1993:1716) argues for example that whiteness was considered 
as a racialised privilege and those who enjoyed it also enjoyed a higher social status, 
to which societal benefits were allocated, while the rights of other non-whites were 
undermined. Following a similar logic, the division of upper and lower caste 
hierarchies in Nepal reproduces differential social status’, and social status among 
individuals and groups reproduces social inequality, which reproduces the unequal 
distribution of power and resources. Such inequalities are maintained by those in 
powerful positions via institutions and social processes (Warwick-Booth, 2013:2).  
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Inequality of resources does not only signify economic resources such as money but 
also refers to social respect. The respect and prestige allotted to an individual or group 
are significant social resources that in turn relate to other forms of resources and 
power (Krieken et al., 2015:204). Correlatively, long-standing disrespect and 
domination by dominant groups reproduce inequality. The enforcement of caste-
based untouchability generates lower social status and disrespect for Dalit, at the 
same time as excluding members of the group from access to power and other material 
resources. According to Dorling (2015:103), institutionalised social norms undermine 
and exclude marginalised people from what would for those in advantageous 
positions constitute normal social activity, and this creates further segregation and 
disdain for the marginalised groups in the society.  
 
The severe forms of caste hierarchy and discrimination evident in Nepal are an 
explicit example of structural injustice. As discussed in Chapter Two, structural 
injustice is the ‘consequence of unequal condition of individuals underlined by the 
institutional rules and regulation’ (Young, 2001:41). Caste discrimination is the 
perfect illustration of institutional rules and regulations that subjugate fundamental 
human rights of Dalit, and have done so for hundreds if not thousands of years across 
the South Asian sub-continent (Ahuti, 2010:1). As a consequence of the manifestation 
of lower social status and structural injustice in social, economic, educational and 
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political sectors, Dalit occupies the lowest rank according to various social indicators 
of human development in Nepal.  
 
Fraser (2003:7) argues that disrespect is one aspect of injustice that denigrates in 
stereotypic public cultural representations and everyday life interactions. This 
resonates with the Weberian paradigm, where low-status groups are interpreted less 
worthy and undervalued by the dominant culture (Krieken et al., 2015). In Nepal, 
Dalit identity is interpreted by other social groups as deviant from and devalued by 
the dominant culture. This section, thus, explores how caste-based social structures 
and practices of untouchability engender the social inequality of Dalit in Nepal. 
 
5.2. Manifestations of Status Inequality 
Imposition of Untouchability 
One of the themes came out of my interview was status inequality caused by the 
imposition of untouchability. Untouchability refers to the humiliations imposed, from 
generation to generation, on a particular but sizeable section of the population that 
relates to impurity and pollution (Soorya Moorthy, 2008). It is the extreme and 
vicious aspect of the caste system, prescribing severe social sanctions against those 
placed at the bottom of the caste structure invoking terrible punishments, fatal 
attacks, and atrocities (Ibid). The major dimensions of the prevailing practices of 
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untouchability are exclusion, humiliation-subordination, and exploitation as emerged 
by interview data. They—the untouchables—are excluded from much of social life, 
including from everyday activities like sharing sources of drinking water and 
participating in religious worship and festivals. This was illustrated in one of my 
interviews:  
I recall an incident that when I accidentally touched the water vessel of 
higher caste women, she scolded me. The higher caste woman threw 
away the “touched” water and sprinkled pure water3 on her water vessel 
to purify it. This incident humiliated me, but I could not speak against 
higher caste women as I was alone. I am compelled to tolerate such 
everyday incidents related to caste discrimination 
 
(Batuli Sarki, Interview, 30 August 2014).  
 
Similar everyday discrimination occurs in the Tarai regions of Nepal as experienced 
by interview participants. Dulari Harijan being Dalit women is not allowed to use 
public tap freely in her locality.  
If there are higher caste people, we (Dalit) should wait for them until 
the higher caste finish fetching water from wells. Dalit are not allowed 
to touch others water vessels. In case, Dalit touches their vessels then 
Dalit are thrashed or scolded. Sometimes the situation becomes complex 
because higher caste has their unity and intend to suppress in any case.  
 
(Dulari Harijan, Interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
These instances of discrimination I recorded in my interviews resonate with data 
collected by civil society organisations. For example, the Informal Sector Service 
                                                          
3In the rural areas of Nepal, higher castes use “gold" touched water to purify the pot touched by the lower caste 
Dalit. 
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Centre (INSEC) has documented the persistence of caste discrimination—
untouchability in the record of incidents that it keeps, set out in the Human Rights 
Year Book (2014). According to this yearbook, 88 Caste discrimination incidences 
occurred in Nepal in that year. The incidents varied in the different years and 
diversified slightly according to the records of various agencies. INSEC recorded 101 
cases in 2013; in the same year, Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organisation’s 
monitoring recorded 95 cases; the National Dalit Commission registered 60 cases of 
caste discrimination in 2011.  
 
The above statistical evidence has not been systematically collected, but these sources 
indicate that caste discrimination related incidents repeatedly occur even though it 
has been already outlawed. The forms of discrimination recorded in these incident 
records vary—including denial of access to public places, beating, verbal abuse, 
domestic violence, and violence about inter-caste marriages. Even against these 
figures, very few incidents are reported and registered formally with the police and 
courts. According to INSEC (2014), almost 90 percent of cases are hidden. Given the 
potential importance of the formal implementation of sanctions by the authorities, it 
is important to understand why Dalit report so few cases. According to one of my 
interview subjects, Yuktilal Marik: 
The key reason for the low registration of incidences related to caste-
based discrimination is Dalit low awareness level, low social status and 
exclusion from law enforcement structures. There is higher institutional 
bias and prejudice against Dalit. The caste based discrimination does 
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not become the important case for law enforcement mechanism such as 
police. 
 
    (Yuktilal Marik, Interview, 12 August 2014).  
In other words, the systemic discrimination experienced by Dalit reduces the ability 
to seek justice. We see here a vicious cycle:  where low social status underpins status 
discrimination, at the same time as it impedes the victims’ access to state protection. 
These findings resonate with the previous studies such as Bhattachan et al. (2008). 
However, this research reveals the multidimensional nature of injustice and 
institutional bias causing the degrading situation of Dalit in Nepal. 
 
Prohibition in Temples and Cultural Functions 
Dalit prohibition in the temple, as emerged from my research, is one of the key 
inequality caused by caste discrimination in Nepal. Led by Saharsanath Kapali, Dalit 
embarked on their struggle for justice in 1953. In1954, for the first time in history, 
Dalit entered into the main Hindu temple, Pashupatinath, in Kathmandu. Despite 
this momentous event, Dalit is still struggling for equal rights in accessing Hindu 
temples (BK, 2014). Evidence of discrimination shows that even today, temples are 
not open for Dalit. Although they follow similar religious beliefs to members of higher 
caste groups, they are barred from entering and worshipping in temples. It was hoped 
that the Declaration on a caste discrimination-free nation (2001; 2006) would bring 
substantial change. However, there is still evidence of continuing discrimination as 
mentioned by interview participants.  
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We thought that the government declaration would help to decrease the 
discrimination and Dalit would get easily entrance to the temples. 
However, there is still discrimination. Dalit are not allowed in Temples. 
There are many examples of Dalit being restricted.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
Primary research conducted for this thesis and by other researchers (e.g. Ahuti, 
2010:26) indicates that discrimination in temples is persistent, being particularly 
strong in rural areas and that such discrimination is for the most part neither 
resisted by Dalit nor officially reported. Almost all the interviewees in my study 
agreed that discrimination in temples and more broadly in public places is 
widespread. For example, Buddha Sunar from the Gulmi district described pervasive 
forms of discrimination, including the exclusion of Dalit from local temples4. 
Struggling for equal rights during Dashain (a major Hindu festival) Dalit have been 
thrashed, blockaded and killed due to their protest and resistance, as described by 
one interview subject: 
A priest in Chhinnamasta Temple located in Bhardah, Siraha had 
declared that if Dalit wants to enter the temple, he will commit suicide, 
but we decided to get into the temple with the financial support of Action 
Aid Nepal in 2001. Dom entered the temple, but the priest refused to place 
Tika on Dalit. Dominant groups thrashed Dalit and issued blockades to 
their work and access to the local shops. Later police forced those 
dominant groups to open up the facilities. However, now Dalit are again 
restricted from the temple.  
(Yuktilal Marik, Interview on 12 August 2014) 
 
                                                          
4Buddha Sunar, Interview, 30 August 2014 
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Dalit are also denied access to take on the role of the priest in religious institutions. 
They are compelled to practice priesthood for their own communities only, but the 
wider society does not recognise their priesthood. Indeed, the Brahmins who serve as 
priests do not permit Dalit to listen to religious scriptures (Pandey et al., 2006:21). 
These religious exclusions laid down in the Hindu based notion of Varna also have 
implications for Dalits’ of educational opportunities. Brahmins are considered the 
only valid holders of education and Dalit are in turn limited to occupying the role of 
service providers. As written in the Manusmriti, if Shudra (known now as Dalit) read 
and write, cut their tongues, if they listen, pour liquid hot brass (pagalekosisa) in 
their ears (Bhattachan et al., 2008:113). This strict religious restriction continues 
with the ongoing result of long-term deprivation of education. The priesthood 
restriction is also another form of discrimination as described by Keshar Bk: 
The Brahmin priest does no offer priesthood to Dalit even if they follow 
the same religious and cultural practices. This compels Dalit to become 
a priest for their community only. There are very few Dalit who knows 
the Sanskrit text offer priesthood for their community. Moreover, 
sometimes we consider our nephew (Bhanja) as our priest to accomplish 
our cultural functions as ‘naming day’ or ‘marriage’.  
(Interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
Formal exclusion from religious sites such as temples extends to different forms of 
cultural and group exclusion. Dalit are not invited to social functions held by 
dominant groups. As experienced by interview participants, if by chance they are 
invited, they are treated in a degrading manner, for example, their food is served 
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separately on leaf plates, and they are not permitted to be involved in any of the 
public functions or worship. Ironically, Damai, a group of Dalit, are the ones who are 
called upon to play cultural instruments for entertainment and auspicious functions, 
but they are seen very much as limited to this service role and are treated 
inhumanely. A Dalit community leader, Keshar BK described the situation of Dalit 
in broader social life: 
I have experienced such discrimination at social functions. However, 
these sorts of behaviours have been normal and widely accepted as social 
norms. No one dares to challenge the practices through legal processes, 
as the cases are unnecessarily lengthy and spoil social relations  
(Interview, 28 August 2014).  
 
I can also confirm this through my own experience. As a member of the Dalit 
community, I have also faced direct and indirect forms of similar humiliating 
treatment by members of the dominant caste groups. In 1998for example, I was 
invited to the function to celebrate the marriage of a school peer. During that 
ceremony, higher caste people asked me to be sure that I remained separate during 
the feast. It was found that Dalit faces direct discrimination at cultural functions, 
religious places and other public spheres such as public wells even after the 
enforcement of anti-caste discrimination and prohibition act, 2011. 
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Restriction in Inter Caste Marriage 
The interview I have conducted has also confirmed that caste segregation continues 
to demarcate the boundary for marriage in Nepal. Marriage between Dalit and 
dominant groups is de facto prohibited although there is no formal legal regulation 
to this effect. The Marriage Registration Act 19715 defines marriage as occurring 
between a man and a woman and only specifies that the parties must register their 
marriage in a recognised office and they must both have reached twenty years of age. 
Nevertheless, as emerged through my research interview, inter-caste marriage 
between Dalit and non-Dalit remains a controversial issue and challenges the 
orthodox caste discrimination and untouchability practices in Nepalese society:  
Dalit are not allowed to marry with higher caste. In case, there is a love 
affair between higher caste and Dalit; there is a restriction on marriage. 
Dalit should face harsher punishment, and sometimes they are thrashed 
and killed. Higher caste often snatches away if their daughters marry 
with Dalit. There are also so many cases of Dalit killed due to inter-caste 
marriage in Nepal. 
(Laxmi Pariyar, NC leader, Interview on 22 August 2014)  
 
This resonates with previous research conducted in Nepal. For example, research 
interviews carried out by the Jagaran Media Centre (JMC) with 200 inter-caste 
married couples in 2009, in six districts of Nepal found that couples who had married 
outside their caste faced significant abuse. They broke their findings down into four 
                                                          
5
Marriage Registration Act 1971 second amendment 3 November 2006 
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specific categories of abuse: harassment, forced separation, displacement and 
institutional discrimination (Mohara, 2011:7). My Research participants mentioned 
that couples who marry outside of their caste face social sanctions, economic 
hardships, societal disrespect, exclusion from religious and cultural events, exclusion 
from their families and villages, and they might face difficulties in obtaining birth 
and citizenship certificates6. Moreover, most importantly, the children of mixed 
marriages face widespread discrimination from their society. The following incident 
reported in a national newspaper is a clear example of the deleterious results of inter-
caste marriages and their negative results for Dalit.   
Tilak Kami of Budeli VDC in Dailekh district, his wife Minu and elder 
brother Tek Bahadur have been displaced for the past year after Minu’s 
parents and relatives allegedly chased them away for marrying a girl 
from the so-called upper-caste family. Tilak, who was a relief-quota 
teacher at the Janakalyan Lower Secondary School, was expelled from 
his job after he eloped with Minu. 
(Kantipur, 2014) 
 
Very few couples who marry across caste find acceptance from their families and 
broader society. Based on my research, it seems that acceptance of couples of married 
across caste depends on the level of understanding amongst family members, their 
socioeconomic status and their access to power. It would thus seem that there can be 
accepted, but in general, inter-caste marriage between so-called dominant groups and 
Dalit is restricted (Bhattachan et al., 2008). When people break this informal rule, 
                                                          
6Rajesh BK, Interview, 13 August 2014 
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the consequences can be serious. Young Dalit people have been known to disappear 
or be subject to extreme physical violence when they marry upper caste people, and 
there are even cases of them being murdered, as happened with a young Dalit man 
in Kavre district7. A research participant says that: 
Inter caste marriage is one of the problems Dalit facing in Nepal. There 
is very rare chance of acceptance from a higher caste. Higher caste 
rather attempts to dismantle the inter caste couple. Being a local Dalit 
leader, we continue to receive so many cases of inter caste marriages. 
The higher caste often effort to rescind relationship of married couples. 
(Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview on 28 August 2014). 
 
One of the key issues emerged from my research that members of dominant castes 
forcibly remove their daughters or female relatives if they marry Dalit men. For 
example, interviewee Ganesh Shreepaili stated that:  
Higher caste groups forcibly remove their daughter if she marries with 
Dalit. This also applies to the higher caste boy-if he marries the lower 
caste girl, the family use power, network and money to dismantle the 
couple. There is a problem for inter caste couple to sustain in the society.  
   (Interview on 28 August 2014) 
 
                                                          
7A18-year-old Dalit boy named Ajit Mijar was found dead on 14 July 2016 in Dhading district of 
Nepal. Ajit was a resident of Panchkhal Kavre District, who married his non-Dalit girlfriend 
Kalpana Parajuli, on 9 July 2016. The girl’s relatives and the Area Police Office Panchkhal 
forced the couple to abandon their marriage. Her relatives forcibly took Kalpana away on 11 July 
2016, two days after the marriage, and they threatened to kill Ajit within 72 hours. On July 16, 
Ajit was found dead, and his body was buried by the riverbank of Furke Khola, Dhading District 
(Pressenza, 2016). 
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The data records of different organisations also confirm this fact. There were 71 caste 
discrimination-related cases recorded between 2003 and 2011 by the Dalit NGO 
Federation (DNF), 67 cases were directly related to prejudice in inter-caste marriage. 
According to IDSN (2015) out of 107 caste discrimination cases, 15 were directly 
related to the denial of, and atrocities committed in relation to inter-caste marriage. 
These recorded incidences should be interpreted as indicative but are unlikely to give 
us reliable insight into the true extent of the problem, which my interview subjects 
indicated was widespread. This research shows that caste hierarchy plays a 
significant role in marriage affairs and the inter caste marriage especially among 
higher and lower caste is completely prohibited. The obstinacy of inter caste marriage 
has not been systematically revealed by other research which this research does. 
 
Restriction in Public Services 
One of the themes that came through my interviews that Dalit are prohibited from 
freely using public services being lower caste in Nepal. For example, they are not 
allowed to use public water taps, wells, to enter temples or to access general health 
services. Most of the incidences of overt caste based violence or harassment occur at 
public taps, wells or temples because these are the places Dalit access services they 
use, even in the face of the risk of being thrashed, scolded or dehumanised8. A case 
                                                          
8Janga Nepali, Interview, 1 September 2014 
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reported by a newspaper is an evidence of Dalit restricted for accessing a public well. 
In this incidence, villagers in the Saptari District restricted a Dalit from accessing 
water from public wells in front of the team of a famous TV producer and movie actor:  
A renowned movie actor Rajesh Hamal observed how local dominant-
caste villagers restricted a Dalit person in the locality from accessing the 
public well while they were enroute to filming a famous TV show "Sajha 
Sawal" on 1 August 2015. Dipak Mallik, a Dalit young man, was 
restricted to fetch water in front of hundreds of people. He calls someone 
from the dominant people to fetch the water from well as he is not allowed 
to touch.  
(South Asia, 2015) 
 
A particularly worrying exclusion concerns access to health services. Although Dalit 
health is poorer than other caste groups, as they are often involved in hazardous work 
and have unhealthy working environments, caste prejudice impedes their freely 
accessing health services. One of the key issues emerged through my research 
interview that the health service centres are primarily run by dominant groups who 
give preference to their kin and relatives above the lower caste groups9. For Dalit, 
who are not able to afford private health clinics, this exclusion is tantamount to total 
exclusion from any health care (Bhattachan et al., 2008). As interview participants 
explained, however, it is not only poverty but also a social status that underpins the 
difficulty in accessing health services10. Dalit are severely underrepresented as 
professionals in health services. Being poor and with lower social status, Dalit are 
                                                          
9Keshar Bk, Interview, 28 August 2014 
10Rajesh Bk, Interview, 13 August 2014 
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not able to afford expensive medical courses, and this automatically limits their 
access to working in the health field. A research participant opines that:  
Dalit are systematically deprived from health services. First, being poor 
we are not able to receive a technical education (medical/engineering). 
We are also not able to access private health services.  We are also 
excluded from being local health worker because of caste hierarchy Dalit 
service is not preferable for higher caste. We are not allowed to enter the 
houses of higher caste that exclude Dalit health worker for providing 
service.  
(Rajesh Bk, Dalit leader interview on 13 August 2014) 
At the same time, even if they do make it that far, according to Rajesh Bk, in rural 
areas, Dalit health workers are not allowed to enter dominant groups’ houses to 
provide them with treatment.  
 
It appears that caste discrimination, for example restricting Dalits’ entry to public 
hotels is worse in rural than in urban areas. Dalit are not permitted to enter hotels 
in their locality, even if they are willing to pay the required costs. This finding 
confirms by research carried out by Lawyers National Campaign against 
Untouchability (LANCAU) Nepal (2009), 94% of the registered caste discrimination 
cases occurred in the countryside, and only 6% were in urban areas (p. 9). The Dom 
community, one of the most excluded of the Tarai Dalit, are not allowed to enter local 
hotels, and should they be permitted any service, they are required to bring their 
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utensils (glasses and plates) if they want to buy tea or foods11. Discrimination by 
public hotels and the persistence of this form of discrimination was mentioned by a 
majority of interview participants. Binod Bisankhe, for example, discusses the 
difficulty that Dalit faces in being permitted hotel entry if the owner identifies that a 
person belongs to the Dalit caste. Dalit are thrashed and penalised if they enter the 
local hotel. This is more pervasive to Dom community in the Tarai12. 
Thus, this research outlines the pervasive exclusion of Dalit in public services such 
as health and hotels. This finding resonates with other studies. Additionally, different 
perspectives on poverty are offered. Poverty limits Dalit to access technical courses 
such as medical and engineering. As a result, there is a wider gap of Dalit inclusion, 
compared with others, into public services. 
 
Dalit Ghettoisation and Community Participation 
This research finds out that Dalit have their homes in fairly remote places, such as 
either at the top of a hill or slightly outside the main village in the rural hilly areas, 
and this lack equal access to basic resources such as electricity. In the Tarai, the 
pattern of Dalit settlement is determined by access to land. As most Dalit do not own 
land, they often reside on the side of river banks or near the jungle (Ahuti, 2010:26). 
                                                          
11Yuktilal Marik, Interview, 12 August 2014 
12Binod Bishankhe, Interview, 10 September 2014 
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This means that Dalit settlements lack basic infrastructures such as road access, tap 
water and electricity. The geographical remoteness is exacerbated by the way in 
which caste hierarchy and access to power determine access to these forms of 
resources. Another important fact found out through my research is that the 
settlement pattern is also determined by caste segregation and social status. The 
following excerpt from an interview evidences how Dalit are obligated to settle in 
places without basic facilities. 
We are compelled to settle in nearby jungle and river bank on public land. 
Landlessness is the problem for Tarai Dalit. I guess that more than 80 
percent of them are landless. We have no place to construct Toilet. We 
have demanded the land ownership in landlessness commission. 
However, no one listens to our voice. 
(Yuktilal Marik, Interview, 12 August 2014).  
 
The another point Yuktilal makes points to the importance of planning decisions, but 
the problem is that Dalit are excluded from community development process. At the 
local level, there are various users' group committees established to properly manage 
community development projects, for example, forest users’ committees, school 
management committees, and water users’ committees. The lower participation of 
Dalit and domination of higher caste in the decision-making process is also confirmed 
by other research (Gilmour and Fisher, 1991; Shrestha and McManus, 2007). 
Shrestha and McManus (2007:278) find that ‘wealthy and higher caste people (i.e. 
elites) have captured the decision-making and implementation powers, resulting in 
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inequitable decision-making processes and distribution of outcomes̕. As mentioned by 
research participant Yuktilal Marik: 
Dalit are very few in the local community development committees, and 
the local elites (high social status, wealthier and educated) dominate 
local decision-making processes. The main reason is Dalits’ lower 
socioeconomic condition. The widespread caste discrimination is also 
reason preventing Dalit leadership in users’ committees.  
(Interview on 12 August 2014) 
 
One of the major findings of this research is that caste hierarchy, and social status 
determines the settlement pattern. As revealed by this research, Dalit being lower 
caste and poor are mostly landless which limits them to live on river banks or 
unfertile land. In the case of community participation, the domination of higher 
castes prevails. This limits inclusion on committees and at decision-making levels. 
 
Formal Domestic Legal Instruments against Caste Discrimination 
Legal initiatives to eliminate caste discrimination date back to 1963 when the 
Country Code introduced a law against caste discrimination in Nepal. King 
Mahendra in his autocratic party-less Panchayat regime amended the ‘old’ County 
Code of 1854 as the ‘new’ Country Code of 1963.13 The modified code had a provision 
to abolish untouchability and other forms of caste-based discrimination. It was, 
                                                          
13
12th amendment of National Code 1963 was made on Nov 30, 2007  
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however, no more than a legal announcement, as there was no effective mechanism 
to punish those who violated it (Bhattachan et al., 2008). Moreover, as opined by a 
research participant despite its symbolic boldness, its effectiveness was undermined 
by the fact that Dalit could not afford to take action against higher caste Hindus and 
members of Indigenous groups, due to their heavy dependency on these groups for 
their survival and livelihood.  
The declaration of new civil code with anti-caste discrimination 
provision was a powerful tool for Dalit in that period. However, it was 
not effectively implemented. Dalit were not able to file a case against 
higher caste as they were dependent upon them. The state mainly law 
enforcement mechanism was not supportive to Dalit. Thus, despite 
having a law it seems that there was the persistence of discrimination 
in that particular period.  
(Yam Kisan, Lawyer Interview on 15 August 2014) 
 
The democratic constitution of Nepal, 1990, included an anti-caste discrimination 
provision in its fundamental rights section. Article 11, sub-articles 1, 2 and 3 are 
those provisions which specifically refer to the legal equality among citizens. Sub-
article 4 directly relates to the Dalit. According to this article, ‘no one shall be 
discriminated by caste and creed in public presentations, and in the use of public 
properties; perpetrators shall be punished by the law’ (Constitution, 1990). As 
already discussed, however, despite such positive constitutional provisions, caste 
prejudice and discrimination persisted. 
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The Interim Constitution of 2007, promulgated after the historic Peoples’ Movement 
2006, brought another landmark change into the anti-caste discrimination law and 
Dalit rights.14 The article 35, sub-article 14 covers the special policy of affirmative 
action for Dalit women, and other disadvantaged communities and article 8 (2) (b) 
provides rights to acquire lineage-based citizenship in the name of one's father or 
mother. As mentioned by a research participant, this new legal provision has opened 
a door for Dalit citizenship in the name of the mother, especially the Badi, who had 
traditionally been deprived of this basic citizenship right. 
Badi, an excluded Dalit group, are deprived of the citizenship certificate. 
The previous law did not allow Badi women to provide citizenship 
certificate in the name of mother. There is no identification of father 
born by Badi women that deprive the children. They are also deprived 
of other opportunities. However, this changed new constitutional 
provision allowed to provide citizenship certificate in the name of 
mother that will mostly benefit to Badi.  
(Puspa Badi, Interview, 6 August 2014) 
However, despite the immense potential offered by these legal reforms, many of my 
interviewees were sceptical about the ability to bring about change. For example, 
Keshar BK stated that ̔the new legal provisions are in papers which are not 
specifically implemented at the local level. The ineffectiveness of law enforcement 
                                                          
14Article 14 of this Constitution guarantees rights against untouchability and caste discrimination (Interim 
Constitution, 2007). Beyond these legal moves, the Caste-Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and 
Punishment) Act, 2011was one of the most prominent achievements because it was the first separate law to address 
and outlawall forms of caste discrimination. Article 7 (a) and (b) provides for the perpetrator of caste discrimination 
to be imprisoned for a term between one months to one years, or to be fined between1,000 Rupees and 25,000 Rupees, 
or both (NDC, 2013).  
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pushes back the changes in the society ̕15.  One need to ask why, even in the face of 
these now extensive anti-caste discrimination laws, the evidence indicates that 
discrimination persists. One answer provided by one of the interviewees suggests 
multiple factors:  
According to Prof. Om Gurung, the persistence of the caste structure 
and discrimination are due to the ineffectiveness of state initiatives, the 
lack of united Dalit resistance and lack of awareness in the general 
society.  
(Interview, 20 August 2014) 
Other factors that have been identified and that came through in my research are 
prejudice amongst prosecutors and reluctance of others within state institutions to 
take action to ensure the implementation of laws protecting Dalit rights. As 
mentioned by the interview participants, for example, Kamala Hemchuri, there is 
wider prejudice on Dalit case16. The reluctance of political parties to regulate the 
behaviour of their members is also another key reason. In many instances, party 
cadres provide political protection to the offenders and that further victimises 
innocent people. Moreover, insufficient attention by the media, which is more 
concerned with news worth events than regularised chronic and structural 
discrimination, contributes to a lack of general awareness or concern.  
                                                          
15Keshar Bk, interview on 28 August 2014 
16Kamala Hemchuri, Interview, 13 August 2014 
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This research indicates that the recent changes to legal provisions against caste 
discrimination are more progressive than before, but the implementation is not 
effective as expected by Dalit. The institutional bias and Dalit exclusion in law 
enforcement mechanism are few reasons being law enforcement ineffective. In fact, 
there is no indication of decreasing level of discrimination despite the harsher legal 
provisions in Nepal. 
 
5.3. Economic Inequality 
This section is an anatomy of the current economic status of Dalit indicating the 
forms of economic marginalisation Dalit are experiencing. My research shows that 
Dalit continues to live under severe forms of economic marginalisation in a semi-
feudal society where indirect forms of forced or bonded labour and landlessness 
undermine their economic independence.  At the same time, the forces of globalisation 
and neoliberal policies have generated crises for the traditional occupations of Dalit. 
Free trade, privatisation, and decreasing government investment directly affect 
Dalit, who cannot compete with modern markets and policies (Mandal, 2014:8). As 
expressed by Keshar BK a research participant, global companies are, for example 
producing cheap fashionable shoes and clothes thereby replacing the traditional 
tailoring and shoe making occupations of Dalit. He further says that there are ready-
made agricultural tools are available in the market that also affects to the traditional 
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occupation of Dalit17. No substantive government policy has been formulated to 
address the effects of this type of occupational crisis. This research identifies that 
Dalit find themselves caught between the disappearance of traditional occupations 
and a history of unequal traditional patron-client relationships. 
 
As it came through my research interview that caste, discrimination has been a key 
obstacle to Dalit developing private enterprises. Thisis also confirmed by the fact that 
only 10% of Dalit own land, meaning that 90% are landless and without capital and 
can only earn a living through wages. Dalit inclusion in the public sector is very low, 
with only 1% in the Army and Police service (Ahuti, 2010:25). Recent statistics show 
the economic inequality of Dalit whose average per capita income is US$361 as 
compared to US$712 for other Nepalese, and 43.6% Dalit still live below the poverty 
line (CBS, 2011).  
 
Degrading Traditional Occupations 
One of the features of the traditional feudal system in Nepal is the existence of a 
caste-based occupational division of labour with Dalit, in particular, being confined 
to particular types of occupations. Under Feudalism the power of the ruling class 
                                                          
17Keshar Bk, Interview on 28 August 2014 
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rested on their control of arable land, leading to a class society based on the 
exploitation of the peasants who farm, typically under serfdom (Brown, 2010). The 
lord-serf relationship is a paradigm for understanding power relationships under 
feudalism, where serfs had to work for their lords without wages(Ibid). What one of 
the themes came through my research interview is in the case of Nepal, the unfair 
wage system associated with this semi-feudal form of organisation is known as 
Balighare, and it has resulted in significant economic dependency amongst Dalit.   
 
Caste-based occupational divisions were a significant trait of Nepalese agrarian 
society, and indeed traditional occupations continue as the primary source of Dalit 
livelihood18. The rigidity of traditional occupations has trapped Dalit in poverty. As 
indicated by my research participants, among the twenty-six sub-categories of Dalit, 
each has a distinctive occupation that was held as in some way bringing benefits to 
the broader society. Dalit residing in Hill regions have occupations that are distinct 
than those that are held by Tarai Dalit. For instance, in the Hill regions, the Kami 
are metalworkers, the Sarki work with leather, the Damai are tailors, and the Gaine 
are musicians19. The occupations of Tarai Dalit include washing clothes, road 
cleaning, digging out fields, catching rats, weaving and cleaning animal 
                                                          
18There are 27.9% of Dalit in three districts dependent on their traditional occupations (FEDO, 2012:68). However, 
the percentage of Dalit dependency on traditional occupations varies by districts, with 45% in Kavre and 15% in 
Dhanusa district. At the same time, 41.4% Tarai Dalit and 11.17% of Hill Dalit are systematically excluded from 
higher professions (CBS, 2014:146). 
19Janga Nepali, Interview on 1 September 2014 
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carcasses20.The data indicates Dalits' higher dependency on their traditional 
occupations rather than other forms of employment such as official jobs. 
We (Dalit) are heavily dependent on traditional occupation because we 
do not have an alternative option. We are not highly educated to get 
government jobs. The local level jobs such as teaching in school also are 
taken by other groups. We are not included in the decision making level. 
This is the main reason other caste gets a job at the local level and Dalit 
needs to rely upon their traditional occupation.  
(Keshar Bk, Dalit local leader, Interview on 28 August 2014) 
 
As emerged from my research, caste hierarchy plays a vital role in shaping the level 
of wages in a traditional occupation. It was found that Dalit receive very low wages 
on the basis of their traditional occupation such as Balighare as mentioned by 
research participants. An interview participant described the persistence of unfair 
wages: 
Dalit are compelled to receive a significantly lower amount of grain 
wages in exchange for their traditional work. Baali (grain wages) is 
common in rural villages. Even if this system is unfair for Dalit, Dalit 
have no alternatives.  
(Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview on August 2014) 
 
This is also confirmed by other research that the traditional occupation is known by 
different names such as Balighare/Khalo/Pulo/ Riti Magnya for the same purpose in 
                                                          
20Ganga Prasad Mahara, Interview on 12 August 2014 
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different regions of Nepal (Nepali et al., 2011; Rasaili, 2009; Cameron, 1998) are 
traditional institutions that for centuries have determined wages. It is a system 
whereby payment for work takes the form of the provision of minimal levels of grain 
instead of cash. Khalopratha also was known as Balighare Pratha is a system 
whereby Dalit go to threshing floors to collect grain at the time of harvest. As further 
confirmed by (Nepali et al., 2011:5) Dalit are paid substantially lower rates than 
higher caste labourers are, and due to power inequities and the lack of any other 
livelihood options, Dalit are not in a position to bargain. Being mostly landless, the 
grain Dalit ‘earn’ does not last even for three months (Rasaili, 2007). Traditional 
practices persist even though unequal wages are now illegal. Formally, the Labour 
Act, 1991, requires equal remuneration yet in practice, informal social norms 
continue to underwrite unfair and unequal wages.  
The legal cessation of the traditional feudal relationships resulted in Dalit being left 
as landless and without capital or education. Thus, Dalit are still completely 
dependent on landowners. This means that they are completely vulnerable to 
exploitation.  
 
Bonded labour 
One of the key themes came through my research interview that bonded labour no 
longer continues in its original and legalised form, but it too has left a legacy. Caste-
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based enforcement of bonded labour continues to reproduce economic marginality and 
is ubiquitous in the Tarai and the far western regions of Nepal. The Haliya, who serve 
as the agricultural labourers are found in the Western Hill regions, and the Haruwa, 
bonded plougher and Charuwa, bonded cattle herders, are found in parts of the Tarai 
(Wickeri, 2011:930). It is estimated that there are about sixty thousand Haliyain nine 
districts of the far western region of Nepal. The Haliya and Haruwa experienced 
severe economic exploitation and deprived living condition, illiteracy and 
landlessness (WOREC, 2012).  Each of these types of bonded labour arrangements is 
associated with inherited debt bondage, due to loans provided to individuals or 
families in the form of cash or rent for land. These loans are repaid over time by the 
debtors, who are then compelled to repay their debts through agricultural labour and, 
in some cases, work in the homes of their landlords. This pattern compels debtors to 
be exploited by landlords forever with ongoing extended loans.  
 
My research reveals that Dalit are often in a cycle of bonded labour caused by their 
lower economic, education and social status. A Dalit activist recalls the cycle of 
bondage enforced on Dalit when he used to serve as a Haliyain the Bajhang district 
of Nepal.  
When I was a schoolboy, I had to plough the fields of landowners. We did 
not even have a small plot of land or even a shed to stay. We were 
compelled to live on a little piece of land provided by the landowner, 
however, due to inherited debt and land rent, all our family had to work 
in their fields as agriculture labourers. Many other families like us spent 
their whole life being Haliya and under poverty and illiteracy. Haliya is 
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a form of economic exploitation, which needs to be eradicated efficiently, 
and Haliya should have alternative bases like land and economic 
resources. 
(Ganesh BK, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
Despite the abolition of this sort of slavery by the government, which officially 
cancelled the loans and freed individuals and families bonded under Haliya and 
Haruwa, in fact, as they remain landless, illiterate and poor, freed Haliya and 
Haruwa are compelled to continue working for their former landowners. As 
mentioned by research participants the government declared the Haliya and Haruwa 
free from bonded labour without any specific plan for how they would survive or 
become economically self-sufficient once the old system was no longer permitted to 
operate. Ganesh BK further expresses his views that:  
The declaration of Haliya free from bonded labour is a good initiative. 
However, the government could not provide alternatives to the freed 
Haliya. The Haliya did not have any place to stay, and there was not any 
other livelihood opportunity. This situation compelled Haliya to return 
with their landlords.  
(Interview on 8 August 2014) 
 
The Haliya have not received substantial benefit from the government despite the 
declaration of Haliya liberation of 2008, which formally entailed the provision of land, 
housing, and educational opportunities but did not deliver on these (Action Aid, 
2011). Despite what seemed like a momentous change, in fact, there is no substantial 
difference in the lives of Haliya, as they continue to work under landowners.  
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This research shows that Dalit are exploited because of bonded labour. Such 
exploitation manifests by locking Dalit into traditional occupations such as Balighare 
and other forms being Haruwa, Charuwa and Haliya. The underlying cause of Dalit 
exploitation is caste hierarchy as indicated by this research, which resonates with 
Nepali et al. (2011). However, this work alternatively finds out that despite being 
free, Haliya continues to face exploitation due to ineffective management of 
government. 
 
Landlessness 
My research indicates that an agrarian society heavily reliant upon agricultural 
subsistence, the land is the most important means of production, but Dalit is landless. 
For example, as stated by an interviewee, being landless Dalit are reliant upon the 
wage work and bonded labour21. Other sources confirm this as the land, which alone 
contributes one-third of Nepal’s GDP, is a vehicle for material wealth and social 
status and is the key determinant of identity, power, health, and political access 
(Wickery, 2011). Out of the total land holding, only 1.4% of those who own land own 
14% of the total arable land (Adhikari, 2008). The proportion of landlessness people 
in Nepal is the highest among Dalit, with90percentage still landless. This situation 
is the legacy of the feudal governance system of the Rana regime that lasted until 
                                                          
21Yuktilal Marik, Interview, 12 August 2014 
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1950 and produced an unequal distribution of land that remains unchanged. The 
higher prevalence of landlessness among Dalit continues despite agrarian reform 
efforts (Nepali et al., 2011). As mentioned by Tarai Dalit participant Ganga Mahara 
landlessness is higher among Tarai Dalit:  
We (Tarai Dalit) are facing tremendous problems being landless. Most 
of us do not have land ownership. We are living on public land without 
land ownership, and it makes us difficult. We are not able to access 
government services and income opportunity. We are not able to 
construct a toilet on public land.  
 
Land ownership is the basis for access to food, housing and development, and without 
access to land, many people find themselves in a situation of high economic 
insecurity. Land access and ownership are also directly linked to social and political 
power as ‘landless people do not have influence and control in the process and are 
bound to face exploitation and discrimination by landowners' (Nepali et al., 2011:6). 
Landlessness reproduces multiple problems in the lives of Dalit beyond the obvious 
ones associated with food and poverty. For example, a land certificate is one of the 
key proofs for claiming citizenship. Accordingly, landless people may well be deprived 
of citizenship, which is, itself a status of statelessness. Revealing the practical 
problems faced by the Dom community, one of the least developed castes among Dalit, 
Yuktilal Marik notes: 
The Dom caste has no land, even for a small shed for pigs, and pig 
farming is the only source of income for this community. Due to the lack 
of land, the community has to defecate in the open, and that produces 
the multiple health hazards. We are deprived of citizenship and 
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financial transactions because a land ownership certificate is an 
evidence of being a citizen in Nepal. 
       (Interview, 10 September 2014) 
 
According to the 2014 Human Development Indicators, Tarai Dalit occupies the worst 
position regarding socioeconomic status, and they are the worst off concerning 
landlessness. One example of being excluded from state resources is that a landless 
Dalit do not have citizenship certificate, which restricts them to access allowances 
provided to senior citizen. Thus, landlessness has a multidimensional effect such as 
poverty, access to state resources and opportunities among Dalit in Nepal. 
 
Unemployment 
One of the themes that came through in my interviews is the economic vulnerability 
caused by the lack of employment opportunities. This finding confirms by the 
secondary facts and figures. Unemployment is a major problem in Nepal with more 
than 83% of the population either unemployed or economically inactive if we include 
the 68% of the population who are partially engaged as self-employed in the 
agriculture sector (CBS, 2011). According to IDSN and Dalit Civil Society Report, 
60% Dalit are unemployed and earn their livelihood from traditional occupations. The 
unemployment incidence is higher among Tarai Dalit women compared with Dalit 
men (IDSN and DCSO, 2015).  My research interviews suggest that there is a higher 
incidence of unemployment among Dalit. 
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It is very pathetic to tell you that Badi (Dalit) women are not allowed to 
work in higher caste for wage labour. Higher caste considers Badi 
women are only for entertainment. This perception compels Badi women 
either to begging or to sing or dance for other peoples' entertainment. 
This is the similar case with other Dalit people in Nepal. 
 
(Puspa Badi, Interview, 6 August 2014)  
 
Cyclic forms of unemployment, in particular, have detrimental effects on the 
economic status and opportunities of Dalit. Cyclic unemployment occurs when there 
is high demand and an inadequate number of jobs and proper training skills (Brown, 
1983:164). As revealed by my research, there is high unemployment among Dalit in 
Nepal. For example, an interviewee mentioned that Dalit are excluded from local jobs 
in schools and other places22. The caste prejudice becomes a key challenge for Dalit 
in employment.  Due to lower industrialisation, a high dependency on foreign 
products and goods has an adverse effect on the job market. An interviewee gives a 
typical example of how Dalit is deprived in the local job markets. 
Dalit is living through complexities of caste discrimination, landlessness, 
poverty, and illiteracy. Dalit does not get a helper role in local schools and 
offices even if they pass the SLC. The educated Dalit also do not get even 
a teaching job because the entire school teacher quotas are fulfilled based 
on nepotism and favouritism. The dominant high castes get all the 
employment opportunities. 
(Keshar BK, Interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
                                                          
22Buddha Sunar, Interview, 30 August 2014 
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As felt by research participants, Dalit youths in particular experience a higher rate 
of unemployment than other age cohorts do. Many Dalit youths have been compelled 
to discontinue their education and migrate to overseas to find paid work (IDSN, 
2012). There, most of them work in menial unskilled jobs that are hazardous to their 
health.  
Thus, cyclic forms of unemployment have caused detrimental effects to the Dalit of 
Nepal. The caste prejudices limit Dalit to access the local jobs, compelling them to 
menial work. Dalit are also trapped in the capitalist market as it has substituted the 
traditional occupations of Dalit. This research indicates that Dalit in Nepal are 
trapped by caste prejudice, hegemony and the growing capitalist markets. 
 
Restrictions on Dalit Entrepreneurship 
Unable to earn money from capital ownership and restricted in wage labour 
opportunities, one possibility would be entrepreneurship. However, one of the themes 
emerged from my research is that Dalit restriction on entrepreneurship being lower 
caste and persisting discrimination. As elaborated in the above section though, 
landlessness impedes Dalit from accessing loans from financial institutions that 
might support entrepreneurship. ʻLack of land also means lack of access to credit and 
total dependency on landlords to deliver wages and food. This predicament is 
compounded by a lack of educationʼ (IDSN, 2013:4). Moreover, Dalit 
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entrepreneurship is limited as caste-based discrimination prevents Dalit for running 
small tea shops, milk cooperatives and even to run hotels publicly as mentioned by 
research participant.  
We are deprived of having entrepreneurship being Dalit. Higher caste 
avoids hotels run by Dalit. Higher castes do not eat foods and water 
touched by Dalit. In this case how to run a hotel business.  
(Sewal Ram, Dalit leader Interview on 20 August 2014) 
Such discrimination has, however, provoked struggles, like one for equality in Milk 
Selling Rights initiated by local Dalit in the Western Hill district, Syanja in 1994.  
In this particular locality, a milk collection centre was established where 
all high caste farmers used to sell their buffalo and cow milk. However, 
Dalit was not allowed to sell their milk being a lower caste people. Dalit 
milk or any form of water touched by them was restricted from other 
higher caste people. This oppression initiated the Dalit struggle. After 
several years of struggle, Dalit got equal rights to sell their milk in the 
milk collection centre. 
(Maharjan and Kisan, 2013) 
 
Caste discrimination continues to impede Dalit taking on opportunities to run 
businesses like hotels. One of the research interviewees, Yuktilal Marik, a Tarai Dalit 
activist described how Dalit are still compelled to clean their tea glasses tea in hotels 
even though they pay the full cost of the tea. He questions how, given such severe 
situations, Dalit could even think of running their hotel businesses23. As he argued, 
no one will come to or buy products from Dalit hotels. Dalit in the Hill districts also 
                                                          
23 Yuktilal Marik, Interview on 12 August 2014 
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experiences similar impediments in running hotels. A local Dalit leader in Gulmi 
district has similar views  
There is caste discrimination in urban areas, but the intensity of 
discrimination in villages is more entrenched than in urban areas. Caste 
prejudice is a major impediment for Dalit hotel entrepreneurship. 
(Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview, 28 August 2014).  
 
Furthermore, despite their trade skills, few Dalit like goldsmiths or tailors own retail 
shops. Lack of sufficient capital investment and management skills are challenges to 
sustained entrepreneurship. The persistence of discrimination is one of the key 
impediments for Dalit entrepreneurship in Nepal.  
 
Exclusion from Financial Institutions 
Financial institutions such as banks, cooperatives and microcredit finances can play 
a significant role in the alleviation of poverty (Mensah, 2004).  Financial inclusion 
contributes to the economic development of faster growth and better income 
distribution while at the social level it helps the social empowerment of the poor. One 
of the relevant facts revealed by my research is that the exclusion from such financial 
institutions inhibits the empowerment of poor Dalit. A research participant while 
explaining the importance of Dalit access into financial institutions says:  
The financial institution such as banks and micro finance are an 
important source for income generation. Dalit are excluded from these 
institutions. Dalit are not able to open up their bank or finance as it 
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requires lots of investment. Being landless, poor how can we open up 
banks. We are also not included in the committees and not hired as a 
staff. This disadvantaged us.  
(Binod Bishankhe, Interview 10 September 2014)  
 
Microfinance initiatives have the economic goals of reducing poverty and tackling the 
marginalisation of the poor, particularly the deprived sections of the society. Access 
to micro-credit loans at the lowest interest rates and community shareholdings, 
including saving and credit processes, enable poor people to improve their socio-
economic conditions where they might not be able to access mainstream financial 
institutions (Bk, 2006). Microfinance, a financial institution aimed to empower the 
marginalised poor people, evolved in the mid-19th century through cooperative 
savings in the United Kingdom. In Nepal, the first credit cooperative was formed in 
the Chitwan district of central Nepal in 1956.A more formal micro finance program 
began in 1970 (BK, 2006). My research data indicates that Dalit are also deprived of 
financial institution being poor as mentioned by Sewal Ram:  
Dalit are not often included in the committees of the financial 
institutions such as microfinance and development banks. Most of the 
Dalit do not have a bank account. To open the bank account or financial 
institution someone needs capital. Being poor, it is hard to have capital 
to invest for opening such institution  
(Interview, 20 August 2014)  
This research finds out that access to financial institutions matters for Dalit because 
Dalits’ exclusion from regular financial institutions extends from the denial of bank 
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credits to policy making. This is also confirmed by other research that Dalit exclusion 
extends in financial institution mostly to accessing loans, savings and credit (BK, 
2006). Other research also confirms that financial institutions are not inclusive. 
Executive committees, accounts committees, and the local committees are dominated 
by higher caste with only a few Dalit included in this highly segregated space (BK, 
2006:5).  
 
The exclusion in financial institutions intertwines with the land issues. Being 
landless creates stateless, and without national citizenship, people are unable to open 
bank accounts and access any other services. Exclusion from citizenship locks people 
into the cycle of poverty. Those worst affected by financial exclusion are the most 
marginalised sections of society like Dalit. This exclusion occurs primarily because of 
the lack of Dalit education, the attitude of bankers and policy directions in the 
banking sector. Existing economic and financial institutions thus enforce and 
regulate the customary norms of the caste system in Nepal.  
 
Dalit Labour Migration 
Both internal and external Labour migration has been increasingly observed in 
Nepalese society for many decades. Labour migration, particularly overseas, rapidly 
increased across the country from the 1990s. What one of the themes emerged from 
my research is that labour migration has been a key livelihood strategy in the face of 
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the lack of opportunities. This is confirmed by the large numbers of youths from 
marginal households have been migrating both to nearby cities, to India and 
overseas. Over 1700 Nepali leaves the country daily for employment, mainly in the 
Gulf countries and Malaysia to improve, their livelihoods back home (Government of 
Nepal, 2014) and this trend is increasing. The number of labour migrants was 3.9% 
in 2008/09 and almost doubled in 2013/14 to 5.6% (Ibid).  There are substantial 
numbers of Dalit going to the Gulf countries and Malaysia.  
 
My research reveals that Dalit should continue to face caste discrimination in the 
process of overseas employment. The caste inequality also extends to their working 
condition in overseas. As found out by other research, due to their caste position, Dalit 
continue to suffer from appalling working conditions overseas (Sunam, 2014). The 
evidence of caste discrimination that Dalit has to face during labour migration 
process is as mentioned by interviewees:  
There are very few Dalit led overseas manpower agencies. Being fewer 
manpower agencies and poor Dalit neither can access good jobs nor find 
good working condition at overseas. Dalit are compelled to go for 
unskilled jobs. The better jobs overseas are taken by the higher castes 
who migrate for improved labour opportunities. Dalit also cannot afford 
to go to the developed country being poor and mostly illiterate.  
(Nirmal Deula, Interview, 5 August 2014) 
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Thus, although improved livelihood is a central factor, and migration is an alternative 
form of ‘escaping from economic dependency on non-Dalit’ the pattern of dependence 
is replicated to some extent (Sunam, 2014:2032). My research indicates that 
migration is not merely a livelihood strategy but helps Dalit to change their caste and 
other forms of social relations. The direct economic benefit from labour migration 
helps Dalit to contest the hegemonic economic relations with high caste people as 
produced by the Balighare system. Dalit are also trapped in the capitalistic market 
while in overseas work as most of them are unskilled labourers and restricted to 
challenging and dangerous jobs. As expressed by the research participants the 
absolute control over labourers, unfair payment, unprofessional and risky job options 
restrain Dalit on the international labour market.  An interview excerpt supports this 
claim: 
Labour migration of Dalit is more convenient as compared to the 
traditional occupation. There are discrimination and domination in 
traditional occupation. Foreign employment enabled Dalit to save basic 
income which has reduced the traditional dependency with higher caste. 
However, Dalit are trapped by the capitalist market of unfair payment, 
dangerous jobs.  
 
(Janga Nepali, Interview, 1 September 2014) 
  
As labour migration increases for the Dalit youth, they confront several challenges, 
one of which is the management of loans as expressed by the research participants24. 
Individual loan providers, as well as financial institutions, require any form of 
                                                          
24Keshar BK, Interview, 28 August 2014 
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property, particularly land, as collateral for a loan (BK, 2006). However, having no 
land or property, Dalit youth face the major challenge and are compelled to use loans 
with high-interest rates (Nawal and Sanjay, 2015). The money sent back as 
remittance is used to pay back loans and daily subsistence. Challenges for labour 
migrants do not end only with the loan, but it extends to finding out appropriate 
brokers for good work overseas. Many youths have been the victims of unscrupulous 
brokers, and their misuse of the cost paid for overseas work (Ibid).  
 
Dalit youth are trapped into forms of cyclic labour migration in Nepal. The decreasing 
pattern of traditional occupation, increasing capitalist market and persisting caste 
discrimination are a few reasons Dalit youth take up labour migration. However, they 
also continue to face hurdles overseas due to unscrupulous brokers and menial jobs. 
 
5.4. Educational Inequality 
This section outlines Dalit educational inequality in Nepal.  It explores the question 
of what form of inequality exists in the education sector for Dalit and what are its 
causes and effects. With a literacy rate of 52.4 %, the educational status of Dalit is 
fragile as compared to the higher caste Brahmin with a literacy rate of 81.9% 
(Sharma, 2014). According to the 2011 census, only 0.4% of Dalit have achieved a 
Bachelor degree and above, as compared to a national average of 3.4%, and 20% of 
Dalit children do not enrol in school every year (CBS, 2011). Among other several 
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problems identified through my research low enrolment, high dropout rates, and 
caste prejudice in schools, combined with a discriminatory curriculum are some 
dimensions of the problems Dalit are facing in the education sector.  
 
Drawing on Fraser’s (2003) argument that injustice can be remedied only if there is 
recognition or revaluing of devalued identity, diversity, and representation, one can 
thus see that the problem with education is not only about resources but also about 
Dalit identity and how it is held in this system. Thus Dalit need revaluing of their 
identity and representation in schools. As they are considered a lower class, they have 
lower representation at the policy making and implementation levels. At the same 
time, they require the redistribution of resources and opportunities. 
 
Educational Function and Social Justice 
In different times and spaces, the function of education is interpreted in diverse ways 
reflecting competing systems.  Functionalist perspectives emphasise the role of 
education as being primarily to prepare young people to support society, whereas 
Marxist and Feminist perspectives bring a more critical view, highlighting the role 
that education plays in a filtering process in schools, causing oppression and 
disadvantage for some individuals while unfairly advantaging others (Hart, 2012:19). 
Considering both perspectives, one can argue that education maintains the status 
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quo of oppressive regimes in some contexts, but can also in other contexts promote 
social mobility.  
 
According to the critical perspective then, and as Zeigler argues, ‘the educational 
system is regarded as an essentially conservative, culture-preserving, culture-
transmitting institution; the educational system now tends to be observed as the 
master determinant of all aspects of change' (Zeigler, 1970:20). The educational 
institution is a vital organ of the society that can play a role to reproduce the social 
system and to sustain the social, religious and cultural practices. It produces social 
values, attitudes, and knowledge (Tropp, 1965:6).  
 
However, the educational system can also generate social mobility based on merit. 
Social mobility can be maximised in the least elitist public education system with a 
maximised welfare policy. Whereas they might be excluded from other institutions, 
lower socioeconomic students can in this setting have access to educational 
opportunities. At the same time, they may, and do have lower access to resources and 
opportunities. As a result, they attend less prestigious institutions, which reinforces 
the social hierarchy rather than increasing social mobility (Hart, 2012:28).   
 
In Nepal, educational systems, in fact, play a major role in aiding and encouraging 
the reproduction of social inequality and social exclusion. Cultural capital undertakes 
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a central significance in the above process of social reproduction because inequalities 
occur in the cultural transmission, which accentuates social class (Tzanakis, 
2011:76). This process is facilitated in schools where teachers’ pedagogic actions 
promote the cultural capital of the dominant class, by rewarding students who 
possess such capital and by penalising others who do not (Ibid). Cultural transmission 
is a strategic process of family based intergenerational reproduction. In modern 
societies, the school has become the most important agency for the reproduction of 
almost of all social classes (Nash, 1990:432).  
Situation of Dalit Education 
One of the fundamental issues emerged through my research is that Dalit have been 
historically disadvantaged in the educational sector. As noted above, this pattern of 
exclusion has its roots in the Varna system as described by Manusmriti, in which 
Dalit were considered as the labourers, and the Brahmin (higher caste) was the only 
rightful holders of education (Ahuti, 2010). This framework persisted in the twentieth 
century in Nepal, with education having been prohibited for Dalit right up to the 
1950s, particularly during the Rana regime. In fact, not only Dalit but also other caste 
groups were excluded from school education, but the penalty for violating the rules 
was harsher for Dalit than for other caste groups. Janga Bdr. Rana established some 
schools during the Rana regime, but they were only for the Rana family and not open 
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to the public. As a result, 98% people were illiterate in Nepal until 1950, and only 100 
Dalit were found to be literate in this period (Bhattachan et al., 2008).25 
 
The secondary data and research interview indicate that substantial numbers of Dalit 
students are still out of school.26A research interviewee indicates some of the reasons 
for this:  
There is a lower enrolment of Dalit children at the first school going age 
because of poverty and lack of awareness among Dalit parents. The 
school going age children are supposed to help their parents to look after 
other siblings. When parents go to wage labour older children care for 
their siblings. This causes non-enrolment of Dalit children at school.  
(Buddha Sunar, Interview, 30 August 2014)  
 
Even where Dalit are enrolled, continuation in school is a problem. In 2004, the school 
completion rate of Dalit was considerably lower—15% of the total Dalit 
                                                          
25Democratic political change in 1950 encouraged Nepali people to open schools. Consequently, Dalit also started to 
go to school but there was not any particular provision for Dalit (Bhattachan et al., 2008). The 1990s political 
change is a landmark in the educational sector, as the government made primary school free for all children (Ibid). 
There was nominal provision for scholarships for ultra-poor, including talented Dalit children. The educational 
policy did have significant impacts on the outcome of Dalit education, for example, the literacy rate of Dalit doubled 
in 2001 to 33.8% from 17% in the 1991 census. This rate increased to 52.4% in 2011, although there is still a large 
gap between non-Dalit and Dalit literacy. The literacy rate of the Tarai Dalit is the lowest among the groups in 
Nepal. In 2011 census, the literacy rate of Dalit was 52.4% (Hill Dalit 61.9% and Tarai Dalit 34.5%) which is less 
than the national average of 65.9%compared with 81.9% of Brahmin community (CBS, 2011). The Dom (20.3%) 
and Musahar (21.8%) have on average the lowest literacy rates among the bottom ten and the other higher caste 
groups (CBS, 2014). The significant difference between the Hill and Tarai Dalit literacy rate is generally determined 
by their awareness levels and access to opportunity and power. 
 
26The share of Dalit and ethnic enrolment is proportionately lower than their share of the population. The Dalit 
proportion of students at the basic level is 19.7 % and the secondary level 10.5 % (Government of Nepal, 2012). 
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population.27The key reasons for Dalit lower attainment and continuation of school 
as mentioned by a research participant are:  
…. most of the Dalit are poor, and their children should help their 
parents for daily wages and agricultural work. The persisting poverty is 
a key reason for Dalit discontinuation. However, the widespread caste 
discrimination is also another reason. Dalit children face direct and 
indirect forms of caste prejudice and discrimination by their peer and 
teachers at school which discourage Dalit children. Also, the exclusion 
of Dalit in management committee and teaching force are also 
contributing factor.  
(Dulari Harijan, Interview, 8 September 2014) 
With non-enrolment, higher dropout rate, irregularities of school attendance and the 
incidence of caste discrimination are the problems that Dalit experience in the school 
and educational sectors. High dropout and low levels enrolment are the current 
challenges for Dalit in Nepal.28 Dropping out of schools was more frequent among 
Dalit students compared to the other groups. The interview data also suggest that 
Dalit are dropping out of school at a higher rate than other groups due to the 
persisting caste discrimination and poverty. Ganga Prasad Mahara, a Tarai Dalit 
says that: 
                                                          
 
27 Tarai Dalit such as Chamar, Khatwe, Dushad are very poor and the Mushahar have almost no education. Overall 
66.4% of the population aged 5-25 years currently attends school or college. Attendance is highest among Hill 
Brahman (79.3%), followed by Newar (74.3%) and Hill Chhetri (73.3%) (CBS, 2011).  Similar to literacy, all at the 
bottom are the Tarai Dalit, and the Dom has the lowest percentage of the current school or college attendance 
(22.2%), followed by Musahar (29.3%) (CBS, 2014). Dalit School Leaving Certificate (SLC) pass rate is very low 
in comparison with other caste groups, and this then relates to Dalit enrolment and continuation in lower secondary 
and primary levels. 
28The enrolment rate of Dalit is 18.7%, of Ethnic people is 36.7% and the total enrolment rate is 84.7% at the basic 
education level (GON, 2012). In primary school, repeating grades and dropout rates are high, especially in Grade 1, 
and the completion rate is low. 
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Dalit children continue to face caste discrimination at school. They 
experience discrimination from their peers and teachers. Teachers put 
Dalit children on the backside of the classroom. Some teachers even do 
not touch Dalit children and do not encourage them to participate in the 
classroom actively. The poverty and caste discrimination are main 
reasons for dropping out kids from school.  
(Interview on 12 August) 
 
This research revealed that poverty, racist behaviour and bullying by peers are 
causes of school dropouts. This is confirmed by the survey of NNDSWO (2004) in 6 
districts, where more than 50% are not going to school, the reason for dropping out is 
the adverse economic situation. Poverty compels Dalit to wage labour, and most 
children work with their parents. The informal social values and norms also 
discourage Dalit children from continuing their schooling. As mentioned by research 
participant Keshar Bk, the use of caste derogatory words like Kami, Sarki, Chamar 
and Dom humiliates Dalit children. He said that ̔school peer and teacher use to call 
Kami, Sarki and other derogatory words. Dalit children feel humiliation if someone 
call them using such derogatory form ̕29. Inside the classroom, the higher caste 
students do not allow Dalit students to sit together with them.  This was confirmed 
in the field work, where almost all the interview participants agreed that there is 
some form of direct and indirect discrimination in schools in Nepal.  
Bhola Paswan, a Dalit journalist, spoke about the way in which teachers 
separate Dalit from other children by having them seated at the back. 
                                                          
29Keshar Bk, Interview, 28 August 2014 
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Particularly in the Terai regions, Dalit are not allowed to touch the 
water in schools. 
(Interview, 12 August 2014)  
 
There were similar findings from Bhattachan et al., (2008) as they found that mostly 
Dalit student sit separately at the back of the classroom, and in some schools, Dalit 
are still not allowed to enter at all. The higher caste students fear Dalit as they can 
touch their lunch (Bhattachan et al., 2008). Another source of peers' rejection is 
related to the age of Dalit students, as Dalit children often begin school later than 
other groups (Mahat, 1999). The racist behaviour of peers discourages Dalit children 
from continuing their education. Dalit children do not get support from higher caste 
children in discussions and thus miss the opportunity of sharing and exchanging 
talents. The recent case of discrimination as reported by Makalu TV is an example of 
how Dalit students are treated in the school30. This research finds out that various 
forms of discrimination can be observed in schools. One of them is a restricted 
relationship with the teacher. A research participant highlighted some of the 
prejudice behaviours in schools:  
                                                          
30Kanhayia Mallik a Dalit student in Rangeli-5, Morang faces discrimination in school. He says that the 
teacher asks him to stay on the back bench in the classroom. The teacher directly says we are lower caste and 
does not allow us to sit in the front bench and to take part actively in reading and writing. If we ask the 
teacher to sit at the front, the teacher uses corporal punishment. Another Dalit girl had a similar experience as 
now she has left the school from the same village. She says "I do not like to go to school because the teacher 
and peers consider us lower caste and misbehave by untouchability and caste discrimination. I feel humiliated 
when they discriminate against us (Makalu Television, 6 June 2015) 
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Teachers abuse Dalit children by using their surnames, which humiliates 
them. Teachers do not use water touched by Dalit. Teachers inspire non-
Dalit children to be seated separately from Dalit. The lower ranked mark 
is given to Dalit children. Teachers give priority to non-Dalit children for 
extra-curricular activities, e.g. tours, educational visits. The class 
monitor is selected by non-Dalit children who always beat and punish 
Dalit children. Many Dalit students face the problem while renting a 
room. However, teachers do not help them in this situation. Many Dalit 
are restricted from schools if they resist the unfair behaviour. 
(Keshar BK, Interview on 28 August 2014) 
 
Reinforcement of the dominant culture, particularly untouchability practices are 
pervasive at schools and discourage Dalit children from attending and continuing 
their schooling. The following statement from an interviewee, who is now a social 
activist, shows clearly how Dalit had to suffer caste discrimination in school, also 
showing its pervasiveness across settings: 
…Untouchability in the school was common for me because I had no 
knowledge at that time, I had to live separately. I was not allowed to touch 
a water pot or jug. Later when I moved to Kathmandu for my college 
study, I used to stay in a hostel, but some Brahmin colleagues left the 
hostel when they knew that I was untouchable and they were reluctant 
to have lunch in the kitchen together. I used to think sometimes that I 
am also the same as other peers in school and college, but I had no choice 
and had to accept it. 
(Padam Sundas, Interview, 8 August 2014)  
 
A low level of teacher diversity is also a major challenge in Nepal. The majority of 
teachers still come from the higher caste groups—Brahmins and Kshatriyas. Only 
3.3% of teachers at the secondary level and 2.7% at the higher secondary level are 
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Dalit, which is the lowest among all caste groups (GON, 2012). This is highly 
damaging because of the presence of Dalit teachers matters in some senses. As 
discussed in the theory chapter, representation has a symbolic value. One of the key 
factors came through my research is that the presence of Dalit teachers can provide 
role models to both Dalit parents and children to make them realise the importance 
of education. Despite the 9th Government plan (1997-2002) that required that there 
be one Dalit teacher per school, the policy was not implemented effectively. If properly 
implemented, this type of policy could play a vital role in creating an inclusive 
teachers’ force in Nepal, and Dalit would benefit from it. By highlighting the Dalit 
exclusion in Teacher force, one the participant says that:  
Dalit is also excluded in the teaching force. At the local level, the school 
management committee hires their relative or the person who is 
affiliated with a political party. There is a higher discrepancy in the local 
hiring process. The government plan also is not implemented effectively. 
If the plan is implemented, it would help Dalit to be included in the 
schools.  
   (Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
This research indicates that Dalit also face exclusion from the Management 
Committees at schools. These committees play a guiding role to make schools efficient 
and have a role in selecting teachers, managing the resources and ensuring that 
schools provide quality education. Even though the provision for inclusive 
membership is made through the 7th amendment of the Education Act, 1971, neither 
the existing legislation nor the regulations are specific regarding the actual process 
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of this committee formation. The lack of Dalit in the teaching profession and their 
inability to win elections contribute to their exclusion from these committees 
(Bishwakarma, 2009). In some cases, higher caste people who hold positions in school 
management committees restrict Dalit from nominating their candidacy for a 
management committee. Dalit representation on the committee could influence the 
process of teacher selection and efficient distribution of Dalit scholarship. The 
education policies do not have mandatory provisions for Dalit on School Management 
Committees and Parents Teachers Associations, so the representation of Dalit in 
school governance is low. One of the interviewees confirms the exclusion in these 
committees:  
The school management committees are also led and controlled by 
higher castes. Dalit are not considered capable of managing these 
committees. This sort of exclusion discourages Dalit from actively taking 
part in the education sector. The exclusion reduces Dalit trust and 
ownership. 
(Budha Sunar, Interview, 30 August 2014) 
 
One of the key issues revealed by this research is that although the curriculum is the 
backbone of education and could play a role in eliminating social stigmas, social 
discrimination, in fact, the Nepalese curriculum is itself caste biased and 
discriminatory to Dalit.  This is confirmed by the Nepal Dalit Commission's review 
(2004), some prejudice prevails in the textbooks. For example, as mentioned by the 
research participants, derogatory words and phrases are referred to in the reading 
materials or subject textbooks such as Kami Kale ki Kale Kami (Black Kami or Kami 
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Black). The lack of relevant teaching and learning materials to discourage 
discrimination and untouchability is one of the key reasons for continued 
discrimination in schools31. There is absent of positive mention of traditional Dalit 
professions in the curriculum, although this type of inclusion could help students to 
revalue their importance, rather than emphasising the negative descriptions. In 
general, the curriculum has not considered the Dalit and marginalised groups as 
essential components of the nation.  
The education system in Nepal plays a vital role to reproduce the caste system and 
discrimination in Nepal. My research resonates with other research regarding the 
use of derogatory terms in the educational curriculum, the persistence of 
discrimination by teachers and peers, the exclusion from school management 
committees and that teachers reinforce the caste hierarchy and hegemony in Nepal. 
 
Review of Government policy for Dalit education 
As revealed by this research, although there have been many efforts and initiatives 
to address the serious levels of educational inequality that exist in Nepal, these have 
not been as effective as they might have been, even taking into account the very 
challenging governance context. The Nepal Government has formulated some 
targeted policies for Dalit education and has adopted some international conventions. 
                                                          
31Buddha Sunar, Interview, 30 August 2014 
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However, the implementation of these policies is not effective as a result the progress 
is slow. For example, Nepal did not significantly progress achieving free and 
compulsory primary education as set out by Millennium Development Goals 
(UNICEF, 2006). Despite having national and international legal procedures, it could 
not be effective in halving the gap in Dalit education. While explaining Dalit situation 
in education, one of the research participant Bhola Paswan says that:  
…. education situation of Dalit is still pathetic, and this case is more in 
Tarai regions of Nepal. There is widespread caste discrimination at 
school. Dalit students are not encouraged properly, and there is no 
learning environment. There are certain national and international law 
against discrimination and initiative to reduce the gap, which is indeed 
not working well.  
(Interview on 12 August) 
 
Among the several legal provisions, the Education Act 1971 (8th amendment, 2004) is 
one of the important laws in safeguarding free education for Dalit children. This Act 
envisioned free primary education for all children including free education for poor 
Dalit, ethnic groups and women. Education by law (2002) has directed community 
schools to manage free education for poor Dalit, Ethnic groups and girls. An inclusive 
provision in the Annual Strategic Implementation Plan (ASIP), 2006 has taken 
various measures. One of them is policy reform to improve the inclusion of 
disadvantaged groups such as the inclusion of teachers from traditionally 
disadvantaged groups will be prioritised. However, the implementation of the law is 
not effective as mentioned by participants:  
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…the inclusion of Dalit in school mainly in its school management and 
teaching force are significant for Dalit because that could motivate Dalit 
children in school. The level of caste discrimination could be reduced due 
to Dalit representation. However, Dalit are rarely included in school 
management and teaching force.  
(Yuktilal Marik, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
The Dalit scholarship is one of the major visible programs of government to support 
the education for Dalit. The School Sector Reform Plan (2009-2015) focuses on basic 
education. It includes a free education provision that is cost-free services for 
admission, textbooks, tuition and examinations. Particular attention is paid to paying 
Dalit and persons with disabilities from the Karnali zone as this zone is 
comparatively considered as underdeveloped in Nepal. The Dalit Development 
Committee has been distributing higher education scholarships to Dalit students 
every year (Bhattachan et al., 2008). However, the scholarships have been misused 
by teachers and school management committee members that deprive the needy Dalit 
students of those scholarships.  
 
5.5. Political Inequality 
The ‘political inequality refers to the unequal influence over decisions made by 
political bodies and the unequal outcomes of the decision’ (Dubrow, 2015:477). 
ʻPolitical inequality is a subtype of power inequality, visible within the political 
processes of all kinds of political structures. In modern democracies, political 
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inequality is simultaneously a dimension of democracy and dimensions of 
stratification (Ibid). A popular definition of political inequality that is grounded in 
equality of opportunity is related to the distributional approach. It is structural 
differences in the distribution of political resources. This clarifies that one group has 
greater or lesser access to or acquisition of political resources. Political possessions 
are anything that can be used to affect political decisions such as social and 
psychological factors, an authority position, a network connection or action or political 
participation (Dahl, 1996). The following section highlights how Dalit of Nepal has 
been dispossessed from political power.  
 
Dalit Participation and Representation in Political Parties 
One of the key themes emerged out of my research is that Dalit inequality is 
entrenched in the political sphere with lower participation in political parties, and 
inappropriate government policies. Inclusion statistics of different political party 
evidence that Dalit participation is lower in their committees. Political inequality 
interrelates with socioeconomic, educational status of Dalit, which is in general in a 
fragile condition. The government policy to address this condition is inadequate and 
ineffective despite recent changes to electoral policy supporting the increased 
inclusion of Dalit in politics (Ahuti, 2010). Thus, this section highlights the existing 
Dalit situation in the political sphere including its relationship with caste 
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discrimination showing that caste discrimination plays a complex role causing Dalit 
inequality in politics.    
 
Dalit participation in formal political structures has been slowly increasing since 
1990 although there is persisting inequality. Dalit gradually started to take part in 
the formal political process through the nomination of Dalit members for political 
party committees and elections. However, data indicates that Dalit are under-
represented as they are neither in leadership nor sufficiently represented in the party 
structure. None of the political parties has elected Dalit to lead the party.  By 
explaining the obstacles to Dalit one research participant Jiban Pariyar says that: 
…Dalit are still excluded from a political leadership role. Very few Dalit 
are nominated by the central committee of major political parties. This 
also reflects at the lower committees of the parties. There are also 
evidence of discrimination as higher castes devalue the leadership of 
Dalit. Among others, Dalit poverty and lack of education are also some 
other obstacles for Dalit to continue politics.  
(Interview on 8 August 2014) 
The composition of the central committees of the major political parties in 2012, as 
shown in Table 5, indicates the low representation of Dalit. 
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Table 6: Dalit Representation in the Central Committees of the Major Political 
Parties 2012 
S.N. UCPN-M NC CPN-UML 
Dalit members  6/138 (4.34%) 6/85 (7.10%) 7/115(6.08%) 
Female Dalit members 1/138 (0.72%) 2/85 (3.35%) - 
Terai Dalit Members  1/138 (0.72%) 1/85 (1.17%) 2/116(1.72%) 
 
Source: (Khanal et al.,2012) 
 
One of the key reasons for the lower participation of Dalit, as came through my 
research, is the domination of non-Dalit in political systems. In other words, even in 
a democratic regime the informal norms that traditionally excluded Dalit continue to 
block them from formal participation and decision-making processes.  In particular, 
the leadership of political parties is traditionally held by upper caste men. Dalit and 
other marginalised groups are mostly party cadres rather than leaders. Dalit are 
excluded from formal decisions making levels as those levels are dominated by mostly 
higher castes (Khanal et al., 2012). Dalit, in general, are considered as the vote bank 
for political parties rather than leaders. As Constitutional Assembly member Anita 
Pariyar described the situation:  
Political parties still do not believe that Dalit make competent leaders. 
They are reluctant to provide roles and responsibilities, particularly 
leading roles for Dalit. This is not only in one party but also with all the 
parties in Nepal as they carry conservative ideas and always see Dalit 
as incapable. 
(CA Member Anita Pariyar, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
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The political participation is, however, more than just voting and standing for 
political candidacy. This means attending public meetings, engaging in public 
discussions and the taking part of actions that point to political interest and 
engagement. Although the majority of Dalit vote in the elections, there is little 
evidence of subsequent formal political engagement (Khanal et al., 2012). Lower self-
esteem and humiliation impedes Dalit from accessing opportunities and resources. 
Nevertheless, it was found that Dalit often use informal means for political 
engagement to influence political actions and learn about political issues in their 
community.  
Dalit are not in the leadership role even at the local level. Dalit engage 
in political activities but use informal means such as Dalit talk to local 
political leaders, share their views with Dalit community leaders, or 
simply stay silent during meetings. The political engagement depends 
on the educational level of Dalit. Illiterate Dalit are not able to raise 
their issues appropriately. This is also problem that makes Dalit to use 
informal medium to convey their concern during meetings, 
(Keshar BK, Interview, August 2014).  
The problem is that these forms of informal political participation or low participation 
lead to the misrepresentation or non-representation of Dalit views and interests. 
Thus, although the democratisation process has given formal space to Dalit to 
exercise their rights and participate in formal politics, the inclusion of Dalit is still 
missing.  
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Dalit are affiliated to the main political parties mostly as party cadres.  Even though 
Dalit manage to obtain membership at the local level, they often fail to gain leading 
role at central committees. Alternatively, Dalit used political wings to advocate their 
issues. As revealed through my research almost all the political parties have their 
Dalit political wings. The Nepali Congress has the Nepal Dalit Sangh, and UML has 
Nepal Utpidit Jatiya Mukti Samaj. Dalit leaders who are actively working in the 
party are also a member of these political wings. Dalit wings follow the party ideology, 
structure and directives; however, they explicitly discuss Dalit rights. It is a way of 
organising Dalit along party lines. Ganesh BK, General Secretary of Mukti Samaj, 
suggests that Dalit wings are important for political parties. 
Dalit political wing in political parties are imperative to sensitise, 
organise Dalit community according to party lines. This platform helps 
Dalit leaders to discuss and recommend the party to adopt a policy for 
Dalit, which would be effective in the party structure specifically always. 
It is indeed useful to create pressure on Dalit agenda in an organised 
form. 
 
(Ganesh BK, General Secretary Mukti Samaj, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
The political wings of Dalit have been a platform to organise joint political action. 
Highlighting the importance of Dalit political wings and their joint action, Dalit 
leader Chabilal Bishwakarma says that:  
Despite there are some criticism against the divided political ideology of 
Dalit leaders as they are scattered in different political parties, recent 
events of the formation of informal 'Joint Political Struggle Committee 
of Dalit' is very prominent for Dalit Movement. Dalit leaders of the main 
political parties chair the committee in rotational basis and agendas are 
decided in this committee if any protest programs to set forth. This 
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committee led a demonstration against government curtailing of Dalit 
rights. 
 
(Chhabilal Bishwakarma, Central Committee Member UML, Interview, 26 
August 2014) 
 
My research indicates that the political participation and representation of Dalit is 
slowly increasing after the 1990s political change in Nepal. However, the persistence 
of higher caste domination in party structures and leadership together with caste 
prejudice has been detrimental factors for Dalit participation in politics. 
 
Exclusion of Dalit in the National Legislature 
Dalit representation in the national legislature was consistently lower than other 
higher caste groups during Panchayat period and even after the reinstatement of 
democracy in 1990. In the Panchayat system, the King used to nominate the 
supporters for the Panchayat Assembly (Khanal et al., 2012). During 30 years of the 
Panchayat, only 4 Dalit were nominated, as shown in Table 6. The repeated 
nomination of the same Dalit candidates evidences the pseudo participation of Dalit. 
Dalit nomination in the Panchayat Assembly was tokenism.  
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Table 7: Dalit in the National Panchayat 1961-1990 
S.N. Name  Year of Appointment  
1 Dhanman Singh Pariyar 1962 (nominated by King) 
2 Hira Lal Bishwakarma 1971 (nominated by King) 
3 Hira Lal Bishwakarma 1974 (appointed by King) 
4 Hira Lal Bishwakarma 1981 (nominated by King) 
5 TR Bishwakarma 1981 (appointed by King) 
6 Tek Bahadur Bishwakarma 1986 (nominated by King) 
 
Source: (Khanal et al.,2012) 
The reinstatement of democracy in 1990 brought freedom of speech into party politics.  
Several political parties evolved during this period, but the inclusion of Dalit and 
marginalised groups remained zero as higher caste elites led most of the parties. After 
the political changes of the 1990s, there were national general elections in 1991, 1994 
and 1999 for 250 electoral seats of the National Parliament. However, only one Dalit 
candidate won the election in 1991. As some of the reasons for the failure of 
democracy for Dalit non-representation, Mr Chabilal Bishwakarma, central 
committee member of UML mentions 
The prolonged nature of political biases for Dalit candidacy, the 
financial crisis Dalit experience and the untouchability perception 
among the voters are key reasons for Dalit failure. These key reasons 
impact Dalit to contest election even if they contest there is less chance 
of winning the election. 
(Interview, 27 September 2014).  
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During Panchayat, the nomination of Dalit in the upper house was symbolic and 
nominal. Table 7 shows the Dalit leaders nominated by King during Panchayat 
system in Nepal.  
Table 8: Dalit in the National Assembly 1991-2001 
S.N. Name Year Method of Appointment 
1 Dal Singh Kami 1991 Upper House (NC) 
2 Golchhe Sarki 1991 Upper House (UML) 
3 Man Bahadur Bishwakarma 1993 Nominated by King 
4 Ratna Bahadur Bishwakarma 1995 Upper House (NC) 
5 Bijul Kumar Bishwakarma 1999 Upper House (NC) 
6 Lal Bahadur Bishwakarma 1999 Upper House (CPN-UML) 
7 Rishi Babu Pariyar 1999 Nominated by King 
8 RamPrit Paswan 1999 Upper House (CPN-UML) 
 
Source: (Khanal et al.,2012) 
Dalit representation in the national legislature since the 1990s until 2007 was only 
tokenism rather than meaningful proportionate participation. In contrast to this 
situation, in 2007 the electoral policy brought substantial changes resulting in about 
8% Dalit participation in the national legislature as shown in Table 8. The interview 
text also further clarifies the Dalit exclusion in the national legislature.  
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Despite the democratic changes, there were no substantial shifts in the 
political representation of Dalit in Nepal. There were only very few Dalit 
representations. The political parties were reluctant to provide election 
tickets to Dalit candidate. Even if they provided, it was in the place 
where there was no strong party hold. That led to the failure of Dalit 
candidate to win the election. 
    (Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014)  
Table 9: Dalit in the National Legislature 2006-2013 
S.N National Assembly Dalit seats/Total Seats Percent 
1 Interim legislature Parliament, 2006 18/330 5.45% 
2 Constituent Assembly Election, 2008 50 (7-FPTP, PR-43)/601 8.31% 
3 Constituent Assembly Election, 2013 42 (2 FPTP, PR 40)/601 6.98% 
 
Source: Author's Compilation, 2014 
Dalit candidates from the Communist Party (Maoists) won overwhelmingly in direct 
elections as this was previously considered as the matter of power and money as 
shown in Table 9. As indicated by most of the interviewee, in previous general 
elections, Dalit used to be nominated in areas where there was no strong party hold32. 
However, in 2008, Dalit were nominated to party held areas with full party support 
for the election campaign and necessary expenditures that brought a historical 
achievement (Ahuti, 2013:333). This trend was previously uncommon as the political 
parties used to nominate Dalit in less party holds electoral areas.   
Table 10: Dalit in the National Legislature by Political Party 2006-2013 
                                                          
32 Ganesh BK, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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S.N. Political Parties and Dalit 
seats 
Interim 
Legislature 
Parliament, 
2006 
Constituent Assembly 
Election, 2008 
Constituent 
Assembly 
Election, 2013 
1 Nepali Congress  1 0-FPTP, PR-9 0-FPTP, PR-9 
2 Communist Party of Nepal-
UML 
3 0-FPTP, PR-10 2-FPTP, PR-9 
3 Communist Party of Nepal-
Maoist  
12 7- FPTP, PR-16 0-FPTP, PR-9 
4 Janamorcha Nepal 2  0-FPTP, PR-9 
5 Other Parties  - 0-FPTP, PR-7 0-FPTP, PR-9 
6 Dalit Janjati Party  - 0-FPTP, PR-1 0-FPTP, PR-9 
Source: Authors Compilation, 2015 
As indicated by my research, to increase Dalit representation in political parties and 
the legislature, the effective implementation of inclusion policy is necessary. This was 
something confirmed by a number of my interviewees in my study33. However, the 
persisting caste prejudice is a key impediment to effectively implementing the policy 
and providing fair representation for Dalit in Nepal. 
Electoral Policy and Dalit Representation 
One of the key themes revealed by my research is that the electoral system is 
fundamental to shaping the representation of Dalit in Nepal. This finding is also 
confirmed by Khanal et al. (2012) research. Social class, gender and caste blind policy 
creates greater exclusion of marginalised groups. For instance, the direct election 
                                                          
33Ganesh BK, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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system is known as First Past the Post (FPTP) failed to ensure the representation of 
Dalit in most of the elections held before 2008 (Khanal et al., 2012). The electoral 
policy, 2008, approved the principle of proportional representation, which translated 
into having a mixed method electoral system for a total of 601 Constituent Assembly 
Members (Election Commission, 2007). This policy introduced 250 seats for First Past 
the Post (FPTP) and 335 for Proportional Representation (PR). Political parties were 
bound by this law to nominate a proportional ratio of caste, ethnic and gender 
balance. As the result of this law, the first time in the history, Dalit achieved 8% Dalit 
representation in the National Legislature. Arguing the importance of proportional 
representation policy, Dalit leader Jiban Pariyar says:  
The Electoral policy is a key factor in determining the representation of 
marginalised groups. The mixed method election, the combination of 
FPTP and PR helped Dalit representation in the parliament in Nepal. 
Whereas Dalit representation before 2008 was also zero. The 
proportional representation policy contributed to increasing Dalit 
because this compelled political parties to nominate inclusive list in 
Nepal.  
(Jiban Pariyar, NC leader, Interview, 8 August 2014)  
 
This research also indicates the gaps in the electoral policy. For example, the political 
parties misuse processes by nominating their relatives, business personnel, and elites 
instead of marginalised groups in proportional representation quota34. This pattern 
is further obstructing the chance of Dalit and other marginalised groups from 
                                                          
34 Rem BK, Interview, 6 August 2014 
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increasing their representation. Despite this gap, in Nepal, a PR election system is 
one of the main factors to increase Dalit representation in the national legislature.  
 
Obstacles to Dalit Political Representation 
The combination of caste discrimination, social status as reproduced by hierarchy, 
competency assumption and lack of social capital are few factors excluding Dalit in 
politics as well as non-acceptance of their leadership as came through my research 
interview. This is confirmed by other studies (Khanal et al., 2012; Bhattachan et al., 
2008) since the Dalit leaders who are involved in national politics are compelled to 
follow the elite higher caste leaders even for being nominated in a different structure 
of political parties.  
 
The mixed method election combination of First Past the Post and Proportional 
Representation helped to bring positive results, although this was not sufficient 
according to the principle of proportional representation. Key reasons for the low 
success rate of Dalit in direct elections as opined by Min Bishwakarma leader of 
Nepali Congress are: 
Inclusion policy is not yet fully in practice, and political parties are also 
not serious about Dalit representation. Political parties just provide 
proportional quota and do not promote to contest the direct election. This 
form of political exclusion is an underlying cause hindering Dalit access 
to power. 
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(Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
Tokenism is prevailing particularly after the enforcement of the inclusion policy, and 
pseudo participation is a challenge to the Dalit representation. This research shows 
that nomination either by quota or just as a token in the political mechanism is 
pseudo participation as widely confronted by marginalised groups in Nepal. There is 
contention over meaningful vs numeric participation as they argue that numeric 
participation does not help to raise the agenda unless representatives can establish 
their agenda (Ahuti, 2010). The question of meaningful participation lags behind 
since there is a general trend to nominate an individual based on their favours rather 
than their personal and political qualities.  
The recent changes in the electoral policies have contributed to 
increasing the representation of Dalit in the national legislature and 
political parties. However, political parties nominate the Dalit who are 
more inclined to party. This sometimes undermines the qualities. Thus, 
political parties should consider the meaningful participation rather 
than numeric.  
    (Prof. Madhusudan Suvedi, Interview, 15 August 
2014) 
 
Dalit division by political ideology also has the effect of undermining the effective 
advocacy of Dalit. Dalit leaders are tied to the respective political ideologies of the 
parties to which they belong and are not able to fully acknowledge Dalit communal 
issues. Leaders' dispute over certain issues is an impediment to developing a common 
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Dalit agenda and strongly influencing for its enforcement. For instance, as emerged 
through my research affirmative action is contested among Dalit leaders, both 
regarding its name and content. As mentioned by a research participant Yam Kisan, 
Dalit leaders affiliated with UCPN-Maoist prefer to say special rights, NC uses the 
term reservation, and CPN-UML stands for special reservation35. In principle, these 
three terms denote the same thing, but Dalit leaders continue to argue over 
terminology. This is illustrative of the effect that internal division amongst Dalit has 
on the efficacy of formal politics for Dalit in Nepal. He further explains that:  
...the affirmative action was contested among the Dalit leaders mainly 
for its name and content. Dalit leader affiliated with Maoist prefer to 
say special rights. Special rights as they argue are more progressive 
than reservation. Special rights cover the compensatory provision for 
Dalit representation. NC leader prefers to use reservation as employed 
in India. UML leader prefers the special word reservation. However, the 
essence of these all words is same.  
 
     (Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
This research indicates that the polarised political landscape and the perceptions of 
the major political parties are contributing factors to the unequal participation of 
Dalit. Political parties do not have a common position and interest in Dalit issues36. 
The political parties have failed to take measures and make policy decisions to ensure 
Dalit representation. Rather they have allocated some seats to Dalit candidates only 
as a token and to symbolise their pro-Dalit policy. As expressed by the research 
                                                          
35Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014 
36Binod Bishankhe, Interview, 10 September 2014 
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participant Yam Kisan, Political parties consider Dalit generally as their vote bank 
(source of votes) because of Dalit weaker political associations, internal conflicts, and 
divisions37. Also, there is not any favourable environment to sustain a Dalit cadre in 
politics and to develop leadership capacities. The major impediments are poor 
economic background and social hegemony. Even in today's society, primarily higher 
caste people do not accept leadership from Dalit considering their caste hierarchical 
social values.  
 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explains the underlying manifestations and causes of Dalit inequality 
in Nepal. It has attempted to show how structural injustice induced by caste 
hierarchy persists and how it causes multidimensional effects on Dalit lives. The 
deeply entrenched caste discrimination has caused inequality and injustice through 
socio-economic, education and political exclusion and marginalisation. It was found 
that the caste hegemonic social structure continues Dalit to marginalise in this 
modern age. The violation of basic human rights of Dalit is a key concern; however, 
efforts by authorities have been poorly implemented. Dalit remain excluded from 
most real opportunities, denied State resources and disrespected.  
                                                          
37 Yam Kisan, Interview on 15 August 2014 
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In this context, this study has questioned the concept of Dalit assimilation to 
dominant cultural norms mainly because there is no equal respect of the devalued 
identity of Dalit. Revaluing Dalit identity and the redistribution of power and 
resources are crucial to rectifying the injustices faced by Dalit in Nepal. With this 
foundation, the next chapter begins to consider how Dalit struggles for reform and 
justice. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DALIT POWER POLITICS: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
6.1. Introduction  
Whereas the previous chapter set out the deeply entrenched inequality that Dalit 
experience in Nepal, this chapter provides an analysis of how Dalit have been seeking 
to overcome this inequality since the inception of their social movements in 1947. It 
does so by focusing on two main questions. First, it asks how the Dalit Movement 
emerged and how it has developed. Second, it considers what the Dalit Movement has 
achieved in terms of their objective of bringing about the institutional reforms 
required to realise equality and social justice. To explore these questions, this chapter 
briefly examines the Dalit Movement through social movement theory, and I use a 
mix of my interview data and observations I have gained from the literature for its 
substantive analysis. At the same time, the strict distinction that is usually drawn 
between the informal politics of social movements on the one hand, and formal party 
politics on the other, and the distinction between social movements and non-
government organisations (NGOs) does not capture the nature of Dalit advocacy. As 
Dalit have moved between these spaces subject to opportunities, this chapter looks at 
all three to some extent.  
 
Since Nepal’s democratisation, following the fall of Rana regime in 1950, the Dalit 
Movement has been playing an increasingly prominent role in the politics of equality 
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and justice (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013). In this regard, we need to locate the Dalit 
struggle for justice as occurring within the wider framework of Nepalese 
democratisation processes. Nevertheless, when we do so, what we find is that in their 
struggles for rights and freedom, Dalit have often been excluded from mainstream 
politics and the broader democratisation process. In addition, the vicious combination 
of internal division and lack of strong leadership has contributed to the limited 
effectiveness of Dalit Movements in achieving substantial institutional reforms for 
justice. Despite Dalit participation in political transformation, the Dalit voice has 
been only partially heard in Nepal.  
 
We can broadly plot their involvement across three phases of struggle, analysing each 
to show how it has sought to achieve equality and justice in the context of power 
politics and identity. The different phases of Dalit struggle include the evolution of 
Dalit associations from 1947 to early 1990, Dalit struggles for inclusion and 
participation after 1990 to 2006; and constitutional recognition in post-2006. These 
phases are used to organise the analysis of this chapter.  
 
To frame this analysis, the chapter commences with a discussion of social movement 
theory including opportunity structure, focusing on how opportunity structures shape 
the type of actions that are chosen and the form of social movements.  It then traces 
the evolution and development of Dalit associations and Dalit struggles for democracy 
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and constitutional recognition, including a discussion of the more recent 
internationalisation of the Dalit Movement. The chapter then provides a case study 
of Temple Entrance advocacy. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the principal 
causes for the limited effectiveness of the movement, arguing that multiple forms of 
exclusion undermine the effectiveness of Dalit struggle for equality and justice in 
Nepal.   
 
6.2. Social Movements and Political Opportunity Structures 
Originally, social movements were primarily understood regarding class and as 
serving the goal of mobilisation concerning class inequalities. As distinct from these 
‘old social movements’, ‘new social movements’ are defined as those that primarily 
focus on the social, cultural dimensions of inequality and injustice, with identity 
politics becoming prominent (Buechler, 1995:452). The underlying presumption, 
deriving from classical Marxism, was that politically significant social action is 
derived from the economic logic of capital production, class relationships rooted in the 
process of production defines social actors, and social identities are secondary to 
constitute collective actions (Buechler, 2000:442).  New social movements, by 
contrast, do not depend on old political codes (rightist-leftist, liberal-conservative) 
and socioeconomic codes (working class-middle class, poor-rich, rural-urban).  
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Social movements are known as collective action against some injustice experienced 
by the group, with the primary aim of bringing about changes (Harrison, 2001; 
Martin, 2015). According to Young, (1990:186) social movements are a collective 
action of social groups and social groups are collectives of people who have an affinity 
with one another because of a set of practices or a way of life like young, McAdam 
(1982:20) defines social movements as the ‘rational attempts by excluded groups to 
mobilise sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests through non-
institutionalized means’. Social movements are forms of collective protest and 
activities against some structure that creates inequality, injustice, and disadvantage 
in the existing structure of power (Martin, 2015:1). Integrating these definitions, we 
can conclude that social movements are form of collective action against different 
forms of injustices, but they have different characteristics depending on the nature 
of the issue and the context. As I shall discuss, new social movements can also allow 
for a focus on the politics of identity (Habermas, 1975; Melucci, 1980). 
 
Social movements are recognised as a counterweight to oppressive power and action 
against a wide range of scourges (Tilly and wood, 2009:3). Popular social uprisings 
have occurred in one or another form across the world against oppressive powers. 
Social movements have made resistance against oppressive power possible by 
bringing distinct groups and interests together into a broader alliance. As argued by 
Buechler (2000) social movements can be carriers of ‘evolutionary alternatives in the 
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rapidly changing world, vital learning mechanisms in an era of complexity and 
efficient means of resisting the commodification of everyday life’ (p. 45). They provide 
powerful ways of identifying problems, redistributing resources, broadening 
participation and building solidarity.  
 
The new social movement is a movement that emphasises identity politics 
(Habermas, 1975; Melucci, 1980). Habermas (1975:36) reiterates that new social 
movements bring new politics concerned with the quality of life, projects of self-
realisation and goals of participation and identity formation. Similarly, Melucci 
(1980:213) argues that an identity is an important form of change in new social 
movements. New social movements are useful for understanding Dalit social 
movements insofar as they often emphasise elements of Dalit identity as a focus of 
mobilisation. In many respects, this correlates with theoretical perspectives on the 
emergence of new social movements. In this context, mobilisation around rights to 
religious and cultural practices has also been a focus of some new social movement 
theory.  
 
Given the importance of identity for new social movements, the construction of a 
collective identity may constitute one of their major accomplishments and framing 
identity is a prerequisite for the achievement of other goals of the movement 
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(Buechler, 2000:45). Collective identity includes three key elements: shared salient 
characteristics; a corresponding form of consciousness, and; opposition to some 
dominant order (Ibid). The formation of this collective identity provides power to 
stand for collective goals (Gusfield et al., 1994). Nevertheless, the collective identity 
of the social movement may be contested among its members. This notion of the 
construction of a collective identity has strong resonances with the argument made 
in chapter four concerning the need for a subjective identity for the successful 
assertion of group rights, especially since argued by Williams (1998). 
 
Political Opportunity Structure 
A key theoretical concept within social movement theory is the idea of a ̔political 
opportunity structure̕ (Kitschelt, 1986:58). Political opportunity structures are 
comprised of specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and 
historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of 
protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others (Kitschelt, 
1986:58). The opportunity structure influences the choice of protest strategies and 
the impact of social movements on their environments (Kitschelt, 1986).  
In this latter regard, we might note that social movements can affect the political 
opportunity structure in some ways: social movements can influence policy, alter 
political alignments, and raise the public profile and salience of particular issues 
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(Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996:33). Movements can also form collective action, 
demonstrate the efficacy of various means of political action, and draw media 
attention that activates balancing norms in the mainstream media (Ibid). They can 
also create or magnify critical events, to which their opponents can respond. It is 
relatively stable aspects such as traditions and institutions, and subtle elements of 
opportunity such as public policy, political discourse and elite alignment (Meyer and 
Staggenborg, 1996:33). Political opportunity is not just a fixed external environment 
that insurgents confront but also something, an activist can alter (Ibid).  
 
The idea of political opportunity structures can assist us in understanding the 
development of Dalit social movements and how they have sought to explore and 
adjust themselves in the face of different social and political structures. This theory 
will be used to analyse the formal politics, civil society and international structure 
that Dalit have adopted to influence their agenda. Dalit civil society movements have 
been seen as an alternative initiative to the formal political structures that have, as 
previously discussed, largely excluded Dalit. Opportunity structures also shape how 
Dalit are attempting to give voice to their issues in international forums when the 
local institutions are consistently unresponsive and reluctant to address their 
problems, whereas international structures could be tools to influence local 
institutions. The following section explores the social movements of Dalit and their 
effort to utilise international forums to gain solidarity on their issues.    
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6.3. Dalit Social Movements and Struggle in Nepal 
As described above, social movements have been understood as operating outside 
formal politics, while placing pressure on political institutions and decision makers 
to bring about changes in law and policy. For Dalit, the distinction between the formal 
and informal has not been so clear. Indeed, precisely because Dalit experience 
discrimination and marginalisation both socially and politically, to achieve their 
goals, Dalit have moved between the informality of social movements, party politics 
and the sphere of civil society mostly known as NGOs. Dalit’s separate social 
movement was felt necessary to persistently influence the actors of the power politics 
when there was no formal political structure. At the same time, as opportunities 
emerged for their participation in formal politics, or as opportunities in the non-
governmental sector opened up, they channelled their political energies in these 
directions, while still working through social movements.  
Dalit Movement of Nepal is the amalgam of civil society mainly NGOs 
and Dalit political wings of political parties. Despite the tension between 
these major players, now we can observe the joint programs. The joint 
initiative is indeed significant to influence the political parties and 
government on Dalit rights.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
As previously discussed, until 1950, Nepal had been under the strict autocratic rule 
of the Rana regime. The autocratic regime undermined the democratic rights of 
people. The longstanding autocracy was overthrown by continuing political pressure 
from the Nepali people (Parajulee, 2000:36). As noted by my research, the 
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development of Dalit social movements occurred within the wider framework of 
Nepalese democratisation. Nepal’s democratisation started following the fall of the 
Rana, and it was in this context that distinctive Dalit associations arose alongside 
Nepal’s broader movement for democratisation38. However, following the coup, there 
were frequent political upheavals, including the King’s coup in 1960, which again 
undermined democracy in Nepal by enforcing the autocratic rule (Khanal, 2007). 
Until 1990 autocracy heavily influenced Dalit Movements leaving no space for open 
demonstration. Since then, even given several limitations and having their 
weaknesses, Dalit have been advocating for their political aspirations and resisting 
various forms of discrimination at several political junctures. Whereas political 
parties alone failed to effectively address the issues of Dalit in Nepal, as shown by 
my research, through social movements Dalit have sought to resist oppression 
collectively. Thus, this outlines how Dalit, whose rights and freedom have often been 
limited and excluded from the mainstream politics and democratisation process, have 
been struggling in Nepal.  
The Dalit social movement was severely undermined during Rana 
regime. There was no freedom for political demonstration and even to 
read and write. This left Dalit movement no option. However, the 
democracy opened up the door for social movement in Nepal. However, 
after 1990 also there was no significant change in the condition of Dalit 
that made no substantial difference in the discrimination.  
 
(Padam Sundas, Dalit Civil Society Leader, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
  
                                                          
38Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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The Dalit social movement has adopted primarily two forms of approaches such as 
reformist approach and radical approach as revealed by this research. The reformist 
approach aims to reform existing legal provisions to eliminate discrimination. 
However, radicals emphasise on the elimination of caste system39. Ahuti (2010:47) 
argues that there isa different approach to Dalit Movements such as religious 
reformists, Ambedakarism, reformists, and radicals. Religious reformists essentially 
focus on the elimination of untouchability practices in the Hindu religion and seek to 
change religious understandings and practices as a means of getting rid of caste 
discrimination (Ibid). The Ambedakarism perspective is a legacy of Dr Bhimrao 
Ambedakar, an Indian Dalit leader who led a Dalit Movement. He sought social 
reform, within the context of an exploitative social system and as such neither sought 
radical transformation nor promoted armed resistance. The reformist visions are 
represented by NGOs and some conservative political parties, which primarily 
understand Dalit issues regarding development rather than political liberation 
(Ahuti, 2010:47). To the extent that human rights are invoked in this context, they 
are limited to non-discrimination. In contrast, radicalism rejects all the above 
approaches and focuses on the radical changes of the state to provide socio-economic 
and political equality through state restructuring process and may include armed 
resistance. The forms of approaches are:  
Dalit movement is primarily guided through two types of approach such 
as reformist and radicals. The reformist aims to reform existing policy 
                                                          
39Jitu Gautam, Interview, 15 August 2014 
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and provisions for Dalit. Through changing policy, this approach 
attempts to achieve equality. However, the radical aims to restructure 
the state such as the elimination of caste hierarchy. However, none of 
the approach does help unless there is unity among Dalit to assert their 
rights.  
(Jitu Gautam Darji, Interview, 15 August 2014 
 
Despite differences in perspectives, the most prominent goals of the Dalit Movement 
have been to achieve socio-economic, educational and political equality and social 
assimilation as indicated by this research40. To achieve the goals, Dalit have 
struggled through different periods. During its long struggle the Dalit Movement, it 
has achieved some legal outcomes such as anti-caste discrimination law and 
reservations in public service and education, although some people contest the 
usefulness of reservations as a policy approach (Bhattachan et al., 2008). However, 
the Dalit Movement has failed to take advantage of significant moments to achieve 
radical reformation. While outlining the key factors that caused the Dalit movement 
to fail in achieving radical reformation, an interviewee argues that: 
Among several factors, Dalit Movement lacks strong leadership and 
unity. One political party Dalit leader does not accept the leadership of 
another party. There are many leaders, but none of them are the Dalit 
messiah. There is an absence of unity among them as they are divided 
along the lines of political ideology and caste. 
(Bhola Paswan, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
                                                          
40Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
251 
 
To trace the development of the movement and explore some of these issues, the 
following sections review the Dalit social movement from its early development and 
evolution through to recent manifestations seeking institutional reform for social 
justice of Dalit in Nepal.   
 
Foundations of the Dalit Struggle (1947-1990) 
Already when Nepal was under the severe autocratic Rana regime until 1950, 
Nepalese revolutionary youths struggled for democracy and against caste-based 
discrimination. However, their anti-discrimination struggle was undermined by the 
King’s coup in 1960, which again imposed the autocratic Panchayat System, a system 
that lasted until 199041. During the Panchayat System, multi-party democratic 
processes and freedom of speech were banned. In 1990 political change reinstated 
democracy, reinstating various types of free speech, assembly and a multi-party 
democratic system (Hachhethu, 2011). Freedom of speech in the form of media 
freedom, rights to speak up against the State and rights to form political parties were 
the core elements of democracy regained through this change.    
The Dalit initiatives against caste discrimination were time and again 
undermined by the changing political context of Nepal. The initial step 
against caste discrimination was somehow disturbed by the imposition 
of autocratic Panchayat system. However, the renaissance of democracy 
opened the door for the struggle.  
                                                          
41Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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(Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014) 
 
Despite the immense challenge of the formation of a movement in a context where 
people were prohibited from reading, writing, expressing their opinions, organizing 
and protesting, as revealed by this research, Dalit youths like Bhagat Sarbajit 
Bishwakarma and others took the lead in establishing a Dalit Movement to eliminate 
caste discrimination and untouchability in Nepal as early as in 1947.Along with 
several other factors that might have contributed to Dalit youth’s embarking on this 
struggle against discrimination, the Indian Dalit Movement that fought for human 
dignity, social justice and rightful representation was a principal influence on the 
Nepali movement, with the Dalit youths who took a leadership role having been 
educated in Indian colleges as argued by an interviewee. 
Dalit youth who took initiation against caste discrimination were 
primarily educated in India. These youths had observed the Indian Dalit 
movement who then started a movement against caste discrimination. 
They were committed to bringing changes in Nepal. As a result, we have 
now Dalit movement and have achieved several Dalit rights as 
compared to that particular period.  
(Chhabilal Bishwakarma, UML leader, Interview, 27 August 2014)  
 
The Dalit social movement can be seen as going back to the original pro-democracy 
movements in Nepal. It evolved in 1947 when there was growing massive anti-Rana 
resistance against the tyranny of the Rana monarchy in the country (Parajulee, 
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2000). While the pro-democracy movement was aimed at ending the tyranny of Rana 
rulers and thus opening up the pathway to democracy, freedom and justice in Nepal, 
the Dalit Movement that emerged alongside the growing anti-Rana and pro-
democracy sentiments was more specifically concerned with eliminating caste-based 
discrimination.  As expressed by a research participant:  
Although Dalit movement emerged alongside the pro-democracy 
movement, this movement was more focused on anti-caste 
discrimination. Dalit youths since they were facing inhuman 
discrimination in such time, might have felt the need of struggle. This 
historical initiative is the main foundation of today’s Dalit movement.  
(Chhabilal Bishwakarma, Interview, 27 August 2014) 
 
The first Dalit organisation, Biswo Sarbajan Sangh (The World All People’s 
Association) was established in 1947 as a resistance against discrimination and 
untouchability by Bhagat Sarbajit, who had studied Hindu religious texts and 
Sanskrit at Banaras University, India. Before the formation of this association, 
Bhagat Sarbajit organised an assembly of almost 73 Dalit in his local residence 
located at Gairagaun, Bhalumare of Baglung Western Nepal (Kisan, 2005:89). In 
1947 the assembly decided to ask the Prime Minister to eradicate untouchability and 
afford Dalit equal rights in performing religious activities. The contribution of Bhagat 
Sarbajit is, in this sense, historical in the struggle against caste discrimination 
(Barali, 2013:47) and people in the contemporary movement recognise it as seminal. 
As one interviewee in my study indicated: 
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 Bhagat Sarbajit pioneered the Dalit Movement in Nepal. He was 
educated, and empowered in India consequently initiated the resistance 
against discrimination by building a Hindu Temple at his house and 
worshipping Hindu Gods resembling a Hindi priest since he had 
mastered the Hindu religious scripture. However, the higher caste did 
not tolerate such practice and imprisoned him for a lower caste defying 
the traditional Hindu culture system…. His contribution is remarkable 
for Dalit Movement.  
 (Min Bishwakarma, Member of Parliament and Leader Nepali 
Congress, Interview, 18 August 2014) 
 
Alongside Bhagat Sarbajit’s pioneering role in the Dalit social movement, several 
other Dalit groups, in different parts of the country, also initiated resistance as found 
out by this research. Other research also confirms that while Bhagat Sarbajit was 
involved in the empowerment of the Dalit community in Western Nepal, other 
organised efforts were developing in Kathmandu and Dharan (Maharjan and Kisan, 
2013:20).  The Kapali community in Kathmandu started as an association named the 
Tailor Union to raise the voice against caste discrimination. Simultaneously, in the 
Eastern Tarai, an association led by Jadubir Bishwakarma, Nepal Samaj Sudhar 
Sangh (Nepal Social Reform Association), was established (Kisan, 2005:92). Among 
several other leaders, Hiralal Bishwakarma, TR Bishwakarma and Umalal 
Bishwakarma also raised their voices against caste discrimination specifically 
stressing caste equality for social development and unification of untouchables for 
their liberation. An interviewee highlights the problems and importance of these 
associations: 
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There were many different associations during that period. Despite the 
main goal that was to eliminate discrimination, they all lacked strong 
actions. These associations were not able to extract substantial action 
from the State. However, at this initial stage of the Dalit Movement, 
they played a significant role in sensitising Dalit to their struggle 
against caste discrimination in Nepal. 
(Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 2014)  
 
Nevertheless, as revealed by my research although they were operating 
simultaneously, these associations were unable to form joint protests against 
discrimination in their initial stage because of their weak partnerships and the lack 
of a well-formed sense amongst Dalit themselves of collective identity as a community 
suffering from injustice42. As described earlier, the formation of a collective identity 
is crucial for the success of social movements. After the introduction of Democracy in 
1950, various organisations emerged to advocate for the rights of Dalit. These social 
organisations were formed by different Dalit sub-caste groups (Kisan, 2005). The 
work of these associations contributed the initial unification of Dalit but they later 
divided between the various associations undermined their embryonic united 
resistance. As argued by one of the interviewees:  
..social organisations evidenced formation and reformation. Some of 
them were active, but most of them were not. Social organisations that 
were established by sub-caste groups of Dalit helped to raise an initial 
awakening of Dalit and unification.  
      (Padam Sundas, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
                                                          
42Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview on 18 August 2014 
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The abolition of the Rana regime was an environment where Dalit flourished to form 
several organisations, among them: Nimna Samaj Sudhar Sangh(Lower Society 
Reform Association) 1951; Jat Tod Mandal (DestroyCaste Group) 1951; Samaj 
Sudhar Sangh (Society Reform Association) 1952; Pichhadiyeko Barga Sangathan 
(Backward Class Organisation) 1952; Pariganit Nari Sangh (Pariganit Women 
Association) 1955; Achhut Mukti Morcha (Untouchable Freedom Front) 1958; 
Rashtriya Achhut Mukti Parishad (National Untouchable Freedom Council) 
1958(Ahuti, 2010; Kisan, 2005). While some of these associations were active, most 
of them did not function effectively to achieve Dalit rights as mentioned by an 
interview participant:  
During the early stage of Dalit social movement, there were many 
associations opened up. Dalit social movement indeed observed 
formation and reformation of these associations in different names and 
Dalit groups. However, most of these associations were not active. 
However, this indicates that Dalit were sensitised in that particular 
period for their rights although they were not jointly working. 
(Chhabilal Bishwakarma, UML leader Interview, 27 August 2014) 
 
Among several other activities, submission of a memorandum to the Government 
demanding the elimination of discrimination was a key action initiated by these social 
organisations in their early stage.  For instance, the Dalit group led by Manbir 
Bishwakarm, Chairman of Biswo Sarbajan Sangh (The World All People Association) 
had submitted a memorandum to King Tribhuwan on 19 January 1952 requesting 
the elimination of discrimination in temples and other public places (Maharjan and 
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Kisan, 2013:21). This was subsequently accepted and decreed by the King. However, 
there is no evidence of its implementation. These organisations had focused initially 
on the resistance against barbers (Hajam) who until 1947 even refused to cut Dalit 
hair.  
Although these associations took steps to resist caste discrimination, the 
degree of discrimination during that period did not reduce substantially 
as it was deeply entrenched in the society and the autocratic regime was 
not in favour of reducing discrimination. 
(Chhabilal Bishwkarma, Interview, 27 August 2014).  
  
After 1951, there was a significant shift as the small and distinct groups that initially 
formed,and particular caste groups began to unify to create a joint struggle. In this 
context, the Jat Tod Mandal (Caste Destroy Group) led by Saharshanath Kapali, 
which united the Tailor Union and Nimna Samaj Sudhar Sangh (Oppressed Society 
Reform Association) played a significant role (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013). Later, Jat 
Tod Mandal was reformed into Society Reform Association, which led the first ever-
successful PashupatiTemple Entrance Program in 1953. Another Dalit woman led an 
association named Pariganit Nari Sangh that was formed under the leadership of 
Mithai Devi Bishwakarma in 1955, increasing the participation of women, although 
this was not sustained. We might thus characterise the decade from 1950 as the 
awakening phase for the Dalit Movement in Nepal as argued by Min Bishwakarma:  
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During this period several Dalit social associations were established by 
different Dalit leaders. Dalit in this period observed formation and 
reformation that helped to build up the foundation. However, changing 
politics also affected Dalit to remain inactive.  
(Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 
2014) 
It was found that even during the period of political change in the 1960s, the Dalit 
social movement disappointed early hopes and was fraught with division. The 
restriction of social and political rights that followed the Royal coup in 1960 further 
undermined the effectiveness of the movement (Parajulee, 2000:36). Unable to resist 
such a coup and its effects, Dalit began to focus their organisation on supporting the 
party-less Panchayat System imposed by King Mahendra. During the Panchayat 
period, the Dalit Movement remained in defensive mode to reform themselves. For 
almost a decade after the 1960s, the Dalit Movement was virtually leaderless (Kisan, 
2005). Only in 1967, the organisation Nepal Rashtriya Dalit Jana Bikas Parishad 
(Nepal National People Development Council) was formed under the chair of Mr 
Saharshanath Kapali. After its national assembly in 1972, this organisation 
demanded a reservation policy for Dalit for the first time in history. In the following 
decade, however, until early 1980, the Dalit Movement was mostly inactive, and in 
fact, some Dalit leaders became pro-royalist during the Panchayat Period. One of the 
interviewees observed that:  
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The restriction of civil rights, mainly social and political rights, by the 
royal coup, undermined the effectiveness of the Dalit movement in 
Nepal. However, they faced tremendous challenges such as internal 
division and reformation. Some of them became pro-royalist for the sake 
of opportunity.  
     (Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014). 
 
The formation of new associations continued, then some of them were dissolved in 
the decade of 1970, and we saw a decreasing level of Dalit protest against 
discrimination as revealed by my research. This is also supported by other research 
that shows Dalit Jana Bikas Parishad divided into two groups; one was led by TR 
Bishwakarma and another group by Hiralal Bishwakarma, although it was merged 
into Nepal Rashtriya Samaj Kalyan Sangh led by Siddi Bahadur Khadgi in 1982 
(Ahuti, 2010:35). A few other organisations emerged, but they were less active than 
expected. Perhaps because of this, Dalit organisations mostly led by leftists emerged 
after 1983. Among them, only Utpidit Jatiya Uthan Manch (Oppressed Caste 
Upliftment Forum) played a crucial role in the 1990s civil protest against the 
Panchayat System in Nepal. As mentioned by an interviewee, the formation and 
reformation of Dalit association continued in the Panchayat period:  
There were several Dalit associations established in the Panchayat 
system. Some were active, and some were not. The formation and 
reformation of these associations were observed mostly during this 
period. Some associations supported the Panchayat system. However, 
some of them such as Utpidit Jatiya Uthan Manch opposed and 
protested against the Panchayat system.  
(Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014) 
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Turning now to what these social movements achieved, my research indicates that 
the introduction of an anti-caste discrimination provision in Civil Code, 1963, 
certainly counts as a key achievement, and one directly linked to the objectives of the 
movement to have anti-caste discrimination law introduced and implemented. While 
the introduction of the law was the result of several factors, the demands of the Dalit 
social movements, which in 1951 were the first to articulate and make formal 
demands for the elimination of discrimination in public places and 1953 mounted a 
struggle for Entrance to the Pashupati Temple, do seem to have made a contribution 
as mentioned by Padam Sundas, a contemporary Dalit social leader: 
The legal provision against caste discrimination based on the Civil Code, 
1963, is a key achievement of Dalit struggle. The legal provision made 
caste discrimination an illegal and punishable atrocity. 
Implementation, however, did not happen so easily or as eagerly 
expected while the society was not ready to accept it. It was indeed avery 
challenge to Dalit takes action against higher caste since Dalit were 
heavily reliant on them and that action could destroy the traditional 
relationship.  
(Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
One of the key efforts of the Dalit movement, as my research shows, is that of Dalit 
entrance into one of the holy Hindu temple, Pashupatinath, Kathmandu in 1953 was 
historic. However, the systematic violation of social and political rights in the 
autocratic Panchayat System had limited opportunities for Temple Entrance during 
this phase, which subsequently undermined Dalit efforts (Maharjan and Kisan, 
2013). However, Dalit took courageous steps to enter the famous Hindu Temple 
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Pashupatinath. This Temple Entrance became an exemplary effort, which propelled 
Dalit to be united in their struggle for equality and fairness as expressed by research 
participants. 
Although it was very challenging, entrance into the Pashupatinath 
became only the first historical attempt of Dalit where they exercised 
power to demand their equal rights and justice. 
(Padam Sundas, Interview, 8 August) 
 
Indeed, as revealed by this research, following the several unsuccessful efforts to 
ensure Temple Entrance during the Panchayat System and throughout its 70 years 
long struggle for justice, the Dalit Movements took it as a form of symbolic resistance 
to religious inequality. This effort for Temple Entrance continued massively after the 
1990 political change because the Hindu Temple Entrance program was also a major 
site of strategic resistance against caste discrimination (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013). 
Nevertheless, real outcomes for Dalit remain limited. Many temples are today still 
closed to Dalit as observed by research participants.  
Temple Entrance is one of the strategic programs for Dalit equal rights and 
justice. This strategy has been used from the early stages of Dalit movement. 
However, there is no substantial achievement of equality in religious practice. 
Dalit are still blocked by higher castes and are not allowed to enter the temple 
in many places.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
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During its long history of resistance, one of the key issues found is that the Dalit 
Movement has been dominated by reactive strategies rather than proactive action. 
The Temple Entrance and protest of discrimination in dairy companies for equal 
rights to selling milk are a few examples of proactive action from the Dalit Movement. 
However, the protest against atrocities, the government’s reluctance for inclusive 
policy formation and its implementation are some reactive strategies. The reactive 
strategies are also not utilised properly causing a key gap in the Dalit movement. 
 
Dalit Struggle for Inclusion and Participation (1990-2006) 
The reinstatement of democracy in 1990 opened up a political opportunity for Dalit 
and other marginalised people to openly fight for their rights. Although political 
parties had been banned during the Panchayat System and facing constant 
repression by the Government, they nevertheless played a significant role in ousting 
the autocratic Panchayat System. Dalit also actively joined the protests, 
demonstration and strikes in the Peoples Movement of1990 (Khanalet al., 2012). 
Finally, the Peoples Movement compelled a change in the political system from 
autocracy to a multi-party democracy in 1990 (Parajulee, 2000). However, the 
constitution promulgated in 1990 failed to address issues concerning the injustices 
faced by Dalit sufficiently43. Beyond these spaces, some groups of Dalit youths 
                                                          
43Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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retaliated against caste discrimination under the banner of the so-called Dalit Youth 
Force.  
The constitution of 1990 included the anti-caste discrimination 
measure. However, this did not provide special measures to improve the 
socio-economic condition of Dalit. Although there were persistent 
exclusions of Dalit, democracy opened up multiple opportunity 
structures for them to push for recognition of their rights. 
(Rajesh Bk, Interview, 13 August 2014) 
This research shows that whereas before this period they had been comparatively 
silent on Dalit issues, only after 1990, political parties began to raise Dalit issues. 
Because Dalit had historically been excluded from socio-economic, educational and 
political opportunities, and as discussed in the last chapter, not even a single Dalit 
was represented in national parliament that contributed Dalit continued struggles. 
However, democracy opened the door for Dalit to pursue their struggles through 
political parties (Ahuti, 2010). Indeed, as a result of this change, political parties 
became the centre of power politics and responding to this shift, seeking to influence 
political parties became central to the Dalit agenda. In this context, Min 
Bishwakarma shared his views that: 
The democratic change in Nepal has opened upthe door to Dalit mainly 
to exercise their rights for political participation. Dalit were deprived of 
political involvement and their struggle for justice during Panchayat. 
Dalit now are openly protesting against discrimination and creating 
pressure to the political parties to implement the inclusion policy even 
if they are reluctant to do so.  
(Interview, 18 August 2014)  
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During this period, influenced by efforts to unify leftist political parties, Dalit political 
activists sought to unite their associations. Nepal Rastriya Dalit Jana Bikas Parishad 
and Utpidit Jatiya Utthan Manch merged in 1992, establishing the Nepal Utpidit 
Jatiya Mukti Samaj44. Actively seeking to enter party politics, in 1997 Nepal Dalit 
Sanghwas established, as the Dalit wing of the Nepali Congress. Several other 
political parties also formed Dalit wings during this period. At the same time, Nepal 
Utpidit Dalit Jatiya Mukti Samaj significantly helped to extend the Dalit Movement 
from the local to national level from 1992 to 1997. Speaking of this period, Dalit 
political leader Chhabilal Bishwakarma underlines the importance of the 
reinstatement of democracy in 1990. 
The restoration of democracy in 1990 was a key achievement for Nepalese 
people for their rights. Dalit are most the vulnerable group, who has 
indeed got an opportunity to advocate openly for their rights. If there had 
not been a democracy, then Dalit would not achieve constitutional rights-
although there is a lot more to do for the elimination of discrimination 
and rights of equality. 
(Interview, 27 August 2014) 
 
Among several other achievements, the constitutional provisions that recognise anti-
caste discrimination in the new constitution of Nepal, 1990, were key achievements 
for Dalit community. Although a similar provision had already been included in the 
Civil Code, 1963,which prohibited all forms of caste related discrimination and 
practices of untouchability, as mentioned by a research participant this was the first 
                                                          
44Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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time in Nepalese history that the condemnation of caste discrimination had been 
included in the Constitution.  Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, the 
implementation of constitutional and legal provisions has remained partial, and 
evidence remains of persisting discrimination countrywide.   
The 1990s political change and the subsequent Constitution included 
anti-caste discrimination measures for the first time in Nepalese 
history. This constitution condemned caste discrimination. However, 
the implementation was ineffective. Dalit continued to face caste 
discrimination despite these changes. 
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
The research interviewees agreed that the reinstatement of democracy in 1990 
provided freedom to express views against injustice as well as opening the way to 
constitutional recognition of anti-caste discrimination provisions, but that the 
implementation was ineffective. The following statement by a research participant 
makes clear that:  
...the fundamental rights of Nepali citizens were restricted before 1990. Mass 
demonstrations and protests were restricted. However, the dawn of democracy 
in 1990 provided an opportunity to express against injustice and 
discrimination. The new constitution of Nepal, 1990, endorsed anti-caste 
discrimination, in the Constitution, for the first time. However, the 
implementation of this constitutional provision remained ineffective and as 
result caste based discrimination persisted.  
(Chhabilal Bishwakarma, Interview, 27 August 2014) 
Although several weaknesses persisted during this period, democracy provided the 
platform to exercise their rights, and as a result, Dalit and other marginalised people 
utilised several platforms such as formal political structures and civil society 
266 
 
including NGOs to jointly struggle against injustices. However, the changed political 
space, as well as the constitutional provision, did not effectively slow or stop the caste 
discrimination in Nepal. 
 
Dalit in Maoist Insurgency (1996-2006) 
Although the Maoist insurgency went well beyond being a social movement, for many 
Dalit, it did provide a venue for pressing claims about injustice. My research indicates 
that Dalit participation in the Maoist civil war was appealed by their priority on 
equality and justice in Nepal. Maoist initiated an armed struggle in 1996 within the 
political instability and social inequality (Onesto, 2007). The Maoist movement 
demanded equality and justice for marginalised people in Nepal as their key political 
manifesto and the armed resistance that is mounted can be seen as having been 
fuelled by people’s frustrations with underdevelopment, political instability and 
complexities of discrimination. Over-centralization contributed to a hegemonic state 
structure, dominant leaders and power controlled by a small group of political elites 
and the exclusion of marginalised people. My interviews showed the way in which the 
Maoist party spoke to the issues that many people felt to be fundamental, gaining 
significant public sympathy.  
…during insurgency Maoist party paid particular attention to the caste-
based discrimination and untouchability cases. Otherwise, there would 
not bea vast difference of the intensity of caste discrimination 
countrywide. Unfortunately, despite Maoist attention now there is 
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ongoing evidence of discrimination even at those places where 
discrimination was less during the Maoist insurgency. 
(Padam Sundas, Civil Society leader, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
 
As Sundas has indicated, where Maoists hold areas of the country, they actively 
worked to reduce caste discrimination. Other research also confirms that because of 
robust action against perpetrators of discrimination, Maoist controlled areas were 
relatively free from caste discrimination and untouchability. Within five to six years 
of fighting, the Maoists had won extensive popular support and gained control of 
much of the countryside. The Maoists raised people's concerns for injustice, inclusion 
and development. Their slogan for development and change appealed to many young 
people, particularly ethnic and Dalit youth who were attracted to join the people’s 
war. By adopting an anti-caste discrimination agenda, Maoists were able to take 
advantage the experiences of Dalit, by practising equality during the war and 
resisting various social violations, they appealed to Dalit youth. During the 
insurgency, more than five thousand Dalit youths were involved in the people's 
militia and people's liberation army (Pariyar, 2013:324). Of the thirteen thousand 
killed during this war, 1661 were Dalit (INSEC, 2010). One of the research 
participants Bishwabhakta Dulal highlights the importance of Maoist war that 
brought many changes in Nepal.  
…Maoist war has been instrumental in bringing social and political change in 
Nepal. It has played a significant role to reduce discrimination and empower 
Dalit and other marginalised people. It has also contributed to bringing 
political change in 2006 that institutionalised democratic republic, secularism, 
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inclusion and restructuring of the state. This helped to initiate inclusion policy 
in Nepal. 
(Interview, 18 August 2014) 
 
The Maoist insurgency provided an unprecedented opportunity for Dalit who became 
leaders in the people's government, commanders of the liberation army and chief 
justices in Maoist controlled areas (Pariyar, 2013:324). Dalit CA member, Laxmi 
Pariyar, says that the primary reason for Dalit youth involvement in the Maoist 
insurgency was because of the pursuit of justice, equality and radical transformation 
of the country45. Despite such contributions from Dalit, the Maoist party has been 
criticised for not putting sufficient effort into ensuring the protection of Dalit rights 
in the new constitution making process, resulting in Dalit rights’ being insufficiently 
addressed in the new constitution of 2015.  
 
Dalit Struggles for Transformation (2006-2015) 
This section briefly outlines the Dalit struggle during the political transformations 
after 2006, particularly about the 2006 citizen movement. Despite their long standing 
struggle, due to fragmented politics and a vicious cycle of exclusion, Dalit rights were 
partially addressed by the changes. The Citizen Movement (Janaandolan II) of April 
2006 marked a critical political juncture, which transformed Nepal's unitary 
governance into a Republican federal system and led to the adoption of a policy of 
                                                          
45Laxmi Pariyar, CA member, Interview, 22 August 2014 
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social inclusion.  Dalit issues were excluded even though they actively took part the 
protest. This is further confirmed by an interview:  
Dalit not only in the 2006 Citizen Movement but also on other occasions 
are actively involved and contributing to the change. During these 
movements, many Dalit have lost their life. However, the result is 
always same. Once again, the change after 2006 failed to address Dalit 
issues sufficiently.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
The royal coup on 1 February 2005, suspending the constitution and resuming direct 
reign laid the foundation for citizen movement in Nepal.46The main leaders of the 
political parties were detained or arrested and jailed for several months (Upreti et 
al., 2010:93). The King nominated a prime minister from different pro-royalists 
instead of parliamentary political parties, but this strategy did not assist in managing 
the Maoist insurgency rather anti-King uprisings escalated. The Government 
suppressed the anti-King uprisings led by Seven Political Party Alliances (SPA). The 
citizen uprising built momentum after the 12-point agreement between Maoist forces 
and the main political parties which continued for 19 days claiming 25 people's lives 
(including 4 Dalit) and leaving 5500 people injured (Upreti et al., 2010). An 
overwhelming number of rural citizens participated in this citizens' protest during 
                                                          
46King Gyanendra took a royal move (a royal coup) in 2002 terminating the democratically elected prime minister 
Sher Bahadur Deuba with a charge of being incapable of managing the political instability in the country.    
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the 19 days' resistance against King Gyanendra. By recalling the peoples' 
participation in citizen movement, a political leader says that:  
…. there was the huge involvement of the citizen in the citizen 
movement in April 2006 that created pressure to King Gyanendra for 
stepping down his move. During the nationwide protest, people took part 
without caring their life as a result 25 people were killed. Among them, 
4 Dalit were also killed for political change. This shows that there is 
equal participation of Dalit in every political change in Nepal but state 
neglects Dalit issues. 
(Khadak Gaire, NC Leader, Interview, 10 August 2014) 
 
The Citizen Movement was to topple the King's autocratic rule as well as to transform 
the fundamental characteristics of the Nepali State such as its organisation as a 
unitary system of governance and its status as the Hindu Kingdom. The unitary 
governance mechanism was exclusively represented and dominated by the hill Hindu 
caste groups despite their being a minority (Hachhethu, 2011:77). In this context, as 
revealed by my research, the citizen movement aimed to transform basic 
characteristics of the Nepalese State rather than simply changing its rules and 
governance system. The Citizen movement of 2006 contributed significantly to 
transform the unitary Kingdom of Nepal into a republic, federal and secular State as 
observed by one Dalit activist: 
The Citizen Movement, 2006, brought major political transformation in 
Nepal regarding changing the unitary kingdom into republican, federal 
and from Hindu religion faith based State to the secular states. We all 
actively took part in this grand civil protest although there were 
repression and risk from the State. This political change contributed 
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substantially to adopt a new legal provision for Dalit and the inclusion 
of disadvantaged groups in the State mechanism. 
(Dhan Kumari Sunar, Dalit women activist, Interview, 8 August 
2014) 
 
The Citizen Movement brought fundamental changes to the Nepalese socio-political 
spectrum as found out by this research. After citizen movement, as demanded by the 
Seven Party Alliance, the King reinstated the dissolved parliament. This new 
parliament voted unanimously to curtail the King's political powers and decided to 
begin peace dialogues with the Maoists in May 200647. As a result of the peace 
dialogue, there was Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the 
Government of Nepal and the Maoists on 21 November 2006. The CPA provided a 
landmark foundation for preparing the interim constitution and parliamentary 
election for a Constituent Assembly, the adoption of inclusion and a state 
restructuring process. After the peace agreement, political parties and the Maoists 
adopted the interim constitution, and subsequently, the Maoists joined Parliament 
in January 2007 (Khanal, 2011). However, the Constituent Assembly elections were 
pushed back three times due to Tarai protests against the interim constitution, which 
had included federalism as a key demand. The protests continued for 21 days 
claiming 39 people’s lives (Hachhethu, 2011). Later, the Government agreed to 
include federalism in its first amendment to the interim constitution, laying the 
                                                          
47Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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foundation for the Constituent Assembly elections that happened on 10 April 2008. 
The details of constitution writing through Constituent Assembly will be discussed 
in chapter seven.  
 
6.4Dalit Advocacy through NGOs 
One of the key findings from my research is that the Dalit non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that emerged after the reinstatement of democracy in 1990 
opened up opportunity structure for Dalit to pursue their advocacy initiatives as an 
alternative to the formal political structures that persisted in excluding them. 
Formally, NGOs are considered to be distinct from social movements, with different 
objectives, but in the case of the Dalit Movement, there is less of a distinction between 
Dalit NGOs and the Dalit Social Movement as indicated by my research. Partly, this 
reflects the orientation of Dalit civil society organisations towards achieving social 
justice outcomes. Although many NGOs focused on the provision of basic needs, Dalit 
NGOs primarily took a rights-based perspective as social leader, Durga Sob who 
pioneered Dalit NGOs argues that  
Dalit NGOs are a platform for Dalit social movements, encompassing both 
rights based and needs based programs. Dalit NGOs are playing an important 
role to continue advocacy and lobbying program. Different Dalit NGOs 
periodically organise interaction, workshop, seminar and conference as a part 
of Dalit advocacy which are fulfilling the gaps. These efforts are remarkable in 
Dalit advocacy in Nepal.  
(Durga Sob, President-Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO), Interview, 8 
September 2014).  
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The NGOs programs are valuable to sensitise Dalit at the grass roots level and to 
assert rights based movement at the central level for policy influence. Other research 
also confirms that NGOs primarily create local community groups for income 
generation and literacy programs, which are also then mobilised for rights, based 
programs from villages to the central levels as needed (Lamsal, 2012:79). As revealed 
through my research, Dalit groups formed by those NGOs are mobilised for mass 
rallies, protests and demonstrations to create pressure on Dalit policy formation48. 
These groups are involved in local program planning through to implementation. For 
example, major national Dalit NGOs bring their local Dalit groups to Kathmandu for 
the celebration of International Day on the Elimination of racial discrimination. 
Durga Sob mentions the importance of local Dalit groups: 
The inclusions of local committees of different NGOs are significant for 
mass demonstrations and celebrations of the international day. This 
provides equal opportunity to local Dalits to be trained in their rights. 
This is also an empowerment process for their advocacy.  
(Interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
After the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s, registration of non-governmental 
organisations significantly increased, which was not possible in the autocratic 
Panchayat System. Among several factors, advocacy and human rights programs 
                                                          
48Gajadhar Sunar, Interview, 17 August 2014 
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were key targets for opening the NGOs in Nepal. Many considered NGOs as the 
preferred alternative to the political process to empower local people. Except for the 
Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organization (NNDSWO), all the other Dalit 
NGOs were founded after 1990.  While there are several Dalit led NGOs across the 
country, only about half a dozen Dalit organisations continue to be active from the 
time of their inception, both nationally and internationally (Ahuti, 2010). Among 
those NGOs Dalit NGO Federation (DNF), NNDSWO, Jagaran Media Centre (JMC), 
Feminist Dalit Organization (FEDO), Dalit Welfare Organization (DWO) and the 
Samata Foundation are active in raising Dalit issues at the national and 
international levels as well as implementing needs based programs in targeted 
districts as mentioned by an interviewee Hira Vishwakarma. He further highlights 
the importance of Dalit NGOs for Dalit rights:  
Dalit NGOs are playing avital role to raise the concern of Dalit. These 
NGOs are both active at the grassroots level and national level to 
sensitise Dalit. NGOs are playing vital role in advocating the issues of 
Dalit as they conduct a mass demonstration, lobbying and interaction in 
association with Dalit political leaders. NGOs can organise these 
programs because they receive funding support from national and 
international organisation, which enables to organise programs 
frequently.  
(Hira Vishwakarma, Dalit social leader, Interview, 2 September 2014) 
While there are various associations formed by Dalit for the struggle against caste 
discrimination in the country, NGOs have mostly played a significant role to sensitise 
Dalit at the grassroots level through literacy programs, micro income generation, 
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development and political awareness programs. Among those NGOs, Dalit NGO 
Federation (DNF) is an umbrella association for the currently affiliated 344 Dalit 
NGOs from 75 districts and has been conducting advocacy programs to influence 
policy at the national level (DNF, 2015). DNF was founded in 1996 with the aim of 
combating untouchability and all forms of caste-based discrimination. It is a common 
forum for raising collective voices in the Dalit community to ensure their rights, 
dignity and opportunity through influencing policy, networking and alliance building. 
Having the primary goals of protecting and promoting Dalit human rights, and 
strengthening the capacity of Dalit NGOs, DNF has established five regional 
committees to work with its member organisations throughout the country (DNF, 
2015). Gajadhar Sunar highlights the importance of DNF: 
DNF is an umbrella organisation of all Dalit NGOs in Nepal. It plays a 
key role in policy advocacy in favour of Dalit. It has also implemented 
capacity building of local NGOs so that they can be capable of tapping 
into the resources for Dalit advocacy. DNF’s presence at the central and 
regional level is very effective.  
(Gajadhar Suanr, Interview, 17 August 2014) 
 
Nepal National Dalit Social Welfare Organization (NNDSWO) was first registered as 
a Dalit non-governmental organisation founded in 1982 and has extended its 
branches to 68 districts out of 75 districts of Nepal (NNDSWO, 2015). Like other Dalit 
NGOs, it has similar objectives to eliminate caste discrimination and promote 
equitable society, however its programs are mainly dominated by education 
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scholarships such as the Nepal Children Scholarship Endowment Programme 
(NCSEP) implemented in 15 districts of Nepal with the support of Save the Children 
US and USAID and Basic Education for Least Educated (BELE) programs initiated 
in Jhapa, Chitwan, Kaski and Surkhet Districts (NNDSWO, 2015).In regards to the 
role of Dalit NGOs, one of the participants opines that: 
While there are many Dalit NGOs registered all over the country, only a few 
of them such as DNF, NNDSWO, FEDO, JMC, DWO are leading NGOs and 
actively working for the rights of Dalit in Nepal. Among others, NNDSWO is 
one of the oldest NGO continuously working to empower Dalit and conduct 
rights based programs in different districts. Despite the weaknesses, Dalit 
NGOs role is vital for Dalit advocacy in Nepal. However, the joint initiatives 
between Dalit political leaders and NGOs are necessary at this stage.  
(Hira Vishwakarma, Social Leader, Interview, 2 September 2014) 
 
The Feminist Dalit Organisation (FEDO) and the Dalit Welfare Organisation (DWO) 
are also very active Dalit national associations that were founded in the same year, 
1994, but they differ in nature. FEDO mostly implements programs for Dalit women 
and is the one, and only Dalit women led and initiated NGO (FEDO, 2016).  FEDO’s 
programs extend the national policy to influence advocacy for local literacy, income 
generation and capacity building of local Dalit women. However, DWO is more 
renowned for their Dalit awareness program through TV and Radio. It was the first 
Dalit NGO to conduct a radio advocacy program from a national radio platform while 
there was not any other local radio station in the country (DWO, 2015). These two 
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organisations have been able to sustain their programs and significantly contribute 
to the civil society movement of Dalit in Nepal.  
Among other several Dalit NGOs, FEDO has been working distinctly on 
the issues of Dalit women since its inception. It has been raising Dalit 
concern at the national and international level. We have taken part 
international forums such as Durban conference, United Nations 
conferences in Geneva and New York and in many other places to raise 
the concern of Dalit and Dalit women.  
(Durga Sob, Interview, 8 September 2014) 
 
Similar to other NGOs, it was found that although relatively late on the scene, the 
JMC and Samata Foundation are making unique contributions through media 
advocacy and academic discourse. JMC has been engaging with both print and 
electronic media such as newsletters, Dalit advocacy programs through its FM 
station, tele-documentaries and capacity building of Dalit journalists. Samata 
contributes significantly to Dalit academic discourse through research, book 
publication and seminars with both Nepalese and Indian Dalit academics. These 
publications have been a hallmark of Dalit literature, which is still insufficient 
regarding influencing policy formation processes through research findings. There 
are few international publications, primarily due to language still being an 
impediment in this sector. In highlighting media advocacy of Dalit, JMC Chair Rem 
BK says that:  
Dalit issues are not sufficiently represented in the media. It was 
pathetic when there were very limited publications. Because of 
increasing social networks and online media, Dalit issues are relatively 
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covered, however; there is still the question of validity. With this gap, 
JMC and other few NGOs are playing a role in highlighting Dalit issues, 
which is very crucial for influencing policy makers and leaders on Dalit 
rights. 
(Rem BK, Chair of Jagaran Media Centre, Interview, 6 August 2014) 
 
Although Dalit NGOs are playing an important role in the Dalit Movement, it was 
simultaneously found that NGOs are also criticised regarding the nature of their 
programs. As argued by an interviewee, despite the advantages of NGOs as they are 
change makers in the short term, in the long run, NGOs can create weaknesses, for 
three reasons.  
First, their programs of social and economic reform are seen as replacing 
political movements and obstructing substantive political and economic 
transformation. Second, there is evidence of Dalit brain drain to NGOs 
as NGOs provide higher wages, resulting in a scarcity of intellectuals in 
the Dalit Movement. Third, there is increasing donor dependency and 
loss of creativity. 
(Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014).   
 
The scattered nature of Dalit activists in numerous NGOs, rather than one, has 
further weakened Dalit voices. It is reported that there were more than thousand 
NGOs up to 2010 working for the rights of Dalit (Sharma, 2011). Division and conflict 
in these NGOs are common as a result several Dalit NGO federations have been 
formed based on political ideology. Also, though NGOs working for Dalit and their 
rights have a similar ideology based on a discrimination-free society, their means of 
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reaching the common goal are numerous and often conflicting. The division between 
Dalit political leaders and NGOs leaders has been a factor in undermining the 
effectiveness of the Dalit Movement in Nepal (Kharel, 2007:61). As observed during 
fieldwork, political leaders accuse NGOs of being reformist and driven by donors. 
Research participant Jitu Gautam argues that NGOs are also playing a role to raise 
Dalit concerns, but donors mostly drive them. NGOs are bound by the rules and 
regulations of donors, which restrict NGOs to be radical in demanding Dalit rights49. 
The blame game and division is an obstacle for unified resistance. Despite these 
criticisms, my research indicates that over the last two and half decades, through 
their work as an advocacy lobby, their publications and seminars, Dalit NGOs have 
contributed to the broader Dalit Movement against discrimination. 
 
6.5 Dalit struggle for Temple Entrance 
As revealed through my research, Hindu Temple Entrance program has been a key 
strategic focus for Dalit Movement during its 70-year long struggle as a form of 
symbolic resistance for religious inequality. As I discussed in Chapter 5, 
discrimination about Temple access is a key form of continuing social injustice for 
Dalit. The Hindu Temple Entrance program was also a major strategic resistance 
against caste discrimination. On the ground, many actions to enter Temples were 
                                                          
49 Jitu Gautam, Interview, 15 August 2014 
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attempted during the period. However, the Government declaration of Dalit equal 
rights in temple entrance in 2001 particularly encouraged Dalit to do so (Maharjan 
and Kisan, 2013). Nevertheless, as discussed in chapter five, despite formal 
Government declarations, Dalit are not easily allowed to enter many places due to 
obstruction from local community members and the general reluctance of local 
government authorities to enforce the laws. The obstructions are observed by Dalit 
leader Ganesh BK: 
There are still obstacles from local people, and there is the reluctance of 
the local government to support Dalit in the Temple Entrance program. 
Indeed, it is a frustrating matter for Dalit in Nepal because they are 
excluded from religious rights being Hindu. They are not allowed to 
freely access Temples even if there are government declarations of a 
nation free from caste discrimination.  
(Ganesh BK, Secretary Mukti Samaj, Interview, 8 August 2014). 
 
At the same time, Temple Entrance has been contested within the Dalit Movement 
as a strategy for the struggle. Opponent groups within the Dalit Movement argue 
that Temple Entrance typically addresses the question of Hindu religious equality, 
which is only one aspect of the Dalit Movement. As a result, there has been a shift 
from focusing on Temple Entrance to fighting exclusion from other religious 
institutions, which discriminate against Dalit. Maharjan and Kisan (2013:30) argue 
that debates of the Temple Entrance program can be captured by three perspectives: 
spiritual, materialist and equality and human rights. From the spiritual viewpoint, 
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the claim is that being Hindu, Dalit require equal rights in access to temples. 
Materialists argue however, that Temple Entrance is not a sufficient basis for Dalit's 
liberation, which rather requires the equal distribution of power and resources. From 
the equality and human rights point of view, Dalit efforts regarding Temple Entrance 
represent a form of ensuring quality in religious and cultural rights. Considering that 
the majority of Dalit are followers of the Hindu religion, equality in the temple is one 
of the major fundamental rights of Dalit in Nepal that demonstrate the needs of Dalit 
recognition. One research participant, Dalit leader Padam Sundas, agrees that:  
70 years of Dalit Movement mostly encircled around the Temple entry 
program; this is not significantly successful yet. There was government 
declaration to make a nation free of untouchability by providing 
permission to the Dalit for Temple Entrance which also could not be 
successful because Dalit are still being strictly restricted in the temples 
in many places-which is a mockery to the modern democracy of Nepal. 
(Padam Sundas, Dalit civil society leader, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
The post-2006period is considered comparatively open to Dalit due to the enforcement 
of anti-caste discrimination laws and government promulgation of a nation free from 
caste discrimination. However, despite state reformation and legal provision, there 
remains evidence of caste-based discrimination including blockades to temple 
entrances in many places of Nepal (Maharjan and Kisan, 2013). According to a joint 
press statement by the Jagaran Media Centre and the Asian Human Rights 
Commission, there have been 45caste-based discrimination related cases registered 
in district courts across the 23 districts of Nepal during its five years' tenure after the 
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enforcement of the 2011 anti-caste discrimination laws (AHRC, 2016).  In this period 
5 Dalit from different districts have been killed in caste discrimination related cases. 
We see that despite reforms, systematic discrimination remains in place. This is 
confirmed by my research. 
The legal reforms also could not substantially reduce the discrimination 
in Nepal. There is evidence of caste discrimination. There are many 
Dalit who have been thrashed, scolded, killed and humiliated due to 
caste prejudices. This is all because of institutional bias and caste 
supremacy in Nepal.  
(Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
Despite the promises of equality and justice and some important formal changes, 
temple Entrance remains something Dalit are still denied. The republican 
government formed after the political change again, in 2006, proclaimed the nation 
free of caste discrimination. Focusing on Temple Entrance, Keshar BK, a Dalit 
activist from Gulmi district, Western Nepal, mentions that:  
The republican government also could not play an effective role in terms 
of guarding Dalit religious rights. We are not able to enter in any public 
temples around our areas despite there is a government declaration of a 
nation free of caste discrimination and the new Act against 
discrimination. Moreover, I believe this is similar to all the places of 
Nepal, except few places. 
(Keshar BK, Dalit Activist, Interview, 28 August 2014) 
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This research finds out that certainly, Temple Entrance is not the only site of 
struggle. Apart from the Temple Entrance program, Dalit struggled against several 
other forms of caste discrimination, among them Dalit resistance to clean animal 
carcasses in Siraha in 1999; Dalit rights to selling milk in Gaindakot were few 
remarkable Dalit struggles50.These two events indicate that support from social and 
political party organisations including local people is essential to achieve social 
changes. 
 
During the 70 years long history of the Dalit Movement, Temple Entrance has been 
a major strategic program. But, Dalit have not gained substantial achievement in 
this journey. There are yet many places where Dalit are excluded from entering the 
temples. Despite the government declaration of a discrimination free nation, Dalit 
are still blocked. Thus, as different than other research, this research concludes that 
unless there is the total elimination of the caste hierarchy, such discrimination will 
persist everywhere. 
                                                          
50In 1999 the Chamar people in the Siraha and Saptari districts stopped cleaning animal carcasses from non-Dalit 
houses. Before this struggle, Dalit used to throw out the animal carcasses. But, non-Dalit as a reprisal excluded and 
blockaded Dalit from using taps, shops and even getting jobs in the local market and attacked Dalit. After several 
protests and a series of dialogues, Dalit became successful in this resistance.  
Another struggle was for Dalit rights to sell milk in the dairies of Gaidakot, Nawalparasi. Local Dalit farmers were 
interested in selling milk in the local dairies; however, the milk of Dalit farmers was excluded. Dalit made a written 
application and even registered cases with the police and courts, to no avail, till a mass demonstration and the 
capture of the dairy including the milk tanker (BK, 2013). In the end, in 1998, management agreed to provide equal 
rights to Dalit for selling their milk, which was a historical achievement.  
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6.6. Internationalization of the Dalit Movement 
In the face of continuing impediments on the domestic scene and with the growth of 
international rights and anti-racism movements, Dalit have increasingly turned to 
international forums to advocate their rights. International initiatives have provided 
an alternative opportunity structure for Dalit, also providing solidarity with other 
movements. Dalit, in these international fora mostly organised by United Nations 
bodies, are participating and raising their voice and concerns (Lamsal, 2012:80). Dalit 
organisations have lobbied the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(UNHCHR) as well as submitted Shadow reports to treaty committees considering 
Nepal’s human rights record. Dalit are using these international structures when 
they see that the international opportunity can help local politics and government 
policy when previously they have repeatedly been excluded from local structures. 
This research indicates that Dalit initiatives in the international forums have 
somehow been a contributing factor to the adoption of Dalit related policies, although 
there is not any direct evidence that this is the case. One of the interviewees, Durga 
Sob, highlights the importance of international initiatives: 
Dalit participation in the international forums have been instrumental 
in influencing national and international actors to bring policy changes 
and to gain international solidarity for the movements. These forums 
provide space to sensitise international actors to Dalit causes. The 
network building with different international and regional actors is 
possible through these international fora.  
(Interview, 8 September 2014) 
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The attempts of Dalit civil society organisations to internationalise Dalit problems by 
taking part in the World Conference against Racism (WCAR) 2001 in South Africa 
was a landmark in internationalising Dalit concerns as found out by my research 
interview. Civil Society organisations and activists were visible in this conference by 
taking part and presenting Dalit concerns and demonstrating for Dalit rights to be 
addressed specifically under racial discrimination (Lamsal, 2012:80). Despite their 
presence and presentations, the United Nations has not still specifically addressed 
Dalit issues but treats them as work and descent-based problems (IDSN, 2015). The 
Durban Declaration also did not specifically recognise caste-based discrimination, but 
it includes several provisions against racism and xenophobia.  
 
In addition to UN forums, Dalit civil society organisations attended the World Social 
Forum (WSF) in India, 2004, which was organised to explore the alternative social 
world. Gajadhar Sunar, President of Dalit NGO Federation, argues that  
...although the rationale for a World Social Forum has been questioned; 
at least Dalit raised their problems and issues in this forum. Dalit 
organisations believed that their participation in this forum was 
necessary at least to include Dalit concerns at such an international 
gathering. 
(Interview, 17 August 2014) 
Many Dalit leaders including local leaders under DNF’s leadership demonstrated at 
the WSF. They continue to take part the WSF and such other forums which are 
almost futile and are not that corner stone to influence local policy formation. 
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However, the continuous representation of Dalit in such international fora is 
providing some support to the Dalit Movement in Nepal. President of Dalit NGO 
Federation (DNF), Gajadhar Sunar also highlights the importance of Dalit 
representation in such forums. 
Dalit taking part in an international forum is very crucial at least to 
sensitise the leaders of international forums as well as the activists and 
leaders from other countries so that they can provide solidarity on the 
rights of Dalit in Nepal. Dalit participation in UN forums is also 
important because Dalit can tabulate their agenda and concerns with 
factual information. 
(Gajadhar Sunar, President of Dalit NGO Federation, Interview, 17 August 2014) 
 
One of the problems emerged through my research is the presence of the same Dalit 
activists and organisations repeatedly at every international forum, limiting the 
diversity of representation of Dalit. The attendance of the same NGOs and their 
leaders at almost every international forum likely limits the opportunities for other 
leaders and leaves a negative impression on the Dalit Movement.  Ganesh Shreepaili, 
a local Dalit leader, argues that: 
Local Dalit NGOs and their activists are rarely provided such opportunities at 
international forums. Donor agencies also provide travel funding to 
established non-governmental organizations and elite leaders, not to emerging 
NGOs. The repetition of same Dalit activist in the international forum limits 
opportunity to emerging leaders. These opportunities should be diversified to 
others as well.  
(Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview on 28 August 2014). 
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Besides participation in international forums, the Dalit Movement is also beginning 
to extend into the Dalit Diaspora as caste issues operate beyond South Asia. Dalit 
associations founded in the UK, the USA, Gulf Countries and European countries are 
visible particularly to raise donations and to provide solidarity with the local Dalit 
struggles in Nepal. One of them, Srijanshil Nepali Samaj-UK is a leading association 
established mostly by Dalit. The members of this association are reluctant to work 
only for Dalit issues, as they want to serve Nepalese concerns broadly.51 This 
association provided financial support and moral solidarity to the Nepalese Dalit 
Movement, such as the direct financial contribution to the Dalit joint struggle 
organised in August 2015, Kathmandu. Again, although Dalit associations in the 
diaspora are essential to Dalit welfare, they are also divided along caste lines within 
Dalit groups. An interviewee observes that:  
There are many associations opened for Dalit support. These 
associations are mainly working for Dalit welfare by providing financial 
donations. However, there is no unity among these associations.  
       (Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014) 
Dalit associations in Gulf are working as a charitable and welfare association to 
support the Dalit in the Gulf, as well as in Nepal, particularly those requiring 
treatment for major diseases such as heart problems, kidney failure, tumours and 
cancer. They also provide scholarships to Dalit students and support income 
                                                          
51 This view was expressed by most of the participants in an interaction program organised by Srijanshil Nepali 
Samaj –UK on 17 July 2015.  
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generating micro projects. Similar associations operate in Europe and USA. Among 
them, the North America Social Organization (NASO) was registered in the USA and 
is actively working for the welfare of Dalit both in USA and Nepal (Kharel, 2007:64). 
NASO provides significant amounts to the victims of the earthquake and Dalit 
struggles recently. By outlining the importance of these Diaspora Dalit associations, 
Tirtha Burma, President of Global Forum Against Caste-Based Discrimination 
(GFACD) says that: 
These forums have been at least a platform to unite Dalit who migrated 
to different countries and raise their voice against atrocities and collect 
donation for poor Dalit. As a result, some donation was provided to the 
Dalit Movement in Nepal while there wasa protest against curtailing the 
rights of Dalit in the new constitution. 
(Tirtha Burma, President of GFACD, Skype Interview, 20 April 2015) 
 
There are also some international associations not specific to one particular country 
such as the International Dalit Solidarity (IDSN), the International Commission for 
Dalit Rights (ICDR), the Asian Dalit Rights Forum (ADRF) and the Global Forum 
Against Caste-Based Discrimination (GFACD). These organisations focus on 
international advocacy rather than providing specific relief funds to Dalit. Some 
limitations are that there is a lack of coordination amongst these organisations and 
they limit themselves to symbolic resistance such as putting out press statements 
against atrocities. 
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There are different Dalit associations established in international level. 
Different associations have different priorities and agendas. There is lack of 
coordination amongst these associations. However, the existence of these 
associations matters for Dalit rights, at least to raise Dalit concern in 
international forums.  
(Tirtha Burma, President of GFACD, Skype Interview, 20 April 2017) 
 
As an example of international advocacy, ICDR's first Dalit March in front of the 
White House on 19 March 2015 subsequently followed by a Dalit conference was a 
historical event in raising South Asian Dalit rights issues (ICDR, 2017).  
The associations opened in different countries are working in favour of Dalit welfare. 
Some other associations are working for Dalit advocacy. These efforts show the 
increasing extent to which the Dalit Movement is accessing the international stage 
both to influence international actors for solidarity and the local actors to create pro-
Dalit policies.  
 
6.7. Conclusion 
Although there is a historical track record of resistance, Dalit continue struggling to 
mainstream their voices. The vicious circle of division and lack of strong leadership 
perpetuates the relative ineffectiveness of the Dalit Movement to achieve substantial 
institutional reforms for justice. Dalit division by political ideology and intra-caste 
associations are some examples obstructing their dynamic unification for the struggle 
against all forms of injustices. Furthermore, intra-caste associations have played 
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both negative and positive roles in the movement. A positive aspect is to provide space 
to empower Dalit within their caste groups, and the negative side is to obstruct the 
unification of Dalit.   
 
It can be argued that most of the major political struggles in Nepal are against the 
unitary, exclusionary and hegemonic power structure and inequality of marginalised 
people—Dalit, women, indigenous nationalities and Madhesi. The huge people's 
participation in 1990 and 2006 street protests and demonstrations against the 
dictatorship evidence the Citizen’s resistance for change.  The Maoist insurgency and 
political transition were part of the change process. However, the change from 
authoritarian rule to democracy and a unitary system of federalism had been formally 
institutionalised only after the completion of the constitution writing process in 
Nepal.  
 
During its long history of resistance, the Dalit Movement has been dominated by 
reactive strategies rather than proactive action. The proactive programs are more 
strategically rational than only more focusing on reactive programs directed towards 
institutional reform for the social justice of Dalit in Nepal.  My research finds out 
that despite Dalits' long history, their voices have not been heard properly. Dalit 
movement also could be effective in achieving their rights if they were not divided 
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along the political ideology. Thus, this research suggests that Dalit should assert 
group politics for their equality and justice.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN NEPAL: STATE RESTRUCTURING, 
FEDERALISM AND DALIT DEBATES 
7.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we explored Dalit struggles for social justice principally 
through social movements, and to some extent through NGOs and international 
initiatives. In this chapter, we turn to recent institutional reforms such as state 
restructuring, and specifically federalism, to examine how these have addressed the 
concerns Dalit raised through the different phases of their struggle. In doing so, this 
chapter outlines the background to the debate in Nepal concerning federalism, the 
principles and contested models of federalism, and how Dalit engaged with these 
processes, as well as issues reflected in the new constitution of Nepal. The 
combination of a research data and secondary literature has been used to substantive 
analysis in this chapter.  
 
As previously discussed, during the period 1990–2015, Nepal underwent a series of 
political changes and institutional reforms. In particular, democracy was formally 
reinstated in 1990, but in many ways, these earlier reforms still failed to deliver 
justice or equality to many groups, and so social movements pressing for change, as 
well as armed struggle, persisted. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was 
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occurred at the end of the Maoist led insurgency laid the foundations for a new level 
of reform through comprehensive state restructuring.  
 
The state restructuring debate formally took place when the Interim Constitution of 
2007 adopted federalism as a model, with the particularities of federal arrangements 
to be discussed by the Constituent Assembly. Federalism was considered a 
mechanism to create a more inclusive and people-centred form of government. The 
federalism debates in the first CA ended up focusing more on caste/ethnic identity 
overlooking capability and other development issues. About Dalit, it became apparent 
that the establishment of identity-based federal units would not serve Dalit interests. 
Other mechanisms, such as Proportional Representation (PR) came to be seen as 
more productive vehicles for Dalit. Based on this analysis, this chapter concludes that 
although Dalit identity should not be the basis for federal units, there is a strong case 
for Dalit continuing to mobilise identity as the basis for ensuring institutional 
reforms that will ensure participatory parity. For this, I will argue that Dalit should 
assert group differentiated politics of recognition to achieve justice.  
 
An overview follows of the conceptual understanding of federalism and basic 
principles for delineating federal units. Specifically, how two Constituent Assembly 
(CA) worked as platforms for institutional reforms will be discussed by describing in 
detail. Different models of federalism proposed by various stakeholders during the 
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debates in Nepal, including the discussion on Dalit identity-based model has been 
outlined ina later section. Challenges Dalit face in the institutional reforms process 
are also highlighted.  This chapter will conclude with a finding that to date, the 
institutional reform processes in Nepal, such as State restructuring and federalism, 
have not sufficiently addressed the issue of Dalit social justice. 
 
7.2. The Political Significance of Federalism 
Since the end of Cold War, the world has been experiencing a remarkable upsurge in 
the politics of place and group identity, and this is reflected in the adoption of multi-
national federalism as a form of political order (Agnew, 1995:224). According to 
Fessha (2011), more than 90 percent of existing states are ethnically plural. In the 
face of such ethnic plurality and its implications for state unity or fragmentation, 
there are two principal options: ‘to disregard the ethnic mosaic by seeking to develop 
a politically mono-cultural society; or to find some institutional way of embracing 
ethnic diversity, of which federalism is one option’ (Fessha, 2011:43). As such, 
federalism emerged as a major tendency within post-cold war world political agendas 
to address ethno-regional and ethnic tensions (Smith,1995). In Western Europe, for 
example, for various countries, federalism was considered as a project for 
renegotiating the political boundaries of sovereignty and citizenship, and for many 
ethno regional communities was a way of refocusing a politics of identity (Smith, 
1995:1).  
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Federalism is based on the notion of autonomy and union. It is the best known, but 
not the only method of giving autonomy to different groups in a society and works 
primarily through various groups’ having some form of territorial autonomy by 
combining 'self-rule' and 'shared rule' (Anderson,2007:69). Through federal 
mechanisms, the principle of ‘self’ and ‘shared’ rules can contribute to safeguarding 
minority rights. It involves a whole range of institutional arrangements relating to 
balance in the distribution of central and regional governmental powers (Agnew, 
1995:299). Federalism has been seen as an evolutionary political arrangement, rather 
than a fixed formula for the territorial division of government powers (Agnew, 
1995:224). Although territorially based Federalism is better known, in fact, 
Federalism can be territorial or-territorial. Non-territorial federal arrangements 
were particularly relevant for societies in which distinct groups are not 
geographically concentrated (Lijphart, 1984:28). Belgium is the best example of non-
territorial Federalism. The amended Belgium Constitution of 1970 establishes a 
cultural council for the French cultural community, made up of the members of the 
French linguistic group of both Houses (the chamber of Representatives and the 
states), and a cultural council for the Dutch cultural community made up of the 
members of the Dutch linguistic group of both Houses (Ibid). These two cultural 
councils serve as legislatures with the power to make laws on cultural and 
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educational matters for linguistic communities, which are partly defined in territorial 
terms (Lijphart, 1984:29).  
 
As a multi-tiered government mechanism, federalism tries to accommodate the 
diverse interests of citizens to achieve broader national integration and development 
(Agnew, 1995). The federations of Switzerland, Canada and India, are examples of 
federalism being used to address diverse interest in multi-ethnic contexts (Smith, 
1995). Federalism can also function as a form of empowerment and means to promote 
social justice (Ibid). Federalism can serve as a countermeasure to hegemonic control 
by dominant groups, instituting collective rights and separate, fair representation for 
minorities, constraining centralised political power (Smith, 1995:17).  
 
Federalism potentially creates structured opportunities for regional voices to be 
heard, and within multi-ethnic federations, enables ethno-regional issues to take on 
a greater political saliency. Regional politics can be constituted to empower localities 
to tailor economic, social and cultural policies to the specific needs and concerns of 
their constituents (Hachhethu, 2011). In this respect, federalism protects minority 
rights through group representation by providing special inclusion rights and a 
degree of autonomy in governance (Thomas-Wooley and Keller, 1994). However, a 
balance must be struck between autonomy and inclusion, with neither alone 
sufficient to protect minority rights. In this sense, the establishment of federal 
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political arrangements may form part of broader State restructuring processes, 
including reform in other areas such as the governance system, security sector reform 
and so on. This broader reform may also include constitutional, political, social, 
economic, cultural, legal, philosophical and ideological aspects (Burgess, 2006). 
 
The federal structure can protect minority rights through the protective measures of 
electoral policy, special political mechanisms and welfare measures (Føllesdal, 
2011:289). The design of an electoral rule in federalism indeed enables and 
encourages the participation of minority groups. As well as considering the 
boundaries of dividing a state, federalism can also attend to minority rights by 
including forms of representation that are particularly attentive to diversity (Ibid). 
For example, forms of electoral design such as proportional representation can 
contribute to fair representation. As set out in chapter five, in Nepal the adoption of 
a PR system has been one option explored for increasing the representation of 
marginalised groups in the parliament.  
 
There are however some criticisms of federalism. Federalism can promote the 
interests of dominant ethnic groups and undermine the rights of other minority 
groups (Elazer, 1991). A dominant ethnic group can use its majority status to violate 
the basic civil rights of association, speech and tolerance enjoyed by minorities. One 
can see the link between this criticism of federalism and some of the concerns about 
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group rights set out in chapter two. Elazer (1991) also points to the challenges for 
sustainable federalism in multi-ethnic states. Federalism has also been criticised as 
institutionalising what are in fact temporary or partial group identities as permanent 
ones (Agnew, 1995). It can create a permanent identity if the design of federal units 
is based on identity line.  
 
7.3. Significance of Federalism in Nepal 
Federalism is not a new feature of the Nepalese political agenda. The Nepal Tarai 
Congress floated the idea of federalism in Nepal as early as 1951 when democracy 
was introduced.52Subsequently, after the restoration of democracy in 1990, the Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party and the Rashtriya Janamukti Party both demanded a federal 
state in Nepal, but this proposal did not draw political attention until the Maoist 
insurgency began in 1996 (Khanal, 2010). During the insurgency period (1996-2006), 
the former rebel group, now the Maoist party had highlighted the issue of ethnicity 
and inequality and promised for the right to self-determination, ethnic self-rule and 
autonomy. The Maoist party had floated their idea for nine autonomous regions for 
                                                          
52
Nepal Terai Congress was a political party founded by Vedananda Jha in 1951 with the objective of seeking 
autonomy for the Terai. The party was founded after a split from the Nepali Congress. Vedananda Jha became an 
important politician during Panchayat political system. 
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the distribution of power and resources without mentioning the word federalism 
during the insurgency53.   
The demand of federalism in Nepal dates back to 1951 as Tarai Congress 
Floated this idea. However, this became the main agenda after Madhes 
uprising in 2007. Federalism was perceived as one of the key demand of 
ethnic groups during CA process. This is indeed contested among 
different groups in Nepal.  
(Prof. Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014) 
 
After the Madhes uprising (Madhes Andolan) in 2007, federalism was formally 
included in article 159 (1) of the Interim Constitution of 2007.54 The first Constituent 
Assembly (CA) (2008-2012) also recognised the federalism agenda as a major issue in 
the state restructuring process (Ahuti, 2013). When the state Restructuring and State 
Power Distribution (SRDP) committee of the first CA explicitly proposed the 
principles and models of the federalism, it emphasised the issue of caste/ethnic 
identity. In this regard, we might note that current demands for identity-based 
federalism emerged out of a historical context in which ethnic identity is to be 
recognised (Shneiderman and Titling, 2015). However, the second CA rejected the 
models of the first CA and proposed a mixed model for federal units.  
 
                                                          
53Prof. Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014 
54
Madhes Andolan was a backlash to Interim Constitution seeking rights of Madhesi and other ‘backward groups’ 
through federalism. The 21 days long movement was a landmark event in bringing out regional based ethno-
nationalism as one of the prominent issues in the national discourse. 
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This research finds out that the foundation for demanding a federal state in Nepal 
was mainly to end discriminatory and exclusionary political mechanisms. Other 
research also confirms this that Nepal is a multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic country, 
federalism was perceived as the mechanism to manage ethnic diversity and the 
nature of discrimination imposed by the state (Føllesdal, 2011:289). As argued by 
Khanal: 
other potential reasons for demanding federalism in Nepal were managing 
diversity and ensuring autonomy, deepening democracy and averting possible 
authoritarian revival, managing unequal development, recognition of identity 
and desire for autonomy and self-government and breaking the dependency on 
the centre, and equal power sharing.  
 
(Interview, 19 August 2014) 
 
Federalism was also seen as challenging the persisting domination of hill high caste 
privileged groups and as a way of making Nepal's political system inclusive and to 
more empower the people (Baral, 2010). The International Crisis Group summarises 
that federalism is: 
‘Inseparably linked to resistance against political and economic 
exclusion by caste, ethnicity and regional identity. The pressure for 
ethnic provinces has to do with aspirations for fair representation in 
government and administration’ (International Crisis Group, 2011:1). 
 
Identity-centric federalism proposals appealed to a variety of ethnic/indigenous 
groups, as they offered rights to self-determination and autonomy for minorities as 
discussed in chapter two. Many organisations representing ethnic and regional 
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groups, disappointed by their failure to gain expanded rights and recognition during 
the democratic period of the 1990s, now saw federalism as non-negotiable (Anderson, 
2007). Diverse and mainly ethnic groups have insistently demanded federalism with 
rights to self-determination and autonomy, but as we shall see, the new constitution 
has not addressed the concept of self-determination and autonomy while recognising 
the rights of ethnic and indigenous groups in Nepal. 
 
7.4. Constituent Assembly: Debate on Federalism and Dalit 
As the process that took place and the institutional structure created to bring forward 
state restructuring were quite complex, I provide a brief overview.  Although there 
was a long historical background for demanding state restructuring, it was only after 
2006 that this was set in motion (Hachhethu, 2011). In 2006 a Constituent Assembly 
(CA) was established as an inclusive arrangement to institutionalise mandates of 
political change, particularly concerning state restructuring, federalism, 
republicanism, inclusive governance and secularism. Federalism, as opposed to 
unitary government, was heavily discussed in both the first and second CA and 
became highly contested.  
 
The CA, a major part of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA), was formed through 
the election held on 10 April 2008. This CA included a total of 601 members, 240 
members elected in single-seat constituencies, 335 elected through proportional 
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representation, and the remaining 26 seats nominated from experts (CA, 2008). For 
the first time in Nepalese history, this first CA was inclusive of women (33%), Dalit 
(8.5%), Ethnic/Indigenous minorities (33%) and Madhesi (34%), 3.83%of members 
also represented the backward regions, referring to the underdeveloped far western 
regions (Hachhethu, 2011:8;Dahal, 2008).My research finds out that although, at 8%, 
Dalit representation was an improvement on the previous situation of almost no 
representation, in fact, this was below the 13% of Dalit in total national population. 
A past CA member explains the inclusion of Dalit in CA that: 
The changed political system and electoral policy brought inclusion in 
the first Constituent Assembly. The combination of direct election and 
proportional representation is key to increase Dalit inclusion. There 
would not be any Dalit if there were not an inclusion electoral policy in 
Nepal.  
 
(Laxmi Pariyar, Interview, 22 August 2014) 
 
Besides acting as a regular legislative body, the first CA was responsible for the 
constitution making process, and as such played a pivotal role in restructuring Nepal 
by institutionalising the peoples’ mandate of citizen movement, 2006. The peoples’ 
mandate of republicanism, federalism and inclusion was addressed by the first CA 
(Hachhethu, 2011:2). At the first meeting on 28 May 2008, the CA declared a 
republican system, abolishing the monarchy. Nepal was declared a secular State and 
adopted a policy of inclusion allocating 45% reservation for Ethnic, Madhesi, Dalit 
and women in the civil service. As Krishna Khanal has discussed, in this sense the 
first CA accomplished major reforms: 
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...the first CA was essential to institutionalise the peoples' aspiration 
expressed in the 2006 people's protest against the unitary and 
tyrannical government. The agendas as federalism, Republican 
governance, inclusion and secularism were expressed in the protest, 
which CA later legitimised through the CA declaration. CA was also 
inclusive which reflected the voice of marginalised people of Nepal. 
(Prof Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014) 
 
Different thematic committees were formed in the first CA to draft the preliminary 
reports for a new constitution. There were three major types of committees: the 
constitutional committee; the thematic committees; and, procedural committees. The 
Constitutional Committee had the responsibility of reviewing and drafting the 
constitution based on concept papers and preliminary drafts from thematic 
committees and suggestions from the CA (CA, 2008). Ten different thematic 
committees were also formed with the major tasks of preparing the preliminary 
drafts, along with concept papers on the subjects assigned to each committee or to a 
subcommittee to resolve contentious constitutional issues.55 
Different thematic committees were formed in the first CA. These 
committees were assigned to produce draft reports to be considered by 
the CA. The report of the committee on State Restructuring and Division 
of State Power was most controversial in the first CA because it had 
proposed ethnicity identity dominant federal provinces and other 
subsequent provisions.  
(Laxmi Pariyar, Interview, 22 August 2014) 
                                                          
55The thematic committees were formed by Constituent Assembly on 15 December 2008; these are i) Committee on 
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles, ii) Committee for Protection of Fundamental Rights of Minority and 
Marginalized Communities, iii) Committee for Restructuring of the State and Distribution of State Powers, iv) 
Committee on Determination of the Form of the Legislative Organs, v) Committee on Determination of Form of 
Governance of the State, vi) Committee on Judicial System, vii)  Committee on Determination of Structure of 
Constitutional Bodies, viii) Committee on Division of Natural Resources, Financial Powers and Revenue, ix) 
Committee on Determination of Bases for Cultural and Social Solidarity and x) Committee for Protection of 
National Interests. 
304 
 
 
My research finds out that the thematic committee reports developed under the first 
CA were arguably progressive in addressing the Dalit rights, despite being vague and 
inadequate. These reports addressed some Dalit issues more than previous 
legislation had addressed them. A few examples illustrate the provision of additional 
compensation in the central and provincial legislature proposed by the first CA State 
restructuring committee56. The special rights known as reservation in civil service 
and education area noticeable proposed policy in these CA reports although the 
reservation policy was already introduced in 2008. The inclusion ordinance had 
provided 9 percent reservation quota for Dalit in civil service including Army, Police 
and Armed Police Forces. The new and progressive proposal, however, became 
controversial regarding its percentage of reservation and process of providing 
compensation. One of the research participants expressed the views that first CA 
reports were progressive:  
The first CA reports were somehow progressive than other legal 
provision. The provision for additional compensation on top of 
proportional representation for central and provincial representation of 
Dalit was progressive as proposed by State Restructuring and 
Distribution of State Power (SRDP) committees. However, this provision 
was curtailed by the second CA.   
 
(Bishwabhakta Dulal, Ex-CA Member, Interview, 18 August 2014) 
 
                                                          
56Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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It was found that the committee on State Restructuring and Fundamental Rights 
were arguably clear on Dalit rights by including the special right for the Dalit 
community in the form of specific affirmative provisions. Reports highlighted the 
mixed model of electoral policy-FPTP and PR. In general, these other reports vaguely 
showed the concerns of all marginalised groups, while not directly focusing on Dalit, 
as there was no consensus on the concept of Dalit agenda itself among the thematic 
committees. An interviewee highlighted her observation:  
The different CA committees were not clear on the Dalit agenda. Some 
committees had included Dalit issues under marginalised groups. This 
happened partly because there was no uniform agenda of Dalit. 
However, some committees such as State Restructuring and 
Fundamental Rights committees were clear on Dalit issues.  
 
(Laxmi Pariyar, Ex-CA Member, Interview, 22 August 2014) 
 
Despite the progressive reports, these first CA reports were also criticised by Dalit 
mainly for not addressing the demand of Dalit. Shortfalls were notably the failure to 
recommend caste-based discrimination practice to be made a crime against the state 
and to make provisions for restorative justice for Dalit. As revealed by this research, 
the CA committee’s failure to address the Dalit agenda can be partly attributed to 
the lack of a uniform Dalit agenda and unity amongst Dalit stakeholders. Later, the 
Dalit joint struggle committee prepared a twenty point Dalit common agenda that 
focused on Dalit inclusion, empowerment with compensatory provision in political 
representation and affirmative action provision, but was silent on Dalit identity 
issues about state restructuring and federalism (Bishwakarma, 2015).  Dalit was 
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nevertheless able to raise and include their issues in different CA reports although 
there was a lack of uniform agenda and unity among Dalit leaders as observed by one 
of the past CA members:  
Dalit CA member did their best to ensure their agendas through 
different committees although they were mostly new and there were 
several challenges to them. We did not have common demands, and we 
had differences in understanding of those demands as well. We also had 
our political agendas. However, we were seriously in favour of Dalit 
issues during the first Constituent Assembly.  
 
 (Laxmi Pariyar, Ex CA member, Interview, 22 August 2014) 
 
The new constitution was expected to formalise the issue of state restructuring, one 
of the major tasks as set out by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), but state 
restructuring through adopting a federal system became one of the most contentious 
issues as revealed by this research. The main contested point was how federalism 
should deal with the issue of ̔identity ̕ and specifically whether ̔single ethnic identities̕ 
or ̔multiple identities̕ should be the basis for establishing federal units. The political 
parties' failure to form a consensus on identity issue caused dissolution of the first 
CA without writing a new constitution (Shneiderman and Titling, 2015). The CA 
failure to deliver new constitution triggered the formation of second CA in 
2013.Nevertheless, the first CA was perhaps a more promising vehicle for reform 
than the Assembly that followed. The first CA was more progressive in addressing 
the rights of marginalised groups as mentioned by Prof. Krishna Hachhethu: 
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The CA committee on the state restructuring proposed 14 identity based 
federal units. Three different types of special regions were also proposed 
for minority ethnic groups. One of the main proposals of the first CA was 
about preferential rights for the ethnic group, which was rejected by 
second CA. 
(Hachhethu, Krishna Prof., Interview, 20 August 2014.)  
 
It was found that representation of marginalised groups was reduced in the second 
CA, with Dalit CA members reduced from about 8% to 7% thus being even more 
seriously under-represented. Dalit under-representation can be explained by their 
reduced success in the direct election. Political parties were shifting their priorities 
away from minority groups; for example, NC Party did not nominate even a single 
Dalit member for First Past the Post (FPTP) election.57A research participant 
mentions the shifting priority of political parties.  
The major political parties shifted their priority from ethnic issues to 
other. In the second CA election, some political party such as NC did not 
provide a ticket to Dalit candidate for FPTP election. Other political 
parties also did not provide as much effort to Dalit candidates that 
resulted in few success of Dalit in FPTP.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
The second CA adopted the reports and progress made by first CA. It was considered 
that adoption of the first CA report would ease the constitution-writing process. 
                                                          
57
Despite discussions about reducing the size of the CA from its 601 members, similar numbers of CA members were 
elected and on this occasion, among 31 political parties represented, the liberal democratic parties won a larger 
proportion of seats (NC-196, UML-175) leaving CPN-M (the Maoist party), which had previously had a majority, in 
third position. 
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However, the second CA failed to produce a new constitution within the first year of 
its formation as promised by major political parties in their election campaigns 
(Hachhethu, 2011). This was again due to political parties’ inability to agree on 
contentious political issues, despite the attempts of the Political Dispute Resolution 
Committee of second CA to resolve them through dialogue. Because of these disputes 
and discontentment, a new constitution was not promulgated timely.  
 
7.5. Principles and Models of Federalism 
One of the key themes came out from my research is that the question of ‘ethnic 
identity’ heavily dominated federalism debates, and it was this issue that became the 
most contentious in Nepali politics. Several proposals for federalism emerged from 
different political actors during this period. Here follows an outline of the proposals 
made by the first CA and its committees; academics, activists, experts and finally 
political parties, all of whom advanced distinct visions for federalism. Proposals made 
specifically by Dalit are also examined although the debate was largely about creating 
federal units based on identity or viability. However, in the case of Dalit, despite 
demanding both territorial and non-territorial federal units—primarily promoted by 
civil society and experts—neither made it onto the mainstream political agenda nor 
were they even strongly raised by Dalit leaders. 
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Federal Model Proposed by CA Committee and Commission 
The key principle of federal restructuring in Nepal as set by the first CA—Committee 
on State Restructuring and Division of State powers (SRDP)—adopted two major 
principles for dividing federal units: Identity and Viability (CA, 2008). These 
principles are the compilations of other sub-elements. Identity brought together five 
sub-elements: Caste/Community; language; culture; geographical/regional 
continuity58,and historical continuity of ethnic groups. ‘Viability’ integrated four 
other sub-elements: financial integration and capability; infrastructure development 
and potential; availability of natural resources, and administrative feasibility. 
Federalism models were suggested based on these two principles, but as revealed by 
my research the federalism debate was in fact dominated by the issue of ethnic 
identity59.  
 
It was found that in the first CA two bodies, the CA committee and the high-level 
Commission intensively discussed federalism, but failed to forge a consensus, and 
they proposed contested provincial models encompassing both elements suggested by 
the CA committee. As an alternative, a mixed model was proposed that focused on 
multiple identities. This mixed model was discussed formally and informally in the 
High-level Political Mechanism and Dispute Resolution Sub-committee. These 
                                                          
58
Regional and historical referred to the geographical areas where ethnic groups were residing.  
59Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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mechanisms also could not forge any real consensus on federal units based on 
multiple identities, and even mixed model proposals failed to create consensus among 
political parties and stakeholders. Prof. Krishna Khanal opines that:  
First Constituent Assembly focused more on ethnic identity based 
federal models. However, there were other political parties and groups 
who were against ethnicity based federal mechanism. However, there 
was a discussion of different mixed model proposals. These all 
alternatives could not forge consensus during first constituent assembly.  
(Prof. Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014) 
The models predominantly focused on ethnic identity in determining federal states, 
but they were opposed by all the main political parties.60Using the framing principles 
of viability and identity, the first CA Committee proposed 14 federal units, as shown 
in Map 2 below. Although there was some recognition of a balance between identity 
and viability, the model supported by a majority of the committee members was 
heavily dominated by ethnic identity elements61. Among the 14 proposed provinces, 
nine provinces were principally based on ethnic identity, and the other five provinces 
were primarily based on geographical/cultural identity.62 Some members of this 
committee dissented and proposed six alternative provincial models instead. Beyond 
the Committee, the 14-province model was highly criticised by non-ethnic and anti-
federalist groups, and many other federal models were suggested by different groups.  
                                                          
60
 Nepali congress and UML basically denied the ethnic identity units including other smaller parties. Nepali congress 
was second bigger party and UML was third in terms number of CA members representing in CA (2008-2012).   
61Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014 
62
 The ethnic/cultural identity based proposed provinces such as Limbuwan, Kirat, Tamsaling, Newa, Sherpa, 
Tamuwan, Magarat, Tharuwan and Jadan.  
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Map 2: Proposed 14 Province Model by Restructuring of the State and Distribution 
of State Powers Committee 
 
 
Source: CA, 2008 
 
Later, a high-level Commission on State Restructuring was assigned to develop 
consensual models. However, members were also divided in this task. This 
commission was formed under the leadership of Dalit to determine the names of 
federal units, number and borders in November 2011. The commission later proposed 
11 provincial models (see Map 3), encompassing both principles suggested by the CA 
committee (CA Report, 2012; Hachhethu, 2011). However, as my research indicates 
that it too failed to forge consensus and commission members again advanced 
different dissenting proposals. Problematically, in each case the proposed models 
focused predominantly on ethnic identity, giving greater priority to the wishes of 
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ethnic communities in the formation of federal units, a move opposed by the major 
political parties.63 Indeed the proposal of a non-territorial Dalit federal unit was 
highly controversial among Dalit groups. An observation of a research participant:  
The high-level state restructuring commission also proposed 11 
provincial models dominated by the ethnic identity. This also included 
a non-territorial federal province for Dalit. However, there were not any 
details of the formation of a non-territorial Dalit province. Non-
territorial Dalit province became controversial among Dalit. 
 
(Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
Map 3: Proposed 10 Province Model by State Restructuring Commission 
 
Source: CA, 2010 
 
As emerged from this research, questions of identity and federal formation also 
dominated other reform processes. For example, although the CA Committee on State 
                                                          
63
Nepali congress and UML including other smaller parties denied the ethnic identity units. Nepali congress was 
second bigger party and UML was third in terms number of CA members representing in CA (2008-2012).   
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Restructuring and Division of State Power (SRDP) proposed three tiers of 
government—central, provincial and local—the overall debate was dominated by the 
question of provinces. In addition, the creation of special local regions directly under 
provincial units, intended to address the needs of the smaller ethnic minorities, was 
also controversial. Three types of special autonomous regions were proposed, 
Autonomous, Protected, and Special (Pandey, 2015:135). Autonomous regions denote 
specific areas where the majority of ethnic/indigenous people reside, based on their 
caste/language or culture. Proposed protected regions aimed to protect the language 
and culture of threatened minorities and allow them a degree of autonomy. Special 
regions were intended to empower ethnic communities not covered by other 
structures but were not considered a separate level of government (CA, 2008). 
Arguing for the importance of special regions Prof. Om Gurung stated that: 
The special regions as proposed by the state restructuring committee of 
the first CA was one of the significant proposals in addressing the rights 
of the tiny minorities in Nepal. This would allow them to exercise 
autonomy rights for their empowerment and protection of their culture 
and language. However, these are contested, and it was complicated to 
pass this proposal in the constituent assembly. 
(Prof. Om Gurung, Interview, 20 August 2014) 
 
This research shows that one of the most controversial elements proposed by the first 
CA was preferential rights for the dominant ethnic group in its specific province, 
including the reservation of the chief ministerial position for this group. The 
Committee proposed such rights where a large majority of ethnic people were residing 
in a region and where this province was based on this majority ethnic identity 
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(Chapagain, 2013:102).64 For example, Limbu ethnic community would benefit from 
this provision if there was an identity-based Limbuwan province. Ethnic/indigenous 
leaders demanded this right in light of their historical oppression and exclusion from 
state power, arguing that it constituted a form of restorative justice for their 
communities (Prof Krishna Hachhethu, Interview, 18 August 2014). They claimed 
that preferential rights would provide compensation for the oppression caused by the 
unification of Nepal in 1769 and its subsequent imposition of one language, religion 
and culture policy (Lawoti, 2007). However, one of the research participants 
expressed the concern that the idea of preferential rights violates the democratic 
norms.  
The proposal of preferential rights for ethnic groups was one of the 
highly controversial proposals by this committee. The preferential rights 
undermine the democratic value of election. Thus, this was later omitted 
in the second CA.  
 
(Prof. Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014) 
 
This research indicates that the federal model proposed by the first CA committee 
was more inclined towards addressing identity issues. The ethnic groups accepted 
these models. However, there was disagreement by some other ethnic groups such as 
Tharu and other groups. Madhesi groups demanded two Madhes province, which 
created controversy in consideration to the demands of Tharu and another high hill 
caste in far eastern and western regions. The issue of identity centric federalism has 
                                                          
64
 Preferential rights will prevail for 10 years considering 5 years of one term election period. 
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not been resolved yet although the new constitution promulgated by other CA has 
rejected it. 
 
Academic, Activist and Expert Views on Federal Models 
Beyond the CA committee and high-level commission's proposal, there were several 
other suggestions from academics, activists and experts in designing federal states in 
Nepal. Primarily two proposals regarding the organisation of an identity-based model 
emerged through this research. Some scholars (Mabuhang, 2009; Hachhethu, 2011) 
were in favour of single caste/ethnicity based identity. Others (Baral, 2010; Khanal, 
2010; Sharma, 2006) argued for the mixed models. The proponents of the ethnic 
identity-centric model argued that this model could help to redress past injustices 
experienced by those ethnic communities by providing autonomy and self-
determination, and creating processes to authorise and ensure their meaningful 
representation. The opponents of the ethnic single identity model criticised that it 
would shatter inter-community harmony, increase ethnic conflicts and contribute to 
the development of secession movements. This debate created turmoil not only in the 
design of the federal state but also in writing a new constitution. According to a 
research participant:  
The discussion of ethnicity based and mixed model federalism in Nepal 
was controversial during the first CA. The federalism debate as such 
caused to dissolve the first assembly. Second CA also adopted the basis 
for designing the federal units. However, looking into the debates, it is 
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hard to have ethnicity focused federal unit as such this created political 
turmoil.  
(Prof. Krishna Khanal, Interview, 19 August 2014)  
 
It emerged from my research that although there was demand for ethnic identity 
based federal states, itis hard to make a case for it in the context of the wider 
reluctance of the major political parties such as NC and UML. In some respects, the 
results of the second CA election were indicative of the unwillingness of large 
proportions of Nepali people to support single ethnic identity centric federalism, 
insofar as NC and UML, which opposed a single identity model won more seats. 
Moreover, there was also debate on the mixed model proposals mainly focused on 
multiple identities and the geographical distribution of proposed federal states, which 
was accepted by the main political parties. One of the research participants observed 
the debate that: 
The single ethnic identity based federal arrangement was highly 
controversial during the constitution making process in Nepal. There 
were different proposals tabulated. One of them was a mixed model 
proposal. The mixed model proposal was accepted by the major political 
parties. 
(Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
One of the fundamental issues came through this research is that the viability based 
debate supports the idea of the conventional five development regions. The scholars 
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(Khanal, 2010; Sharma, 2014) rejected the notion that caste/ethnicity based federal 
units provided the solution and suggested making viable units combining 
ethnic/cultural identity and resource based viability. These five development regions 
are based on a geographic vertical division—high mountain to low land (Tarai). The 
basic argument behind this idea was that resources vary with geographical 
distribution, and if this variety is included in one province, the unit will be more 
viable than one divided according to ethnicity. As expressed by an interviewee:  
The federalism debate was dominated by the discussion of recognising 
ethnic identity. However, an important element of federal provinces was 
to make them viable. This viability aspect was neglected although there 
was a different proposal for this as well.  
 
(Hira Vishwakarma, Interview, 2 September 2014) 
 
Moreover, it was found that some geopolitical, ethnic-regional and resource 
distribution factors seemed to favour mixed federal states. Nepal’s two largest 
neighbours—India and China—were informally against single ethnic identity. Ethnic 
diversity and variation of resources suggested the viability of mixed model federal 
states in Nepal65. As a result, the ethnic-regional and resource distribution elements 
justified the adoption of mixed federal units, a proposal eventually reflected in the 
new constitution. Considering both debates of ethnic identity centric federal vs. mixed 
model federal mechanism, the second CA balanced both concerns and proposed mixed 
model federal mechanism as suggested by few scholars. However, the mixed model 
                                                          
65Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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federal mechanism proposed by the second CA has also been contested by the Ethnic 
and Madhesi groups.  
 
Political Parties on Federal Models 
It was found that the major political parties such as Nepali Congress, UML and 
Maoist were divided over their preferences regarding federal models in Nepal. On the 
debates over the different model, political parties like NC and UML proposed a model 
consisting seven federal states, as suggested by a minority group within the state 
restructuring commission (Thapa, 2017:86). This model completely overlooked the 
identity-centric model, instead reiterating the mixed argument combining Hill and 
Terai (north to south) demarcation of the border. This also contradicted with the 
recognition of identity demands of ethnic/indigenous and Madhesi people. While 
explaining reasons of why multiple identities based federal units do not resolve the 
problem, Prof Krishna Hachhethu stated that:  
The debate of multiple identity based federal unit is not appropriate to 
resolve the ethnic identity recognition issue in Nepal. The fundamental 
problem associated with multiple identities is that it does not provide 
autonomy and self-rule to the particular ethnic groups. This raises the 
question of how the ethnic group can practice their autonomy if there is 
a multiple identity-based province. This does not resolve the problem 
faced by ethnic groups in Nepal. 
(Prof Krishna Hachhethu, Interview, 18 August 2014) 
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As opposed to NC and UML proposal, as revealed by this research the Maoist Party 
continuously argued for identity centric federal states in both the first and second 
CAs. In the first CA, a Maoist CA member led state restructuring committee that 
proposed the14 provincial model dominated by ethnic identity. Again, in the second 
CA, Maoists formed a federal coalition consisting of the members from 
ethnic/indigenous groups, Madhesi and other disadvantaged (Ahuti, 2013). This 
coalition continued their protest demanding ethnic identity to be given priority in 
creating federal states. However, the coalition was not as successful as expected and 
the second CA motion went against this sentiment. 
Among the political parties, the Maoist party was in favour of ethnicity 
based federal model from the beginning. However, Maoist party was in 
minority position in the second CA that caused this party to accept the 
decision during new constitution making process.  
(Anita Pariyar, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
 
This research finds out that heavy contention about the issue of a single ethnic 
identity issue caused a split in some political parties. For instance, some ethnic 
leaders from the UML party left their party and formed a new political party named 
Sanghiya Samajbadi Party to lead the single identity issue66. However, this new party 
could not gain substantial numbers in the second CA election. The weaker positions 
of the political parties pursuing the matter of ethnic identity also contributed to the 
difficulty of fulfilling the aspirations of ethnically marginalised people regarding 
                                                          
66Ashok Rai, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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recognising their identity through federal mechanisms. Ashok Rai, a political leader, 
opines that:  
The issues of single ethnic identity to make a key basis for federal 
designing in Nepal became controversial. This led to the formation and 
reformation of political parties. The formation of Sanghiya Samajbadi 
Party is also to continue the debate of ethnicity based federalism in 
Nepal. However, the weaker position of identity centric political parties 
caused difficulty in fulfilling the aspiration ethnic groups.  
 
(Interview on 18 August 2014) 
 
This research shows that the major political parties were unconvinced about the 
merits of ethnic identity centric federalism in Nepal and the political parties who led 
ethnic identity centric federalism either were a minority in parliament or divided 
themselves. The CPN-M party, which was arguably raising identity-based federalism 
in Nepal, seemed to be willing to compromise this agenda for bargaining political 
power. Madhesi and Ethnic political parties were not in a position to massively 
influence the majority based decision-making process in the parliament. As a result, 
the demand of identity centric federal designing was greatly overshadowed. 
 
7.6. Dalit Claims in Federalism 
While federal reform in Nepal would affect everyone, Dalit had a particular stake in 
the debate. As revealed by this research, one of the key issue of debate was the 
possibility of having access to political power by creating Dalit identity based 
territorial or non-territorial province.  However, this view of Dalit identity-based 
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province was not necessarily an agreed common position with a diversity of opinion 
amongst Dalit activists and scholars. Sunar (2012), BK (2012), and Lawoti (2010) 
argued for Dalit identity-based federal units either ‘territorial’ or ‘non-territorial’, 
however, as revealed through my research that most Dalit activists and scholars 
demanded proportionate representation and special compensatory rights67.The lack 
of common position resulted in negligence of Dalit demand in federalism process in 
Nepal.  
There was not any unanimous Dalit demand in the federalism debate in 
Nepal. Some scholars and activist were in favour of Dalit territorial, 
federal province, and some were for non-territorial. Some few scholars 
also proposed Dalit majority based local governance. However, none of 
the proposals had been seriously taken by political parties. This 
happened because first, there was not unanimous demand and second, 
the federalism debate was dominated by ethnic identity issue.  
(Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
It was found that indeed, insofar as the mainstream identity debate emphasised 
ethnic identity, it overlooked Dalit identity because Dalit claims in federalism were 
not primarily about protecting their culture and language. For example, key Dalit 
activists like Bishwabhakta Dulal argued that the Dalit inequality and injustice 
problem would not be solved by creating territorial or non-territorial units, 
expressing a clear reluctance to creating Dalit identity-based federal units68. Dalit 
claims as emerged through this research were basically to nullify stigma, oppose 
oppression, and to promote social justice by asserting politics for power and achieving 
                                                          
67Chhabilal Bishwakarma, Interview, 27 August 2014 
68 Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview on 18 August 
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proportional representation and compensatory rights. Indeed, this preference 
highlights that for many, the key factor of Dalit social justice is to eliminate caste-
based discrimination and to achieve equality through special measures. Another key 
demand was to get additional compensation on top of proportional representation and 
arguably reserved seats, demands that have been overlooked by the political parties 
and other stakeholders69. As discussed in chapter two, the Dalit reserved seat 
referred to a reserved electoral constituency and special political seat allocation in 
direct election system where only Dalit candidates from different political parties 
would be allowed to contest.  
The key demand of Dalit in federal affairs considering the ethnic 
identity domination of this debate was a full proportional 
representation; additional compensation referred to as special rights 
and reserved seats. Full proportional representation could ensure 
representation in the state mechanism as per their population share of 
13%. The compensation was demanded to repair Dalit historical 
discrimination. The reserved seat was also part of the demands to fulfil 
the representation of Dalit in direct elections. However, these demands 
have been overlooked.  
 
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
One of the themes came through my research is that political representation is a 
priority of central level Dalit leader. Dalit leader demands full proportional 
representation, reserved seats including addition compensation on political 
representation. However, ordinary Dalit focuses more on the reservation and other 
socio-economic development programs. One of the research participants argues that: 
                                                          
69Ganesh Bk, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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Dalit need socio-economic empowerment programs. Political 
representation is also important. However, focusing more on political 
representation does not help the ordinary Dalit. We need elimination of 
discrimination and access to the state's resources.  
 
(Keshar BK, Interview, 28 August 2014) 
 
Further, research participants agreed that Dalit federal units in certain geographical 
locations were not feasible to all Dalit due to their scattered nature. The problem was 
that if such structures were to be drawn based on basic population data, politically it 
would be quite impossible to draw any boundaries with Dalit majorities. Moreover, 
drawing boundaries with Dalit majorities would have been a form of political 
gerrymandering. Another research also confirms that even if majority Dalit areas 
could have been found, Dalit federal units in certain geographical locations would not 
provide social justice for all Dalit who is scattered around the country (Pyakurel, 
2012). Legislation and policies formed in a proposed Dalit province would not affect 
other federal provinces as argued by one of the research participants: 
A Dalit identity based federal province is not effective considering the nature 
of Dalit settlement being scattered around the country. The federal province 
created in some locations would not affect other locations. However, the-
territorial federal mechanism could be an alternative option for Dalit that 
would provide Dalit access to power.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 08 August 2014) 
 
There was not, however, a universal view on Dalit claims. As emerged from this 
research, Dalit were divided by the demand of territorial and non-territorial identity-
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based federal unit. For example, Sunar (2012:29) had argued for Dalit identity based 
territorial, federal sub-units to recognise Dalit identity, even though this was not 
politically endorsed. He proposed four likely sub-units based on the density of Dalit 
in specific district areas. The proposed first Sub province/unit includes Siraha and 
Saptari districts; the second unit includes Parbat, Myagdi and Baglung; the third 
unit includes Surkhet, Jajarkot, Pyuthan, Dailekh and Kalikot and the fourth unit 
includes Bajura, Achham and Doti districts with a second larger population of Dalit. 
However, most of the research participants, including a Dalit wing of the Maoist 
party, were reluctant to support this proposal.  
Dalit identity-based unit would create along-term untouchable identity. 
Considering the dispersed nature of the Dalit settlement, the provinces 
to be created in a certain location would help Dalit. The ultimate goal of 
Dalit movement is not to establish a permanent Dalit identity but to 
achieve equality and integration in the society. So, the creation of Dalit 
identity based federal unit is not helpful for Dalit.  
(Yam Kisan, Interview, 15 August 2014) 
 
What another key demand of Dalit emerged through my research is the non-
territorial federal mechanism. Other research also confirms the importance of non-
territorial mechanism. The scholars such as BK (2012) and Lawoti (2010) suggested 
this mechanism. The proposed 'Dalit legislative council' would be a form of non-
territorial representation, including 35 members directly elected from the provinces 
and some members in a nomination category (BK, 2012). This proposal was endorsed 
neither by Dalit wings of the major political parties nor by the public. Nevertheless, 
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the state restructuring commission of the first CA endorsed this non-territorial 
mechanism for Dalit; even thought here were no details regarding the formation 
procedure and jurisdiction of such non-territorial Dalit units (CA, 2011). Arguing for 
the importance of non-territorial federal units, UML leader Ganesh BK suggested 
that: 
Even if federal territorial states are not possible due to the scattered 
nature of Dalit residing in Nepal, there is still the possibility of a non-
territorial federal mechanism so that Dalit could use their political power 
regarding legislating Dalit policy, directing the Government towards the 
protection of Dalit rights and working as a watchdog for Dalit. This could 
be a formally elected body which is authorised like a commission. A form 
of elected Dalit Council in the shape of the non-territorial province would 
be relevant and is practised in other federal countries like in Belgium, 
Norway, Spain, Canada and New Zealand. 
(Interview, 8 August 2014) 
 
My research interview indicates that neither Dalit leaders nor the main political 
parties were clear on the Dalit identity based federal proposals and none of these 
proposal was strong enough to support the case for Dalit identity-based federal units. 
Perhaps due to the lack of a unanimous political agenda, Dalit did not succeed in 
securing proportionate representation with compensatory provisions or special 
rights70. The lack of common agenda, insufficient research, study and discussions 
weakened the probability of addressing the Dalit agenda in this process, and the 
                                                          
70Ganesh BK, Interview, 8 August 2014 
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question of the Dalit identity based federal unit was somehow overlooked. Hira 
Vishwakarma argues that:  
There was not any unanimous Dalit agenda, particularly on Federalism. 
Dalit leaders were in confusion as for whether to demand a federal 
province or not. This confusion led to the non-recognition of Dalit in the 
federalism process in Nepal. 
(Interview, 2 September 2014)  
Nevertheless, the above proposals were indicative of the diversity of views concerning 
the forms of federal design that could benefit the Dalit in Nepal. The proportionate 
representation with compensatory rights as stipulated in first CA draft reports 
address the recognition of Dalit group rights. There were disputes concerning the 
basic principle of compensatory rights mainly for an additional percentage on top of 
proportional representation. My research interview indicates that Dalit claims are a 
fair representation, affirmative action and inclusion rather than a separate Dalit 
federal unit.  
 
Dalit Identity Debate  
The differences of opinions amongst Dalit interview subjects in this study and the 
differences expressed during the debate raise larger issues about how Dalit in Nepal 
feel about “Dalit” as a unifying identity. This issue relates back to earlier discussions 
about recognition and group politics. In some respects, questions over identity took 
on a different meaning in the context of Dalit demands. Most of the research 
participants argued that recognition of Dalit identity not directly address the nature 
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of injustice faced by Dalit. Nevertheless, replacing the word is also not an immediate 
solution to the Dalit problem. Indeed, as argued by Fraser (2003) revaluation of 
subjugated identity is appropriate in the case of Dalit. The research participant 
argues that the revaluation of Dalit as traditional artisan people could play a 
significant role to unite Dalit. In favour of Dalit identity, Bishwabhakta Dulal says:  
The word Dalit has been established as a strong political tool in South 
Asia. There were many instances of changing the identity with different 
words that could not bring substantial change into Dalit lives. Simply 
changing the word Dalit does not bring a solution to Dalit problems. 
Thus, instead of changing the word, we need to revalue the meaning of 
Dalit that can be a uniting effort for all Dalit.  
(Interview, 18 August 2014) 
Dalit as identity is somehow contested among different Dalit groups. A fraction of 
Dalit leaders and youths argue that Dalit identity as such is a derogatory term and 
it humiliates them. Dalit, as defined by Nepali dictionary, is ̔oppressed̕ or 
̔untouchable̕, which some groups of Dalit do not want to associate. My research 
interviews find out that some Dalit leaders are taking initiatives to replace the word 
Dalit with other alternative word such as 'Shilpi' as discussed in the previous chapter. 
In favour of replacing Dalit identity, CA member Dil Nepali argues that:  
Dalit is itself very derogatory for us. We have been facing many 
challenges being lower caste. Dalit denotes the meaning of lower caste 
and untouchable. Associating this meaning will never provide us with 
the opportunity for liberation. If we continue to use the Dalit word, we 
will always experience discrimination. Thus, we need to change the word 
Dalit to 'Shilpi', which denotes an artisan and is far better than Dalit.  
(Interview, 12 August 2014) 
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However, most Dalit activists like Durga Sob and Rem Bishwakarma argued that 
Dalit identity not as an identity requiring protection but only in the course of 
ensuring dignity and justice: 
Dalit movement is not for identity politics about creating separate federal 
Dalit states. Rather, it is a dignity movement. Dalit needs dignity, social 
justice and equality in every step of their life in regards to access state 
resources, opportunity and power. The debate of Dalit identity-based 
federal states hardly supports the goal of our Dalit movement. It is merely 
futile debate. 
(Durga Sob, Interview, 8 Sept. 2014) 
 
It is in this context the Jagaran Media Center (JMC), Chairperson commented that: 
The Dalit identity based federal unit cannot become autopia. Dalit 
federal unit cannot help Dalit to eliminate rampant caste 
discrimination. Ethnic identity is to preserve, but Dalit identity must be 
eliminated one day. If we create such political mechanism, Dalit will 
always remain Dalit, and we cannot imagine their liberation 
(Rem Bishwakarma, Interview, 8 Aug. 2014). 
 
These views reflect that Dalit identity is contested but changing it also does not bring 
an immediate solution. In regards to the identity recognition in federalism, these 
views reflected the rejection amongst many for the idea that the model of recognition 
that ethnic groups were seeking would not serve Dalit. The core demand of Dalit in 
the federalism debate then remained proportionate representation with additional 
compensation. Dalit leaders advocated for proportionate representation at every level 
of the State, with additional compensation, particularly in political representation 
rather than recognition of Dalit identity.  
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The identity debate is contested in Nepal. Some groups strongly argue that identity 
should be a key form of political organization for Dalit and others oppose this. Among 
Dalit, a minority group are strongly advocating to change identity from ‘Dalit’ to 
‘Shilpi’. However, the majority of participants interviewed in this research strongly 
argue that Dalit should remain their identity. They claim that Dalit identity has been 
already established and it has been recognised by the new constitution.  
There are some advantages and disadvantages associated with identity debate. One 
of the key advantages is that a common Dalit identity is playing a role in uniting sub 
caste categories of Dalit groups. This identity has provided a sense of belonging and 
a common platform for raising their concern. Identity indeed has brought power to 
the movement.  
However, there are some disadvantages in embracing a Dalit identity as a basis for 
political claims. The meaning of Dalit has traditionally been negatively portrayed as 
suppressed, even though this is been now changing. Dalit movements are indeed 
trying to revalue the meaning of Dalit identity as ‘a group of people having their own 
artisan and profession’. Revaluing identity creates a strong sense of belonging to all 
Dalit sub caste groups.  
This thesis strongly argues for revaluing identity by appropriating and refiguring the 
discriminatory aspects of identity. The positive form of group identity can help to 
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unite Dalit against injustices. In order to ensure their justice, Dalit group politics is 
necessary.  
 
Political Participation in Federalism  
Political participation occurs within the electoral arena, or with protest activities 
directly aimed at decision-making processes. Institutionalized acts, such as voting or 
standing for office, have traditionally been considered as the cornerstones of 
democratic engagement (Theocharis & van Deth, 2017: 8). Political participation 
includes such activities as voting, signing petitions, blogging, demonstrating or 
attending meetings. Each of these concrete activities are forms of political 
participation, but voting and party activities are generally depicted as the electoral 
mode of participation (Theocharis & van Deth, 2017: 15). In this sense, political 
participation is about access to votes, governance and decision making processes. 
 
Dalit participation in formal political structures has been slowly increasing since 
1990 although the multidimensional exclusion of Dalit persists in Nepal. Dalit 
gradually started to take part in the formal political process through the nomination 
of Dalit members for political party committees and election contests. This 
participation matters because, as argued by Girard (2014), in the widely accepted 
understandings of democratisation, politics happen through formal systems of 
331 
 
participation. It is considered that taking part in democratic voting and contesting 
elections are prerequisites for active and continuous engagement in formal politics 
(Franklin, 2004 and Lijphart, 1997). Nevertheless, Dalit often lack the tools and 
political resources to engage in formal participatory processes beyond voting.  
 
One of the key reasons for the lower participation of Dalit is the domination of non-
Dalit in political and governance system. In other words, even in a democratic regime 
the informal norms that traditionally excluded Dalit continue to block Dalit from 
formal participation and decision-making processes.  In particular, the leadership of 
political parties is traditionally held by upper caste men (Ahuti, 2013). Dalit and 
other marginalised groups are mostly party cadres rather than leaders. Dalit, in 
general,are considered as a vote bank for political parties rather than as leaders.71 
As Constitutional Assembly member Anita Pariyar described the situation:  
 
Political parties still do not believe that Dalit makes competent leaders. They 
are reluctant to provide roles and responsibilities, particularly leading roles 
for Dalit. This is not only in one party but also with all the parties in Nepal as 
they carry conservative ideas and always see Dalit as incapable.72 
 
Political participation is however about more than voting and standing for office. It 
is also about attending public meetings and engaging in public deliberations, acts 
that indicate political interest and engagement. Field research indicated, however, 
                                                          
71Interview Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview on 28 August 2014 
72Interview with CA Member Anita Pariyar on 12 August 2014 
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that though the vast majority of Dalit vote in the elections, there was little evidence 
of subsequent formal political engagement. Rather Dalit are often found using simple 
means for political engagement, to influence political actions and learn about political 
issues in their community. They talk to local political representatives, share their 
opinion with more outspoken Dalit, or simply remain silent during meetings to 
communicate agreement or disagreements. These informal political channels often 
lead to misrepresentation of Dalits' views and interests. It would thus seem that 
despite the fact that the democratisation process has opened up formal space to Dalit, 
Dalit exclusion continues in informal and formal politics. 
 
The federalism debate has been more focused on the political representation of ethnic 
minority groups in Nepal. As discussed, most of the debates have been around how 
ethnic identity can be addressed through political representation. This debate 
fundamentally lacks the concern of other aspects of marginalization. It is here 
noteworthy to mention the interview excerpts of one of the participants.  
‘Nepali federalism debate has focused on the ethnic identity and political 
representation. Nevertheless, in Dalit case, protection of their identity is not 
key issue. There is not as such discussion on the process of Dalit inclusion in 
politics.’  
(Rem Bishwakarma, Interview on 8 August 2014) 
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Political participation is one of key factor that helps to ensure the representation of 
the interests of distinct groups and represents a key means to empower communities 
by including them in political processes. As discussed earlier, no political party in 
Nepal is led by Dalit . Only very few of Dalit are included in the central committees 
and the proportion of Dalit in local committees is low. 
The problem is that proposed federal mechanisms have been almost silent on the 
question of broadening political participation. There are neither specific proposals 
nor any programs focusing on political education for the marginalized groups, access 
to voting, access to government services and the process of decision-making. One of 
the participants specifically raised the concern of lack of political participation to 
Dalit in Nepal.  
‘Dalit are mostly left out from political process. There are not any specific 
political program to ensure the participation of Dalit in political process. Some 
Dalit are in political committees at local to central level but they get neither 
specific intervention nor the encouragement. Government and political parties 
never conduct any forms of political education on access to vote, access to 
government services, Dalit participation of decision making process..’ 
(Ganesh Shreepaili, Interview on 28 August 2014)  
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This fundamental debate has been left out while designing the federal mechanism. 
Thus, this requires greater effort to ensuring the participation of Dalit in political 
process in a changing context.  
 
7.7. New Constitution: Federalism and Dalit 
Despite the long debate on ethnic identity on federalism, the new Constitution did 
not address the single ethnic identity issues in the manner that ethnic and Madhesi 
groups had been demanding. This constitution adopted seven provinces (see Map 4) 
based on a mixed principle. However, the Constitution did not determine their names 
or boundaries, leaving this to be concluded by a high-level commission as envisaged 
by the new constitution. In the face of ongoing protests by Madhesi and 
ethnic/indigenous groups, there is yet dilemma on the implementation of federal 
governance structure in Nepal. Despite the protests of Madhesi, ethnic groups and 
Dalit, the new constitution was endorsed by 85% of the members of the second CA, 
which arguably curtailed the rights enshrined in the Interim Constitution (2007), and 
the draft reports of the first CA. My research participant confirms that:  
The new constitution is not as progressive as the reports of first CA 
committees. The first CA committees had proposed an ethnic identity 
based federal units. In the case of Dalit, the additional compensation on 
top of proportional representation was a key proposal, but it was not 
included in the new constitution.  
(Ganesh Bk, Interview, 21 September 2015) 
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Moreover, while the Constitution establishes a three-tier government (Central, 
Provincial and Local), the borders of the province and local structures was not fixed. 
The Constitutional Commission later determined the specific numbers and borders 
of local government. Furthermore, this constitution does provide an arrangement for 
special, protected and autonomous regions for the protection of social and cultural 
rights of the ethnic community (Chapagain, 2013:107). However, it is not clear yet 
how and where those regions will be determined.  
 
Map 4: 7 provinces as proposed by New Constitution of Nepal, 2015 
 
Source: New Constitution, 2015 
 
As indicated by my research, there were demands for a full proportional 
representation system, especially from Dalit, but the new constitution adopted a 
mixed electoral system, which combines 60% direct election and 40% proportional 
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representation. This provision thus rejects the huge demand of ethnic, indigenous, 
Madhesi, Dalit and other marginalised people (Ahuti, 2010). Madhesi people continue 
to demand that the electoral constituency is determined based on population 
proportions. If this were to occur, around 50% of the candidates would be elected from 
the Madhes region. The new constitution has mixed elements to determine the 
electoral constituency, which includes population and geography (Constitution of 
Nepal, 2015). An interviewee claims that:  
Full proportional representation was a key demand of all the 
marginalised groups in Nepal. However, the major political parties led 
by elite groups were reluctant to provide full proportional 
representation as a key electoral system. This is indeed the politics of 
political parties seeking power to dominate the state.  
      (Krishna Bk, Interview, 21 September 2015) 
 
Immediately after the dissemination of draft constitution, the Madhesi people began 
a protest program demanding a Madhes province, population-based electoral 
constituency, proportional representation of Madhesi and their equal citizenship 
rights (Sah, 2015). In the course of protest and unrest in Madhes region, almost four 
dozen people were killed while confronting police and armed forces (Sah, 2015). 
Agitators consequently imposed a blockade at the transit border point, and India also 
continued its economic embargo of Nepal (BBC, 2015). Though there was a 
subsequent amendment to the new constitution to address the inclusion of Madhesi 
and another group, the agitating parties were not satisfied and continued their 
protest against constitutional provisions until the new government decided to amend 
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the constitution on September 2016 (Hindu, 2016). This coalition government assured 
Madhesi groups that it would fulfil their demands, and at this point, they stopped 
their protest programs.    
 
My research indicates that Madhesi people are not the only groups who have been 
alienated by the new constitution. Major ethnic groups were left dissatisfied 
regarding their demands for proportional representation, identity-based federalism, 
and the redrawing of the electoral constituency. The marginalised groups are 
dissatisfied because particular communities dominate the existing state structure; 
marginalised groups are deprived of adequate representation in the state structures 
argued by research participants:  
The new constitution has left marginalised groups dissatisfied mainly 
because it did not establish a federal state based on ethnic identity. It 
has not endorsed the full proportional representation system. The mixed 
electoral system and recently proposed seven provinces not specifically 
address the issues of ethnic and marginalised groups in Nepal.  
(Krishna BK, Telephone Interview, 21 September 2015) 
This research also shows that the new constitution has not sufficiently addressed the 
Dalit rights, although Dalit were insistently raising their agenda. Dalit’s minority 
position in the parliament and political party mechanism is one of the key reasons 
that obstructed Dalit issues. Dalit members were also divided by their political 
ideology that was also an impediment to making uniform agenda and creating 
pressure jointly (Samata, 2010; Ahuti, 2013). Apart from this, the overall structural 
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domination is the main factor that neglects the issues of Dalit social justice. For these 
reasons, leaders of political parties neglected toaddress the Dalit agenda in the new 
constitution effectively. 
 
It was found that Dalit organised a series of protest programs in the aftermath of a 
new constitution. They were primarily dissatisfied by curtailed rights to additional 
compensation in political representation in Central and Provincial governments, full 
proportional representation, Dalit reserved constituency and determination of 
reservation. Ganesh BK, Dalit political leaders, specifically mentioned that:  
The new constitution has not addressed the issue of Dalit demands such 
as full proportional representation and additional compensation. The 
additional compensation together with political representation was 
proposed by the first CA. However, it has been curtailed bythe new 
constitution. The demand for political reserved seats is also not 
included.  
(Telephone Interview, 21 August 2015) 
 
As indicated by my research, despite the concerns of Dalit, there are gains worth 
noting. The creation of specific constitutional commissions such as the Women’s 
Commission, Dalit Commission, Janajati Commission, Madhesi Commission, Tharu 
Commission and Muslim Commission along with the National Human Rights 
Commission are, nevertheless, examples of addressing the demands of disadvantaged 
groups. These commissions can collect complaints or recommend changes in the laws, 
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policies, and practices of areas that deny rights to their respective communities. 
However, as reflected by past member of Dalit commission and interview participants 
in this research, the recommendation of Dalit commission is not implemented due to 
the widespread institutional bias and barriers73.  
 
On the elimination of caste-based discrimination and untouchability, Article 24 of the 
Constitution (2015) is crucial, establishing that no person shall be treated with any 
untouchability or discrimination in any private or public place on the grounds of 
caste. Nevertheless, as argued by an interviewee, this article does not meet the 
demand of Dalit, as they did not push for caste discrimination to be made a serious 
punishable crime against State. 
The anti-caste discrimination provision is not much different from the 
provision of the interim constitution, 2007 and anti-caste discrimination 
prohibition act, 2011. Dalit demands to make caste discrimination a 
serious crime against the state. However, this constitution has only 
made caste discrimination a social crime. The constitutional provision 
does not bring substantial change if there is not effective 
implementation.  
(Krishna Bk, Telephonic Interview, 21 September 2015) 
 
The new constitution provides special rights of inclusion for Dalit in all agencies of 
the state based on the principle of proportional inclusion, by making special legal 
                                                          
73Min Bishwakarma, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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provisions of empowerment, representation, and participation of the Dalit 
community. In addition, there are provisions for free education with scholarships 
from primary to higher levels of education and special provisions to pursue higher 
education in technical and professional subjects. Another article provides that Dalit 
will have health care and social security arrangements and rights to protect and 
modernise their traditional occupation and technology (Constitution, 2015). 
According to the Constitution, the State will provide land on a one-off basis for 
landless Dalit families. Nevertheless, all these rights will be determined in the laws 
to be made. Despite having such constitutional provision, implementation of those 
provisions remains to be brought into effect, and one can raise questions about 
whether this will occur and if so, how and when. 
 
7.8. Struggle and Obstacles for Dalit in Institutional Reform Process 
My research reveals that despite being reasonably represented in the both 
Assemblies, due to internal and external factors, Dalit voices received a limited 
hearing during the constitution making process. As mentioned by research 
participants, first, as they had historically been denied representation, Dalit 
members had no previous knowledge and skills in parliamentary procedures. Second, 
Dalit were divided across different political ideologies and their roles in political 
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parties varied74. Some of the CA members were capable of influencing political party 
leaders and the CA process; however, most of them were not in a position to do so due 
to their lack of experience in leadership and limited political education.  
In general, political parties nominated weaker Dalit CA members. They 
did not have proper skill and knowledge in the legislative process. Most 
of them were political party follower. This affected the effective 
performance of CA members to influence their agenda.  
(Dil Nepali, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
 
It was found that the political parties mostly nominated comparatively weaker Dalit 
members for the CA positions. This nomination was purely based on the self-interest 
of the political parties that did not consider the ability of Dalit members during the 
appointment process. This resulted in the inability of Dalit CA members to effectively 
influence the Dalit agenda on different CA committees. In the First Assembly, as 
observed by a research participant, Dalit CA members were not appropriately 
included in various committees, initially because of the non-existence of a Dalit 
caucus. After almost one year of the first CA, Dalit were able to form their CA 
members' forum, which consequently prepared a 12-point common agenda of Dalit to 
be incorporated in the new constitution75. Dalit political leaders also formed a joint 
                                                          
74Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
75Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 2014 
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struggle committee to influence the constituent assembly on Dalit causes. 
Consequently, CA committees began to realise Dalit agendas in the assembly.  
 
Despite ideological differences and their limited capacity, Dalit managed to raise 
Dalit issues.  As an example CA member, Anita Pariyar explains that:  
The main achievement of the Dalit Movement is to influence the CA 
process through a Dalit CA caucus in First Constituent Assembly, which 
was subsequently restricted in second CA. However, we formed Dalit CA 
member coordination committee in the Second Constituent Assembly. 
We have been able to develop the common agenda to influence political 
parties on Dalit agenda through this committee. Dalit Movement played 
a good role in influencing political parties to ensure Dalit participation 
and inclusion in the constituent assembly. 
(Anita Pariyar, CA member, Interview, 12 August 2014) 
 
Dalit in the Second Constituent Assembly also continued their advocacy and 
influencing role.  
However, one of the major weaknesses in second CA was that Dalit CA 
members could not influence political leaders to ensure special rights to 
Dalit in political representation as it was agreed by the CA committees 
of the first and second CA. 
(Ganesh BK, Interview,8 August 2014).  
 
Dalit CA members again formed informal Dalit coordination committees in second 
CA because the formal caucus was restricted. Dalit continued creating pressure for 
343 
 
their rights. However, when the first draft of the constitution was released for citizen 
consultations, Dalit protested against curtailed Dalit rights in the draft constitution. 
Dalit joint struggle committee organised a protest program in Kathmandu on 4 
August2015, which was repressed by the government (IDSN, 2015). However, later 
political parties agreed to retain Dalit rights in the constitution, although to a limited 
degree. 
Despite the continued effort of Dalit CA member in the second CA, there 
was heavy curtailing of the Dalit demands in the draft constitution. This 
compelled Dalit to protest against the draft constitution. As a result, 
political parties agreed to ensure Dalit demand.  
(Ganesh Bk, Telephonic Interview, 20 August 2015) 
 
One might ask why Dalit were not more successful in achieving their objectives in 
the constitution-making process and this period of state restructuring. One factor as 
revealed through my research is unity. Lack of united effort and common agenda of 
Dalit, even across other differences, was a prerequisite in influencing the 
constitution-making process. The division among Dalit CA members along the lines 
of political ideology weakened their ability to establish a common agenda in different 
thematic committees (Pyakurel, 2012:67). Although the Dalit CA caucus provided an 
informal space within CA and platform for Dalit CA members, it remained less than 
fully functional and was not able to deliver more effective results (SAMATA, 2010). 
Nevertheless, although this inefficiency, Dalit CA members played a role in pressing 
their agenda in their respective committees, their differing political ideologies got in 
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the way of their aligning over a unanimous agenda. The party affiliated Dalit 
organisations remained tightly bound within the particular party’s ideological 
framework. As a result, they have had difficulties in setting a common agenda of Dalit 
while their role was limited to a consultative one.  
During the process of constitution making in Nepal, one of the key gaps 
Dalit faced is that they did not have a timely common agenda. Similarly, 
the division by political party lines was also another problem. Even 
though they had a common agenda, it was not effectively advocated by 
Dalit CA members and leaders due to their different views and ideology.  
(Hira Vishwakarma, Interview, 2 September 2014) 
 
As indicated by my research, the further problem was that political parties were the 
major actors who led the political process, but they did not sufficiently pay attention 
to the Dalit agenda, even though there were no major disputes with this agenda76. 
Political exclusion from decision-making forums affected the ability of Dalit to 
progressive reform. Dalit leaders were neither in decision-making positions, nor they 
were in the majority to influence their agendas. With political parties more focused 
on national agenda, the proposals of Dalit, ethnic minorities and women became less 
prioritised during CA process. Most of the Dalit members in CA nominated by 
political parties were comparatively weaker as they lacked leadership and were 
mainly followers within apolitical party77. Ignorance and reluctance of the political 
parties on Dalit representation and issues were key obstacles, among others, in the 
constitution making process.  
                                                          
76Ganesh BK, Interview, 8 August 2014 
77Bishwabhakta Dulal, Interview, 18 August 
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Overall, as my research finds that while Dalit issues were represented in the CA 
thematic reports to some extent, there was a lack of proper understanding on Dalit 
issues by the CA member in different committees. Under-representation of Dalit and 
lack of their unity in all thematic committees caused ineffectiveness in properly 
raising their issues. Moreover, the reluctance of the main political parties toward 
Dalit issue is a key challenge, which affected the reflection of Dalit issues in the new 
constitution. A strategic question was whether it makes sense to demand recognition 
of Dalit identity as a tactic to progress social justice reform. Arguably, the CA process 
demonstrated that identity was a fraught space by which to advance a Dalit political 
agenda.  
 
7.9. Conclusion 
The mainstreaming of Dalit identity through creating separate Dalit federal units, 
either on a territorial or non-territorial basis was neither politically endorsed, nor 
recommended by experts. Even if Dalit majority areas could have been found 
establishing Dalit federal units in certain geographical locations would not have 
provided social justice for all Dalit, who are scattered around the country. In this 
sense, the core demand of Dalit became ensuring proportionate representation with 
compensatory provisions and special rights for socio-economic empowerment. The 
demand for an identity based federal political unit became a controversial political 
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agenda. The major political parties who insistently resisted single identity-based 
federalism won the majority of votes in the second CA and derailed the firm demand 
of identity-based States. This suggests that a focus on identity has proved 
unsuccessful within this political context. However, Dalit should continue to assert 
group differentiated politics of recognition to achieve unfulfilled demand for their 
social justice in Nepal.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The key purpose of this study was to examine the dynamics of socio-political 
structures that underpin the inequality and injustices, which Dalit community in 
Nepal experience, with a view to determining the institutional reforms required to 
achieve social justice for this group. The study indicates that hegemonic power 
relations and recurring patterns of caste discrimination are at the root of inequality 
and injustice experienced by Dalit in Nepal. Moreover, recent efforts to address such 
inequalities as part of the recent political transformation from a unitary to a federal 
system have been insufficient since they have a principally focused on ethnic identity, 
merely including Dalit as an element in this process. By contrast, the central 
argument I have made, arising out of my findings, is that special measures and 
multidimensional institutional reforms will be required to achieve participatory 
parity and remedy of long-standing injustices that Dalit experience. Such special 
measures might include reserved seats, proportional representation and reservations 
for socio-economic empowerment. This is, however, unlikely to occur unless Dalit 
themselves can strongly assert a group differentiated politics of recognition. 
Certainly, deep-rooted inequality and injustices are unlikely to be eliminated 
immediately; that is why there is a need for special measures for the holistic 
development of Dalit, coinciding with the Dalit assertion of group politics.  
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This chapter commences by reiterating the main findings of the research. It then 
considers the implications of the research for theories concerning social justice and 
policy. Section three sets out the significance of the study and recommendations for 
further research. The final section summarises the conclusions.  
 
8.1 The significant Empirical Findings of the Study 
This thesis examined the dynamics of socio-political structures to determine the 
institutional reforms required to achieve social justice for Dalit. It dealt with the long-
standing inequality of Dalit in Nepal and how contemporary political 
transformations, including state restructuring and federalism, are seeking or failing 
to address such inequality. It was found that despite the long historical resistance of 
Dalit, caste discrimination persists to a significant extent.  
 
Profoundly Entrenched Inequality and Injustice 
The persisting hegemony of dominant groups and caste discrimination continues to 
negatively affect the socio-cultural, economic and political experience of the Dalit 
community in Nepal. As discussed in chapter five, the practice of untouchability 
occurs in the public and private spheres, for example in the form of restrictions about 
public temples, hotels, water tap, private homes, inter-caste marriages, and cultural 
functions. In the economic sphere, landlessness, the persistence of bonded labour and 
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restriction in Dalits’ opportunities to participate on an equal footing in trade and 
business are key areas of discrimination. In the political sphere, Dalit continue to be 
excluded from political representation and are denied leadership positions. Such 
practices persist despite the fact that caste discrimination has been formally 
outlawed and in the face of Nepal’s ratification of international human rights 
instruments prohibiting discrimination and requiring recognition of equal rights for 
all people.  
 
By showing how structural injustices founded on caste hierarchies continue to have 
multidimensional effects on Dalit lives, the research questions the viability of a 
program of assimilation to dominant cultural norms that themselves devalue the 
identity of Dalit. Thus, even though Dalit follow the same religious and cultural 
tradition as dominant groups in Nepal, their equality will require an active and 
positive revaluation of Dalit group identity, combined with their distribution of power 
and resources. This finding is consistent with the argument developed at a more 
theoretical level by scholars such as Young (1990) and Fraser (2003), that liberal 
approaches that emphasise individual level equality of opportunity are not sufficient 
to achieve social justice.  
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Slow pattern of Change in Caste Discrimination and Untouchability 
Despite continuing efforts against caste discrimination, the research did indicate that 
changing pattern of caste discrimination is slow. As argued in chapter 5, there are 
everyday direct forms of discrimination such as the use of derogatory language or 
behaving in an explicitly discriminatory way in public spaces, restriction in the 
temple and inter-caste marriage as evidenced by self-reported experiences of 
discrimination from the interview participants in this study. It is acknowledged that 
as a qualitative study, this cannot form the basis of a claim of a robust trend, but it 
is indicative of change. However, there is an indication of change into the pattern of 
direct caste discrimination. This research indicates that the major reasons for the 
changes are increasing levels of awareness about caste discrimination among Dalit 
and non-Dalit, increasing modernisation, and legal measures protecting Dalit rights. 
For example, the recent anti-discrimination law is more progressive than previous 
discrimination laws. Unlike past laws, recent ones specifically cover discrimination 
that takes place in private settings. The level of punishment is also harsher than was 
previously the case, with sentencing options available to imprison of perpetrators 
between one and three months and fined up to 25,000 Nepali Rupees. Nevertheless, 
biased attitudes and practices in state institutions continue to undermine fully 
effective implementation of these laws. To counter such institutional biases, full 
inclusion of Dalit at all levels; from policy, formulation of the systems of 
implementation will be required.  
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Moreover, as I argued in chapter six, the work that local NGOs and community-based 
organisations have been doing on social awareness seems to be contributing to the 
improvement in awareness and sensitivity to caste discrimination at the village level. 
Nevertheless, there remains a need for effective and practical efforts from 
Government both to sensitise people against such discrimination and to penalise 
perpetrators. 
 
My study also indicated that patterns of caste discrimination differ somewhat 
according to geographical location, due largely to different attitudes and levels of 
awareness of people living in that particular place. For example, incidences of caste 
discrimination seem to be more prevalent in the western regions than in the eastern 
regions (Katuwal, 2008:116). The research participants expressed their views that 
the level of discrimination at Tarai regions of Nepal is more complex than at the hill 
regions. Similarly, there is another assumption that the socioeconomic status of Dalit 
also makes a difference in the perception and behaviour of non-Dalit to Dalit. This 
assumption was found to be true as most of the interview participants also agreed 
that the presence of an educated, and more economically prosperous Dalit leader 
whose social status enables him or her to speak out against perpetrators could make 
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a difference in inter-caste behaviour. At the same time, the lower social status of Dalit 
persists through their lifecycle, thereby entrenching discrimination and domination.  
 
As expressed by the interview participants, being the most illiterate and politically 
disempowered, Dalit often live with humiliation and are not able to resist inhumane 
practices. The lower self-esteem and humiliation hinder Dalit from becoming leaders 
in any institutions. This demonstrates the Dalit exclusion from opportunities and 
benefits. The humiliation also extends to accessing other educational, economic and 
political opportunities. For example, as discussed in chapter five, Dalit are not able 
to raise their concern directly in local political meetings, often use the informal 
medium to convey their concerns such as talking to Dalit leader. Often they simply 
remain silent during meetings.  
 
As discussed in chapter five, in this study, interview participants reflected a view 
that Dalit often will not speak against higher caste as they fear such action could 
damage their relationship with the clients who ensure a minimal subsistence from 
their traditional occupations. For Dalit who are caught in traditional occupations in 
rural areas, this patron-client relationship remains a trap. However, this pattern has 
been now slowly decreasing due to the diminishing level of Dalit involvement in 
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traditional professions, increasing foreign labour opportunities and sensitization 
among Dalit about their rights.  
 
Caste Violence and their role in social conflict 
Caste-based violence has been taken lightly by both the State and dominant groups, 
but today, caste violence represents one of the potential risks for worsening social 
conflict in Nepal. The younger generation, particularly Dalit, seem to be retaliating 
against caste based violence and exploitation. As discussed in chapter six, there are 
some initiatives to create forces against caste discrimination and its perpetrators 
such as ‘Dalit Youth force’. Ongoing caste violence and oppression might motivate 
Dalit youth to join revolutionary wings/forces. This was already evident in the 
significant number of Dalit youth who participated in the Maoist rebel force, and 
indeed the Maoists drew on Dalits sentiment against untouchability and caste 
discrimination. The fact that when they were in a ruling position, the Maoists did not 
actively and efficiently address caste discrimination left many Dalit with a sense that 
no government will help them. As a result, some Dalit consider initiating an armed 
struggle against caste discrimination. Were this to happen, it could trigger broader 
conflicts in Nepal.  
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Ubiquitous Institutional Bias and Barriers 
Institutional bias and barriers, as distinct from direct forms of caste discrimination 
continue to impede social justice for Dalit. The dominant groups utilise their caste 
privilege and supremacy to hinder Dalit to access justice. Higher caste groups 
dominate the state institutions such as law enforcement mechanisms, there are 
pervasive implicit biases, as discussed in chapter five, often leading to the negligence 
of discrimination related cases. As argued by Holroyd, (2015:30) implicit bias is not 
easy to detect but stigmatises minority groups. In relation to Dalit, the dominance of 
higher caste is also a barrier for Dalit justice as higher caste uses their privilege, 
networks and power to protect culprits. This study reveals that despite anti-
discrimination laws, widespread institutional biases and barriers persist. For 
example, police refuse to register first information reports (FIR) against caste 
discrimination case, and sometimes crimes are not registered as caste discrimination 
but rather classified as types of other crime. Police negligence and caste bias remain 
a massive obstacle to their being a tool for justice (Kharel, 2007:57; HRW, 2016). A 
recent example involved police refusing to register the element of caste 
discrimination in the murder of a Dalit boy in the Kavre district in the case of an 
inter-caste marriage (Pressenza, 2017). After protests by Dalit activists the case was 
prosecuted as one of caste discrimination, but, the real culprit has not yet been 
punished. 
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The principal institutions that ought to be ensuring justice for Dalit, such as political 
parties, the police administration and chief district officers are similarly reluctant to 
press caste discrimination cases as argued in chapter five. Ordinary Dalit, who are 
often illiterate and poor, rarely press caste discrimination cases, are forced to 
compromise and withdraw cases and may themselves be penalised even if they are 
victims. At the same time, key Dalit government institutions are almost powerless 
and unable to effectively and independently work for the rights of Dalit. For example, 
the Dalit Commission formed under a ministerial decision in 2001. However, it is still 
not the constitutional body and arguably not able to work as a semi-judicial 
mechanism. The key weakness of Dalit Commission was. First, there was not a 
constitutional right given to the commission for acting as a semi-judicial mechanism. 
Second, as discussed in chapter seven, the recommendation of the commission is not 
implemented by the law enforcement mechanism due to widespread institutional 
bias. As a result, many Dalit continue to experience severe human rights violations, 
but voiceless before the law.  
 
Unheard Dalit Voice in Nepalese Political Transformation 
This research uncovered ahistorical track record of Dalit struggle and resistance but 
found that Dalit are still struggling to mainstream their voices, as described in 
chapters six and seven. The trends demonstrate that most of the major political 
protests in Nepal have been against the unitary, exclusionary and hegemonic power 
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structures, and have sought to address the inequality of marginalised people such as 
Dalit, women, indigenous nationalities and Madhesi. Along with other marginalised 
groups, Dalit extensively contributed to bringing about the political changes, but 
these changes have not substantially addressed the issues of Dalit. Political 
movements such as the people’s protests of 1990 and 2006, combined with the Maoist 
insurgency and subsequent political transition are evidence of citizen participation 
against hegemonic power structures, but the changes they sought are yet to be fully 
institutionalised. The promulgation of a new constitution in 2015 should be 
instrumental in institutionalising changes and the rights of marginalised groups but 
is to be implemented. 
 
As discussed in chapter seven, the political transformations associated with creating 
a federal system have not involved a direct link with the identity of Dalit, for example 
creating Dalit federal units. The demand for identity-based federal political units for 
Dalit was controversial, and there was not a strong base for influencing political 
parties in relation to this agenda. Although identity issues were strongly raised in 
the first CA, due to the weaker position of identity proponents in the second CA, the 
demands concerning ethnic identity issues became ineffective. The major political 
parties who strongly resisted single identity-based federalism won the majority of the 
votes in second CA and this derailed the demands based on ethnic identity.  
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The failure to respond to the demand for federal units by ethnic identity provoked 
Madhesi and ethnic groups to protest. Nevertheless, because of the importance, they 
placed on this issue, Madhesi people have continued to protest and demand 
amendment of the constitution to ensure recognition of Madhes provinces. It can be 
anticipated that this matter will be cause for ongoing upheavals.  
 
The core demand of Dalit concerning federalism was the adoption of an electoral 
system of proportionate representation with compensatory provisions. One of the key 
demands of Dalit was to guarantee the additional compensatory rights of political 
representation at central, provincial and local federal structure. To achieve social 
justice through redistribution of resources, Dalit also demanded the special 
provisions for socio-economic empowerment.  
 
This research indicates that special political representation measures such as 
additional compensation in central, provincial and local representation are relevant 
to guarantee the representation of Dalit in federal mechanisms. Research 
participants mainly Dalit political leaders affirmed that full proportional 
representation including additional compensatory measures as proposed by the first 
CA committee is the main demand in the federal mechanism rather than Dalit 
identity based federal units. They further reflected the view that considering the 
dispersed nature of Dalit, either territorial or non-territorial identity based federal 
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units was not the solution to the multidimensional nature of injustice of Dalit in 
Nepal.  
 
Because of the focus on ethnicity based federal units, in the end, the polity overlooked 
the concerns of Dalit. Despite facing multi-dimensional nature of injustice, federal 
restructuring procedure did not fairly recognise Dalit concerns of social justice. 
Neither demand of full proportional representation nor additional compensation was 
accommodated in this journey. There are several factors for the negligence of Dalit 
interest, among them; the Dalit internal division and lack of common agenda in 
federal polity were main problems.  The hegemonic power structure and ethnic 
identity dominated federal debates are also key other factor causing negligence on 
Dalit concerns.  
 
Divided Dalit Movement and Fragile Struggle 
Despite the barriers to political recognition described above, there has been some 
progress in the development of Dalit movements. During the long history of 
resistance as discussed in chapter six, the Dalit movement has been characterised by 
a reactive strategy, for example, protesting against atrocities and governments’ 
reluctance to promote inclusive policy formation. By contrast, demands concerning 
temple entry, equal rights for selling milk to dairy companies are examples of 
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proactive programs. These are more strategically rational. The movement has 
achieved three outcomes. First, Dalit liberation became valuable in the broader 
Nepalese political, social and cultural movements. Second Dalit have come to realise 
the importance of a united struggle for their liberation. Third, in some respects, the 
Dalit movement has compelled political leaders to provide some types of relief 
program for Dalit.  
 
However, the movement has faced numerous barriers. This study suggests that Dalit 
movement has been divided by their political ideology and caste divisions argued in 
chapter seven. As result of this internal division, Dalit movements have been 
relatively ineffective in asserting their rights. Internal divisions add to Dalits’ lower 
socioeconomic condition, the persistence of hegemony and lack of awareness. In the 
face of persistent hegemonic power relations, Dalit are hesitant to express their voices 
against and come out to protest against malicious forms of discrimination. 
Additionally, their socioeconomic condition impedes Dalits’ participation in a broad 
Dalit movement. As they are mostly wage earners, Dalit are unlikely to be able to 
take part in mass protests and demonstrations for their rights. 
 
Dalit movements have also been hampered by a lack of strong Dalit political 
leadership. Dalit political leaders are divided into different political parties. There is 
also rivalry among the leaders such as no one is ready to accept leadership. Moreover, 
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the literature review demonstrates that there is division among the social Dalit 
leaders as referred to NGOs activists and political Dalit leaders. As discussed in 
chapter six, they blame each other. There is also lack of collaboration among these 
leaders. However, recent events indicate that both fractions of leaders protested 
against the CA when there was curtailing of Dalit rights in 2015. The situation may 
be improved as Dalit political leaders have formed a unified Dalit struggle committee 
where all political Dalit leaders and cadres are involved. 
 
This research has revealed that Dalit political leaders have been reluctant to act on 
certain agendas such as federalism and forms of governance. As discussed in Chapter 
7, the overemphasis on the single identity debate side lined Dalit concerns for special 
measures for political representation such as reserved electoral constituency, 
additional compensation in addition to proportional representation including non-
territorial provinces for Dalit. The reserved electoral constituency referred to a 
reserved seat, as discussed in chapter 2 and 7, is an alternative political mechanism 
that guarantees the representation of marginalised groups in the direct election 
system. In relation to Federalism, the research suggests that most Dalit leaders were 
reluctant to pursue federalism as an important part of their agenda for Dalit rights. 
Despite the proposal of high-level Commission on the non-territorial provincial 
model, the Dalit movement did no positively embrace it and thus make it a core 
demand. Few of the Dalit leaders persistently raised this issue, and so it was not 
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heard by the relevant authorities. Dalit leaders were also reluctant to advocate non-
territorial Dalit provinces. It seems that the lack of common agenda and unity among 
Dalit leaders and CA members failed to robustly influence in the CA process. 
 
Unreachable Social Justice for Dalit in Nepal 
Despite the indication of increasing policy awareness and implementation of 
inclusion policies, changes are slow and unlikely to ensure equality and justice for 
Dalit in the foreseeable future. As indicated by literature review of chapter two, fast 
track implementation of policies, inspired by those adopted in South Africa could then 
be helpful to achieve Dalit inclusion. As shown in Figure 2 equality and justice are 
the primary goals of Dalit. This modality displays that for achieving equality, 
different levels of policy implementation is necessary. For example, the first step is 
to provide affirmative action in the form of reservations, proportional representation, 
quotas and special rights. The implementation of affirmative action brings us to the 
next level, where there is an increasing standard of inclusion of Dalit in the private 
and public sectors. The growing level of inclusion itself then provides the conditions 
for achieving equality and justice. Importantly, equality means equality of outcome 
and not only process, but procedural equality combined with affirmative programs 
creates the conditions for substantive equality in the conditions of a hierarchical 
society like Nepal.  
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Figure 2: Equality and Justice Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Source: Author's Illustration) 
 
Group differentiated Recognition Politics: A strategic option for Dalit 
There is a debate on whether the ultimate goal of Dalit movement is to integrate Dalit 
in mainstream society or to retain a Dalit identity through collective or group politics. 
On this question, Dalit political leaders and social activists are clear. They see the 
ultimate goal of the Dalit movement as integrating into mainstream politics and not 
separate group politics. Dalit group politics is just short term strategy of Dalit 
movement to unite them under a common agenda.  
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As discussed in chapter four, a number of contemporary social justice theories 
contend that recognition of groups like Dalit as a separate group and transformative 
redistribution are necessary to achieve social justice. These theories establish 
political rights as fundamental in this process.  The political power of minorities and 
social groups makes a real difference in the distribution of scarce resources, which 
provide the basis for equality. Since injustice is a by-product of institutional rules and 
regulations, which go beyond the individual level, theorist argue for the necessity of 
group differentiated rights (Young, 1990; Kymlicka, 1995; Williams, 1998; Fraser, 
2003). Thus, as distinct from liberal approaches that understand liberation as the 
elimination of group difference, theorists like Young (1990:157) claim that positive 
self-definition of group difference is the condition of liberation.  
 
It is accepted that equal treatment approaches alone cannot address structural 
injustices and that these require group differentiated approaches. This is not, 
however, the same as long-term recognition of a specific group. Nevertheless, group 
recognition is better than dominations domination can create more conflict. To reduce 
conflict, group recognition and unity in diversity are inevitable. This research 
supports the claim of Fraser (2003) as she argues for the importance of both 
redistribution and recognition to achieve social justice for marginalised groups. Being 
a highly marginalised group, Dalit are systematically excluded from socioeconomic, 
education, and political opportunities, resources and their identity has been 
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stigmatised and devalued. Thus, Dalit need both redistributions of resources and 
recognition of identity for their justice. To achieve justice, Dalit should assert group 
differentiated politics of recognition as a short-term strategy. However, this research 
shows that there is still dilemma within the Dalit movement about whether to adopt 
the group politics of recognition or not.  
 
Certainly, this research has shown that even though Dalit identity is contested, it 
has provided a common entity, which has been a useful tool for combating caste-based 
discrimination. Most of the respondents in my study as discussed in chapter seven, 
particularly Dalit social and political leaders, affirmed that Dalit word is not 
derogatory, but rather serves to unite the community. They stated the importance of 
identity. Amongst the younger generation, only small fraction of people sees the Dalit 
word as derogatory. It is reflected that Dalit, as defined by earlier Nepali dictionary, 
meant a derogatory word such as oppressed and untouchable, which they hate. For 
example, the Dalit wing of Sanghiya Samajwadi Forum Nepal (a political party) is 
advocating the word ‘Shilpi’(skilful) community to replace Dalit in the Constitution. 
However, the majority of participants expressed their view that Dalit is a politically 
coined identity as recognised by the national and international institution as well as 
Nepalese constitution, should be revalued it positively that can valorise their identity. 
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It is important here to note that Dalit struggles perhaps differ from other minority 
struggles aimed at recognition.  As described in chapter seven, interviewee in this 
study pointed out that the Dalit movement is not the same as other ethnic 
movements, which are fighting for the protection of their cultural and linguistic 
identity. Because the Dalit identity is associated with the negative perception of 
untouchability, the Dalit fight is one about the elimination of all forms of derogatory 
perception and establishing dignity. Dalit are not fighting for the political 
construction of their identity or to sustain it forever; rather they are fighting for the 
destruction of negative identity. Nevertheless, I argue that identity and dignity are 
interrelated. If there is no recognition of identity, how can there be dignity for that 
group. My research indicates that Dalit should consider the interrelationship of these 
concepts and government and political parties need to recognise Dalit identity, which 
needs to be asserted strategically for Dalit equality and justice. 
 
Political Participation/Representation: Key factor for Dalit Justice 
My research demonstrates that at the central level Dalit leaders see political 
representation as critical. Dalit priorities thus vary according to their situation and 
status. The political leader demand, for ordinary Dalit, what matters is access to 
State resources. Nevertheless, there is a wider understanding that political 
representations one of the key determinants for the resolution of other problems as 
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it determines the national policy and provisions discussed in chapter five, six and 
seven. I agree with Phillips that amongst leaders, there is over-emphasis on 
representation in legislative assemblies rather than on what the representative do 
(Phillips, 1995:3). Thus while the emphasis on political representation is not itself a 
problem, it should not distract from other dimensions of the problem. Nevertheless, 
the provision of political representation proportional representation should remain 
key area of focus insofar as it both increases opportunities for Dalit in politics while 
also supporting broader policy change and Dalit empowerment.  
 
Moreover, my research indicates that to ensure fair representation, special measures 
will be required as argued in chapter seven. This might be achieved through some of 
the measures discussed above, for example, “Dalit reserved seats” to be determined 
by Dalit voters alone. As outlined above, recent institutional reform efforts did not 
bring about such measures that would ensure Dalit political representation. This 
failure must in part be attributed to the reluctance of political parties, which continue 
to marginalise Dalit and not advocate Dalit interests. In addition to political 
representation, political participation of Dalit is a key factor for achieving Dalit 
justice. Dalit participation in voting processes, access to governance and decision 
making will all help to ensure Dalit representation. 
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Recent political changes, particularly the formation of local, provincial and central 
government have achieved substantial inclusion of women and Dalit. Nevertheless, 
the inclusion of marginalised groups has not achieved the level of representation 
proportional to population. Thus, further efforts are required to strengthen political 
participation and proportionate representation in the changing political context of 
Nepal.  
8.2. Theoretical and Policy Implications of the Study 
This study drew on theories of social justice that were developed, principally in the 
Global North and for marginalised groups in those contexts. As such, they can 
illuminate the Dalit case, but in turn, the Dalit case can speak back to them.  
The prevailing discourse about how best to achieve social justice for Dalit suggests 
that the end goal should be assimilation into dominant social groups and abolition of 
specific Dalit identity. Most respondents understood Dalit politics as one of dignity, 
implying this assimilation frame. In one sense, this is appropriate. However, the 
problem with this position is that it fails to appreciate that in practice, and because 
of historical and entrenched structures of injustice, without recognition of their group 
identity and the construction of a positive self-image, dignity is itself threatened. As 
argued by Taylor (1992) the politics of recognition is also a politics of equality and 
dignity. The development of appositive image of Dalit inherited professions, skills 
and knowledge will themselves bring dignity. Thus, this research seeks to counter 
the claim in the Dalit movement that there is a conflict between dignity and identity 
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and to assert the strategic value of a group-differentiated politics of recognition. The 
group politics of recognition demands the formation of institutions such as Dalit 
Council, and electoral measures such as proportional representation, Dalit reserved 
seats or other mechanisms to ensure political representation.  
 
In examining the current literature and research data, it became apparent that the 
Dalit problem will not be cured solely by the redistribution of resources, but requires 
socio-economic-political transformation. As the injustice Dalit suffer involves an 
amalgam of economic, political and cultural issues, these issues should be addressed 
distinctively but also in dialogue with each other. The critical pathways to achieve 
these ends redistribution and recognition suggested by Fraser (2003) and politics of 
group difference argued by Young (1990). These theories were contextualised in 
western societies in the context of the injustice experienced by women and other 
disadvantaged groups, however, and in some respects, they remain useful in 
examining the experience of injustice in the south Asian context of a hierarchical 
caste society. 
As suggested by Andrews (2013) this study also emphasizes the importance of 
focusing on informal institutional reform as a way of addressing the discrimination 
and social stigma manifest in informal institutions such as ‘culture’ and ‘beliefs’. In 
the case of caste discrimination, it is equally important to highlight people’s negative 
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attitude, discriminatory behaviour and practices, which are indeed deeply rooted in 
the society. Although Andrews' theory was developed in the context of the donor 
driven development and institutional reformation, the argument that without 
understanding the informal institution, reform is not sustainable applies here also. 
This research demonstrates that this particular theoretical approach is appropriate 
to deal with social stigma, caste discrimination.  
 
This study exhibits that liberal justice as equality of opportunity and individual 
rights are not sufficient to rectify the multi-dimensional nature of structural injustice 
faced by the Dalit of Nepal. To remedy the structural injustice one need group 
differentiated rights such as affirmative action, proportional representation, reserved 
seats including autonomy. The individual rights including assimilation into dominant 
groups, therefore, does not necessarily offer pathways out of Dalit inequality rather 
further marginalise them in the hierarchical society. This study in this sense 
supports a group-based theory for the greater justice of Dalit in Nepal.  
 
Nevertheless, the study also indicates that the types of recommendations that follow 
from a concept of minority rights as articulated by Kymlicka (1995) are not fully 
applicable for Dalit. Indeed, the kinds of cultural recognition that his theory 
advocates, and the political structures required to ensure it has, in the Nepal case 
been more appropriate for Nepali ethnic minorities. Thus, although Dalit need 
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recognition as a distinct group for strategic reasons, the issue is not long-term 
recognition of their cultural distinctness.  
 
Turning now to the policy implications, the findings of this study on the persistent 
and multidimensional experience of inequality amongst Dalit should supplement and 
inform the contemporary restructuring process in Nepal. Its conclusions should also 
arm Dalit and policy reformers with a vision, and empirical support for special 
measures such as full proportional representation, additional compensatory 
provisions, affirmative action and reserved seats. As an empirically informed the 
study of Dalit injustice and the reforms required addressing it, it provides material 
for academicians; policy researchers and practitioners that can enrich their 
understanding of the complex, multidimensional nature of Dalit injustice and assist 
them to undertake further specific research on this subject.  
 
While this research confirms the existence of widespread bias and institutional 
barriers in enforcing anti-discrimination law and provisions, the state needs to take 
effective and immediate action to implement the existing legal provision and reform 
institutions so that they become responsive and inclusive. The types of electoral 
reforms discussed above, such as proportional representation and reserved seats, as 
well as ensuring the presence of Dalit in all aspects of policy-making will be helpful 
in reducing existing institutional biases and barriers. Moreover, the creation of an 
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independent Dalit Council could be useful. Such a body would ensure that the 
interests of Dalit are represented in all aspects of the legislative process, to promote 
the proper implementation of existing legal provisions, make recommendations to the 
law enforcement institutions and to ensure appropriate responses to the cases 
concerning violations against Dalit. These political measures need to be 
supplemented by a multi-dimensional socio-economic empowerment package and 
measures to raise awareness about institutional bias and discrimination within the 
broader population. Considering the magnitude of inequality, a principle of 
affirmative action, which to date has been implemented in a restricted way, should 
be applied to all state institutions and programs. A fast track system of affirmative 
action could help to close the gap between Dalit and other groups’ representation in 
State mechanism and would generate a multiplier effect. 
 
While political representation for Dalit will be necessary, the political parties should 
implement inclusion policies to ensure the meaningful representation of Dalit in their 
party committees and decision-making processes. They would then be in a better 
position to advocate other measures. Moreover, the anti-discrimination law should be 
implemented in relation to political parties. Penalizing their political cadres if they 
perpetuate caste discrimination would be a key step in discouraging caste violence 
and discriminatory practices in Nepal.  
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With respect to reducing biases, discrimination and practices, which are indeed 
informal social institutions, a multidimensional approach should be adopted and 
executed by government institutions, and civil society organisations, as well as the 
broader public. To this end, massive awareness raising programs against caste-based 
discrimination such as awareness raising related public service announcements, 
street drama against caste discriminations, and notices through print and online 
media, television could be helpful. Public sensitisation mobile camps at the local level, 
street drama, performative studies, research, trainings for the police and related 
government institutions are also important. However, one of the key aspect of 
fighting against discrimination is to empower Dalit of Nepal by providing them 
special affirmative packages comprising of socio-economic, educational, political 
empowerment. While Nepal has already adopted affirmative action policies for Dalit 
and other marginalised groups with respect to political representation, public service 
and the education sector, these are partial and insufficient. To bridge this gap, a 
special Dalit development package is necessary that should benefit the local 
disadvantaged Dalit rather than only those who are educated and economically 
empowered.  
 
While separate empirical research would be required to develop a model for a Dalit 
development package, a tentative format can be drawn from this research. It should, 
for example, include economic empowerment through modernisation of Dalit's 
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traditional occupation, capacity enhancement for alternative professional 
development, and easy access of bank loans and markets for entrepreneurship. 
Similarly, in the education sector, free education and scholarships for Dalit children 
from primary to higher education, inclusion of Dalit teachers and parents in different 
committees, and elimination of all forms of discriminatory behaviour in education 
sector ought to be components of a comprehensive approach. In the social sector, 
reform should include elimination of caste discrimination, inclusion of Dalit in all 
community users groups and committees. Dalit inclusion in all local to central 
political structures, adoption of inclusion policy and its effective implementation are 
few key areas to address for Dalit empowerment.  
 
A key implication for policy is that Dalit should strategically assert a group 
differentiated recognition politics. In doing so, Dalit should consider their efforts to 
reduce internal caste divisions and ideological differences by emphasising the basis 
for unity among a diversity of Dalit groups. For this, the revaluation of the subjugated 
Dalit identity can be great value for unifying Dalit.  
 
8.3 Recommendations for further Research 
This research has focused on different aspects of Dalit disparity and potential areas 
of institutional reform. In its attempt to examine overall inequality and injustice and 
Dalits’ struggle for institutional reform, it has however not focused in tightly on any 
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one particular area. The multidimensional nature of the problem requires multi-
dimensional research, but at the same time, the specification of research on specific 
areas (education, employment and so on) will be necessary to draw specific 
conclusions and make specific policy recommendations. 
One question to which this research point concerns the possibility of collaborative 
struggle amongst Dalit across south Asia, something that could be better enhanced. 
Although some efforts are being made to create a South Asian Forum for Dalit rights, 
they have been insufficient, and succeeding will need broader level political efforts. 
In this context, subsequent research can be focused on the power politics amongst 
and between Dalit in South Asia to examine the obstacles to pursue and press such 
collaborative efforts.  
For Dalit in Nepal, further research on how Dalit in India have deployed group-
differentiated rights, primarily for political representation would be useful. For 
example, the Indian constitution has provided reservations for Dalit and other 
groups. In India, Dalit have also created Dalit based political parties. In Uttar 
Pradesh of India, Bahujan Samaj is a major political party led by Dalit women. 
Nepalese Dalit could be benefited by considering and drawing the Indian experience 
of enforcing differentiated group rights.  
While this research has focused on institutional and structural aspects of Dalit 
inequality and justice, there are several areas that ought to be the focus of future 
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research. There is very limited empirical research commissioned by Dalit scholars. 
Other non-Dalit scholars have not also widely focused on Dalit subjects in their 
research work. Thus, to mainstream the subject of Dalit injustice, there needs to be 
more research conducted by Dalit, non-Dalit Nepal is and international scholars. To 
this end, some of the prominent areas to focus on immediately include 
phenomenological research of Dalit experience of caste discrimination and 
performative studies. The performative studies is a process of acting on the caste 
discrimination and screening to the participants involved in this process. The 
phenomenological studies focusing on select cases to explore situations in-depth will 
be necessary to show the cause and effects of Dalit human right violations. Similarly, 
performative studies may provide opportunity to the participants to reflect and learn 
from the process. In this study, both Dalit and non-Dalit should be research 
participants.  
Finally, based on the finding that internal and ideological divisions among Dalit in 
Nepal have negatively influenced the success of their struggles, further research 
needs to be conducted on the nature of these conflicts and the strategies to overcome 
them.  
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8.4 Conclusion 
The persistence of discrimination and injustice has been the effect of the social 
reproduction of the caste system. My in-depth phenomenological interview data 
demonstrate that caste stratification penetrates Dalits’ lives. As such they are still 
and will for the foreseeable future remain one of the least developed communities in 
Nepal, largely excluded from educational, economic and political opportunities and 
denied social status. Efforts to repair such inequality have been insufficient and will 
continue to be so, so long as deep institutional reformation is rejected in favour of 
more welfare programs. The vicious cycle of discrimination and its manifestation of 
socioeconomic, education and political marginalisation can only be broken through 
special measures that will ensure participatory parity across social, political and 
economic spheres. To achieve and bring about this institutional change and to alter 
the existing dynamics of power politics, Dalit need first to assert a group 
differentiated politics of recognition.  
 
Even though the Dalit identity is contested among Dalit groups, this research 
indicates that Dalit identity is a matter of unity and resistance for their power 
struggle. The Dalit movement has already established Dalit as a separate group 
identity, and the new Constitution has endorsed this identity, despite dissent from 
some Dalit groups. Replacing this identity with new words like‘Shilpi’, as some 
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groups suggested will not assist in this process. Rather positive self-identification and 
transforming identity into weapon for struggle is crucial. Any discursive shift that 
inhibits the unification of Dalit and increases ideological and caste line division 
among Dalit will only be harmful. 
 
Previous studies on Dalit have concluded that assimilation should be the key goal of 
the Dalit movement (Ahuti, 2010). These studies have primarily been based on 
secondary literature reviews, and they have not been informed by sufficient attention 
to contemporary theories of social justice. Drawing on primary empirical research 
and a rich analysis of the theoretical literature, I argue that there is no any evidence 
of being Dalit easily integrated within the hegemonic social structures in the 
foreseeable future, and dominant groups will continue to, directly and indirectly, 
exclude Dalit. Although most Dalit leaders reject Dalit identity politics and claim that 
the Dalit movement must be dignity movement, in the way it has been playing out, 
the contemporary Dalit discourse has become a politics for recognition. A separate 
group politics for equality and justice through recognition of the group is the most 
realistic short-term strategy.  
 
Despite institutional biases and the weak enforcement of existing legal provisions 
against discrimination, incidents of caste-based discriminations are now increasingly 
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reported by the mass media, and indeed, we see instances of active support for Dalit 
victims and demand to penalise the perpetrators of caste based discrimination. 
Institutions need to become more responsive to these demands and effectively and 
comprehensively implement the anti-caste discrimination laws and provisions. At the 
same time, although we see increasing national and international collaboration on 
Dalit issues, there remains an urgent need for unified and coordinated resistance 
against all forms of caste-based discrimination at the national and international 
level. Further research in this field would be of great help in illuminating South Asian 
Dalit strategy to assert their rights in South Asian power politics. 
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APPENDIX 
A: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
 
Department of Sociology and Social Policy Office 
School of Social and Political Science 
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
Room 443 
Old Teachers College 
The University of Sydney  
NSW 2006 AUSTRALIA 
Telephone:   +61 2 9351 7641 
Email: Danielle.celermajer@sydney.edu.au 
Web: http://www.sydney.edu.au/ 
 
Dr Danielle Celermajer 
Associate Professor 
Initial Consent for Interview  
Dear ………….....,  
I am a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney. I am researching at the University of 
Sydney in Australia as part of myPhD. I am working under the supervision of Associate 
Professor Dr Danielle Celermajer in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy.  
This research aims to find out about the institutional measures that would assist in achieving 
social justice for Dalit in Nepal. I am also analysing the underlying causes and nature of 
injustices and current state restructuring and federalism processes. I am in the early stages 
of the research project and am currently making initial contact with the potential 
participants to see if they wish to participate in an interview. To assist me in answering my 
research questions I wish to interview Dalit representatives and leaders, particularly current 
Members of Parliaments, Political leaders, activist and community representatives. I am 
therefore looking for your active participation in this research to share your experiences of 
injustices and policy recommendations.  
Should you wish to participate in the research, I will explain the research and the process in 
detail. The interview will take about 90 minutes and with your permission, I would like to 
audiotape the interview. You should feel under no compulsion to agree to this interview and 
if you do so, you will be free to withdraw at any stage. To cover any costs, you might incur, 
we will provide you 800 Nepali rupee (the equivalent of AUS$10.00).  
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Should you agree to participate, I would like to ensure that your involvement will be strictly 
confidential unless you give your explicit permission to be named in this research. Any 
research data gathered from the results of the study may be published however no 
information about you will be used in any way that is identifiable unless you give us your 
explicit permission to do so.  
As part of the research, we have submitted an application to the Human Research Ethics 
Committee of the University of Sydney. If you wish to participate in an interview or to seek 
further information, please contact me by email at mom.bishwakarma@sydney.edu.au.   
If you wish to contact my supervisor, Dr Celermajer, she can be reached at Telephone: +61 2 
9351 764, Email: Danielle.celermajer@sydney.edu.au 
Kind Regards, 
Mom Bishwakarma  
PhD Candidate 
The University of Sydney | NSW| 2006  
Department of Sociology and Social Policy 
Email: mom.bishwakarma@sydney.edu.au 
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B: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
Interview Questions-1 
Dalit Member of Parliament (MPs) 
Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age…..............……….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….………. Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status ………………………………...Educational Background............................ 
Occupation ………………….........................Organizational Affiliation….......………. 
Interview Questions  
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. Tell me about yourself.  
2. Which caste group are you in? (Dalit sub group)  
3. Where are you from? What is the nature of your work?  
4. As you are from Dalit group, have you ever experienced caste 
discrimination/untouchability? (Elaborate) 
5. What type of discrimination/untouchability is happening to Dalit in Nepal?  
6. What do you think are the major causes of this discrimination/untouchability?  
7. Are there parts of Nepal where discrimination is worse? (High prevalence regions)  
8. Does discrimination/untouchability take place only in public places (Temples, Schools, 
Hotels and others)  
9. What about the discrimination in private places?  
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10. In your view, what types of measures would address the level of 
discrimination/untouchability?  
11. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination patterns 
especially after the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s? 
12. What are the key problems/issues for Dalit apart from discrimination/untouchability 
(for example in relation to socioeconomic, education and politics)? 
 
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
1. Do you think that the legal/policy provisions for the elimination of caste 
discrimination, Dalit empowerment and development are sufficient?  
2. What about legal provision for caste based discrimination/untouchability? Is the 
penalty system sufficient?  (Do you think that there are other systems of penalty that 
would be better? Are there other reform efforts that would help?) 
3. What are the main policies that currently exist for Dalit empowerment? Are they 
being properly implemented? Do you think they are sufficient?  
4. What are the current laws and policies to ensure fair representation for Dalit? Are 
they being properly implemented? Are they sufficient?   
5. Do Government institutions provide a good level of support for the implementation of 
policies and laws? (Structure/Staff) Are there particular institutions that are better 
or worse? If not, is there any bias towards Dalit issues in terms of policy formulation 
and implementation? 
6. If the current level of support is not sufficient, what are the main implementation 
challenges?  
7. What do you think are the major causes for ineffectiveness of policies? (Prompt – give 
examples) 
8. Are there any examples, where you experienced barriers while you were in your 
official position?  
9. Was it possible to challenge these barriers? If so, how?  
10. What type of role do you think that Dalit leaders/civil society/community should play 
in influencing the government on the formulation and implementation of policy?  
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
1. What do you think ought to be the main socio-economic reform agenda?  
2. Do you think it has been systematically raised?  
3. What are the weakness of Dalit leaders, organizations, and civil society?  
4. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly?  
5. What are main challenges to make united efforts?  
6. What are the issues that should be included in the new constitution?  
7. How is it possible to ensure the issues of concern to Dalit will be taken into 
consideration in the new constitution and in the post-constitution scenario for policy 
formulation? 
8. What institutional reform do Dalit want? (Do they need any Council, department, 
commission from central to local level and socio-economic policy)  
9. How can that institutional reform works in favor of Dalit?  
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10. In your opinion, what are key elements to address which actually would address the 
social justice of Dalit in Nepal?  
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
1. What do you know about Nepalese state restructuring and the federalism process?  
2. What are main Dalit issues for federalism?  
3. How will these issues be addressed?  
4. Do you think that there are specific issues that Dalit face that are not faced by other 
minorities? Are these addressed by federalism? 
5. There have been a number of principles suggested for federalism, such as districts 
according to ethnicity or multiple identities. What do you think of these proposals? 
What could be basicprinciple to address while adopting the federal system in Nepal? 
(Ethnicity identity or multiple identities)  
6. Which principle more relates to Dalit in Nepal? What type of federal arrangement 
would best work for Dalit? Why? 
7. What about non-territorial federal unit for Dalit? Is that compatible to address the 
Dalit issues? If not? Why not?  
8. How do you think that federalism could be organized so as to ensure social harmony 
between ethnic and caste groups? 
9. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal?  
10. What could be basic elements for change and development?  
 
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
1. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for Dalit? Is that contested in 
your community?  
2. How would you define Dalit identity? 
3. Do you think that it is a stigmatized identity?  
4. Do youthink that a common Dalit identity is useful for promoting justice for members 
of Dalit communities? What do youthink about the arguments that it would be better 
not to argue on the basis of Dalit identity but simply to integrate?  
5. What measures could be taken to reduce the stigma associated with 'Dalit identity'? 
6. What do you think has made it possible for the Madhes and other ethnic communities 
in Nepal to promote their agendas? Why do you think Dalit have not been able to do 
the same for their own agendas?  
7. Is Identity politics the best way to ensure social inclusion in Nepal? If not, why not?  
 
Is there anything else you would like to share etc.? 
 
Thank you. 
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Interview Questions-2 
State Restructuring and Minority Rights Experts 
Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age………….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….………. Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status …………………………………Educational Background.……..……….... 
Occupation ……………………………………. Organizational 
Affiliation……………………………….…… 
Interview Questions 
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. What do you think the major problems/Injustices faced by Dalit group in Nepal?  
2. What are the nature and causes of problems/injustices?  
3. What are the major forms of caste based discrimination in Nepal (Discrimination in 
public/ private places; direct and indirect …others)   
4. Do some caste or religious groups discriminate against Dalit more than others? Is 
discrimination worse in some regions?  
5. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination pattern 
especially after the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s? 
Other than discrimination and untouchibility, what are the main problems that Dalit 
face?  
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
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1. Do you think that the legal/policy provisions for the elimination of caste 
discrimination, Dalit empowerment and development are sufficient? If not where do 
you see the gaps?  
2. Do you think the current policies have been effectively implemented? If not, where are 
the main barriers (Structure/Staffs/Attitude)? 
3. Do you see challenges within Dalit communities or organizations that get in the way 
of them advocating for their needs and concerns?  
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
1. What do you think ought to be the main socio-economical reform agenda for Dalit in 
Nepal?  
2. Do you think it has been systematically raised?  
3. What are the weakness of Dalit leaders, organizations, and civil society?  
4. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly? What are main 
challenges to make united efforts?  
5. What main issues should be included in new constitution?  
6. How is that possible to ensure that issues of concern to Dalit will be taken into 
consideration in the new constitution and in the post-constitution scenario for policy 
formulation? 
7. What institutional reform do Dalit need for their social justice?  
 
 
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
1. What are main Dalit issues/concern for state restructuring and federalism in specific?  
2. Do you think that there are specific issues that Dalit face that are not faced by other 
minorities? Are these addressed by federalism? 
3. There have been a number of principles suggested for federalism, such as federal units 
according to ethnicity or single identity vs. multiple identities.  
4. What do you think the best principle for dividing federal units would be to support 
justice and rights for Dalit?  
5. What about non-territorial federal unit for Dalit? Is that compatible to address the 
Dalit issues? If not? Why not?  
6. How do you think that federalism could be organized so as to ensure social harmony 
between ethnic and caste groups? 
7. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal?  
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
1. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for this community? Is that 
widely accepted or contested? 
2. How would separate group identity contribute Dalit to integrate in mainstream 
society since they have similar culture, religion and language?  
3. What do you think the major strategies for Dalit political, social leaders to adopt in 
order to promote their agendas?  
4. Is Identity politics best way to ensure social inclusion in Nepal? If not, why not?  
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Is there anything else you would like to share etc.? 
Thank you. 
Interview Questions-3 
Dalit Political Larders 
Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
 
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age………….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….………. Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status …………………………………Educational Background.……..……….... 
Occupation ……………………………………Organizational Affiliation…………………… 
Interview Questions 
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. Tell me about yourself.  
2. Which caste group are you? (Dalit sub group)  
3. Where are youfrom? What is nature of your work?  
4. As you are from Dalit group, have you ever experienced caste 
discrimination/untouchability? (Elaborate some cases or forms of discrimination) 
5. What type of discrimination/untouchability is happening to Dalit in Nepal?  
6. What do you think the major causes of this discrimination/untouchability?  
7. Are there parts of Nepal where discrimination is worse? (High prevalence region) 
8. Does discrimination/untouchability take place only in public places (Temples, Schools, 
Hotels and others)  
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9. What about the discrimination in private places?  
10. In your view, what types of measures would address the level of 
discrimination/untouchability?  
11. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination patterns 
especially after the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s? 
12. What are the key problems/issues for Dalit apart from discrimination/untouchability?  
13. Do the political leaders and cadres still practice caste discrimination in your party? Is 
there any provision to punish the perpetrators?  
 
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
11. Do you think that the legal/policy provisions for the elimination of caste 
discrimination, Dalit empowerment and development are sufficient?  
12. What about legal provision for caste based discrimination/untouchability? Is the 
penalty system sufficient?  (Do you think that there are other systems of penalty that 
would be better? Are there other reform efforts that would help?) 
13. What are the main policies that currently exist for Dalit empowerment? Are they 
being properly implemented? Do you think they are sufficient?  
14. What are the current laws and policies to ensure fair representation for Dalit? Are 
they being properly implemented? Are they sufficient?   
15. Do Government institutions provide a good level of support for the implementation of 
policies and laws? (Structure/Staff) Are there particular institutions that are better 
or worse? If not, is there any bias towards Dalit issues in-terms of policy formulation 
and implementation? 
16. If the current level of support is not sufficient, what are the main implementation 
challenges?  
17. What do you think are the major causes for ineffectiveness of policies? (Prompt – give 
examples) 
18. Are there any examples, where you experienced barriers while you were in your 
official position?  
19. Was it possible to challenge these barriers? If so, how?  
20. What type of role do you think that Dalit leaders/civil society/community should play 
in influencing the government on the formulation and implementation of policy?  
21. Do you think the political leaders have been able to work jointly for Dalit issues? If 
not, what are the major challenges?   
22. Do you think there is any role of political leaders to implement the policies?  
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
11. What do you think ought to be the main socio-economic reform agenda?  
12. Do you think it has been systematically raised?  
13. What are the weakness of Dalit leaders, organizations, and civil society?  
14. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly?  
15. What are main challenges to make united efforts?  
16. What are the issues that should be included in the new constitution?  
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17. How is it possible to ensure that issues of concern to Dalit will be taken into 
consideration in the new constitution and in the post-constitution scenario for policy 
formulation? 
18. What institutional reform do Dalit want? (Do they need any Council, department, 
commission from central to local level  
19. How can that institutional reform works in favor of Dalit?  
20. In your opinion, what are key elements to address which actually would address the 
social justice of Dalit in Nepal?  
 
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
11. What do you know about Nepalese state restructuring and the federalism process?  
12. What are main Dalit issues for federalism?  
13. How will these issues be addressed?  
14. Do you think that there are specific issues that Dalit face that are not faced by other 
minorities? Are these addressed by federalism? 
15. There have been a number of principles suggested for federalism, such as districts 
according to ethnicity or multiple identities. What do you think of these proposals? 
What could be basic principle to address while adopting the federal system in Nepal? 
(Ethnicity identity or multiple identities)  
16. Which principle more relates to Dalit in Nepal? What type of federal arrangement 
would best work for Dalit? Why? 
17. What about non-territorial federal unit for Dalit? Is that compatible to address the 
Dalit issues? If not? Why not?  
18. How do you think that federalism could be organized so as to ensure social harmony 
between ethnic and caste groups? 
19. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal?  
20. What could be basic elements for change and development?  
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
8. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for Dalit? Is that contested in 
your community?  
9. How would you define Dalit identity?  
10. Do you think that it is a stigmatized identity?  
11. Do you think that a common Dalit identity is useful for promoting justice for members 
of Dalit communities? What do you think about the arguments that it would be better 
not to argue on the basis of Dalit identity but simply to integrate?  
12. What measures could be taken to reduce the stigma associated with 'Dalit identity'? 
13. What do you think has made it possible for the Madhes and other ethnic communities 
in Nepal to promote their agendas? Why do you think Dalit have not been able to do 
the same for their own agendas?  
14. Is Identity politics the best way to ensure social inclusion in Nepal? If not, why not?  
 
Is there anything else you would like to share etc?  
 
Thank you. 
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Interview Questions-4 
Dalit Social Leaders 
Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
 
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age………….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….………. Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status …………………………………Educational Background.……..……….... 
Occupation ……………………………   ……Organizational 
Affiliation………………………..………. 
Interview Questions 
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. Tell me about yourself.  
2. Which caste group are you? (Dalit sub group)  
3. Where are you from? What is the nature of your work?  
4. As you are from Dalit group, have you ever experienced caste 
discrimination/untouchability? (Elaborate some cases or forms of discrimination) 
5. What type of discrimination/untouchability is happening to Dalit in Nepal?  
6. What do you think are the major causes of this discrimination/untouchability?  
7. Are there parts of Nepal where discrimination is worse? (High prevalence regions) 
8. Does discrimination/untouchability take place only in public places (Temples, Schools, 
Hotels and others)  
9. What are the discrimination in private places?  
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10. In your view, what types of measures would address the level of 
discrimination/untouchability?  
11. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination patterns 
especially after the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s?  
12. What are the key problems/issues for Dalit apart from discrimination/untouchability? 
(For example in relation to socio-economic, education and politics)? 
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
1. Do you think that the legal/policy provisions for the elimination of caste 
discrimination, Dalit empowerment and development are sufficient?  
2. What about legal provision for caste based discrimination/untouchability? Is the 
penalty system sufficient?  (Do you think that there are other systems of penalty that 
would be better? Are there other reform efforts that would help?) 
3. What are the main policies that currently exist for Dalit empowerment? Are they 
being properly implemented? Do you think they are sufficient?  
4. What are the current laws and policies to ensure fair representation for Dalit? Are 
they being properly implemented? Are they sufficient?   
5. Do Government institutions provide a good level of support for the implementation of 
policies and laws? (Structure/Staff) Are there particular institutions that are better 
or worse? If not, is there any bias towards Dalit issues in-terms of policy formulation 
and implementation? 
6. If the current level of support is not sufficient, what are the main implementation 
challenges?  
7. What do you think are the major causes for ineffectiveness of policies?  
8. Are there any examples, where you experienced barriers while you were in your 
official position?  
9. Was it possible to challenge these barriers? If so, how?   
10. What type of role do you think that Dalit leaders/civil society/community should play 
in influencing the government on the formulation and implementation of policy?  
11. Do you think the social organization as a catalyst for change have been able to work 
jointly and effectively for Dalit cause? If not, what are the major challenges?   
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
1. What do you think ought to be the main socio-economic reform agenda?  
2. Do you think it has been systematically raised?  
3. What are the weakness of Dalit leaders, organizations, and civil society?  
4. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly?  
5. What are main challenges to make united efforts?  
6. What are the issues that should be included in the new constitution?  
7. How is it possible to ensure that issues of concern to Dalit will be taken into 
consideration in the new constitution and in the post-constitution scenario for policy 
formulation? 
8. What institutional reform do Dalit want? (Do they need any Council, department, 
commission from central to local level  
9. How can that institutional reform works in favor of Dalit?  
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10. In your opinion, what are key elements to address which actually would address the 
social justice of Dalit in Nepal?  
11. How can social organizations work for greater influence on Dalit issues?  
 
 
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
1. What do you know about Nepalese state restructuring and the federalism process?  
2. What are main Dalit issues for federalism?  
3. How will these issues be addressed?  
4. Do you think that there are specific issues that Dalit face that are not faced by other 
minorities? Are these addressed by federalism? 
5. There have been a number of principles suggested for federalism, such as districts 
according to ethnicity or multiple identities. What do you think of these proposals? 
What could be basic principle to address while adopting the federal system in Nepal? 
(Ethnicity identity or multiple identities)  
6. Which principle more relates to Dalit in Nepal? What type of federal arrangement 
would best work for Dalit? Why? 
7. What about non-territorial federal unit for Dalit? Is that compatible to address the 
Dalit issues? If not? Why not?  
8. How do you think that federalism could be organized so as to ensure social harmony 
between ethnic and caste groups? 
9. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal?  
10. What role do you see to play for making common agenda of Dalit in state restructuring 
process?  
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
1. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for Dalit? Is that contested in 
your community?  
2. How would you define Dalit identity?  
3. Do you think that it is a stigmatized identity?  
4. Do you think that a common Dalit identity is useful for promoting justice for members 
of Dalit communities? What do you think about the arguments that it would be better 
not to argue on the basis of Dalit identity but simply to integrate?  
5. What measures could be taken to reduce the stigma associated with 'Dalit identity'? 
6. What do you think has made it possible for the Madhes and other ethnic communities 
in Nepal to promote their agendas? Why do you think Dalit have not been able to do 
the same for their own agendas?  
7. Is Identity politics the best way to ensure social inclusion in Nepal? If not, why not?  
 
Is there anything else you would like to share etc?  
 
Thank you. 
Interview Questions-5 
Dalit Government Officials 
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Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age………….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….……….Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status …………………………………Educational Background .……..……….... 
Occupation ……………………………………Organizational 
Affiliation…………………………. 
Interview Questions 
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. Tell me about yourself.  
2. Which caste group are you? (Dalit sub group)  
3. Where are you from? What is the nature of your work?  
4. As you are from Dalit group, have you ever experienced caste 
discrimination/untouchability? (Elaborate some cases or forms of discrimination) 
5. What type of discrimination/untouchability is happening to Dalit in Nepal?  
6. What do you think are the major causes of this discrimination/untouchability?  
7. Are there parts of Nepal where discrimination is worse? (High prevalence regions) 
8. Does discrimination/untouchability take place only in public places (Temples, Schools, 
Hotels and others)  
9. What about the discrimination in private places?  
10. Have you ever realized any sort of discrimination, bias in your office (Government 
department/Ministry etc.)? Elaborate…. 
11. In your view, what types of measures would address the level of 
discrimination/untouchability?  
12. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination patterns 
especially after the reinstatement of democracy in the 1990s?  
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13. What are the key problems/issues for Dalit apart from discrimination/untouchability?  
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
1. Do you think that the legal/policy provisions for the elimination of caste 
discrimination, Dalit empowerment and development are sufficient?  
2. What about legal provision for caste based discrimination/untouchability? Is the 
penalty system sufficient?  (Do you think that there are other systems of penalty that 
would be better? Are there other reform efforts that would help? ) 
3. What are the main policies that currently exist for Dalit empowerment? Are they 
being properly implemented? Do you think they are sufficient?  
4. What are the current laws and policies to ensure fair representation for Dalit? Are 
they being properly implemented? Are they sufficient?   
5. Do Government institutions provide a good level of support for the implementation of 
policies and laws? (Structure/Staff) Are there particular institutions that are better 
or worse? If not, is there any bias towards Dalit issues in terms of policy formulation 
and implementation? 
6. If the current level of support is not sufficient, what are the main implementation 
challenges?  
7. What do you think are the major causes for ineffectiveness of policies? (Prompt – give 
examples) 
8. Are there any examples, where you experienced barriers while you were in your 
official position?  
9. Was if possible to challenge these barriers? If so, how?   
10. What type of role do you think that Government officials like you should play in 
influencing the government on the formulation and implementation of policy?  
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
1. What do you think ought to be the main socio-economic reform agenda?  
2. Do you think it has been systematically raised?  
3. What are the weakness of Dalit leaders, organizations, and civil society?  
4. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly?  
5. What are main challenges to make united efforts?  
6. What are the issues that should be included in the new constitution?  
7. How is that possible to ensure that issues of concern to Dalit will be taken into 
consideration in the new constitution and in the post-constitution scenario for policy 
formulation? 
8. What institutional reform do Dalit want? (Do they need any Council, department, 
commission from central to local level  
9. How can that institutional reform works in favor of Dalit?  
10. In your opinion, what are key elements to address which actually would address the 
social justice of Dalit in Nepal?  
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
1. What do you know about Nepalese state restructuring and the federalism process?  
2. What are main Dalit issues for federalism?  
3. How will these issues be addressed?  
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4. Do you think that there are specific issues that Dalit face that are not faced by other 
minorities? Are these addressed by federalism? 
5. There have been a number of principles suggested for federalism, such as districts 
according to ethnicity or multiple identities. What do you think of these proposals? 
What could be basic principle to address while adopting the federal system in Nepal? 
(Ethnicity identity or multiple identities)  
6. Which principle more relates to Dalit in Nepal? What type of federal arrangement 
would best work for Dalit? Why? 
7. What about non-territorial federal unit for Dalit? Is that compatible to address the 
Dalit issues? If not? Why not?  
8. How do you think that federalism could be organized so as to ensure social harmony 
between ethnic and caste groups? 
9. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal?  
10. What role do you see to play for making common agenda of Dalit in state restructuring 
process?  
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
1. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for Dalit? Is that contested in 
your community?  
2. How would you define Dalit identity?  
3. Do you think that it is a stigmatized Identity?  
4. Do you think that a common Dalit identity is useful for promoting justice for members 
of Dalit communities? What do youthink about the arguments that it would be better 
not to argue on the basis of Dalit identity but simply to integrate?  
5. What measures could be taken to reduce the stigma associated with 'Dalit identity'? 
6. What do you think has made it possible for the Madhes and other ethnic communities 
in Nepal to promote their agendas? Why do you think Dalit have not been able to do 
the same for their own agendas?  
7. Is Identity politics the best way to ensure social inclusion in Nepal? If not, why not?  
 
Is there anything else you would like to shareetc? Thank you. 
 
Interview Questions-6 
Dalit Community Leaders 
Date of Interview:  
Length of Interview:  
Place of Interview:  
Researcher's Introduction: I am Mom Bishwakarma, a PhD candidate in the Department of 
Sociology and Social Policy, University of Sydney, Australia. I am pursuing a study on State 
Restructuring, Dalit Identity and Representation in Nepal. Dr. Danielle Celermajer, 
Associate Professor at the University of Sydney, Australia, is supervising my work on this 
project. As part of the study, I am conducting interviews with a number of Dalit leaders and 
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representatives of Dalit communities. The interview will take approximately 90 minutes. I 
would like to thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. All information 
that we will discuss throughout the interview will be confidential. There are no right or wrong 
answers to the questions. What I am truly interested in is hearing about your experiences, 
opinions, ideas and feelings.  
Participant Information:  
Name: …………………………………..……..Age………….……….…….….... 
Gender…….………………………….………. Districts … …………………….……..….. 
Marital Status …………………………………Educational Background.……..……….... 
Occupation ……………………………………Income level (<20, 20-50, 50+ thousands)    
Organizational Affiliation……………………………….………………………...………. 
Interview Questions 
Dalit Problems/Injustices  
1. Where are you from? What you do?  
2. Which caste group are you? (Dalit sub group)  
3. As you are from Dalit group, have you ever experienced caste 
discrimination/untouchability? (Elaborate some cases or forms of discriminations) 
4. Where most caste discrimination/untouchability does happen? (Public/Private places)  
5. What types of discrimination you face generally (direct/indirect such as verbal abuse, 
physical assault etc...)?  
6. What do you think are the major causes of this discrimination/untouchability?  
7. In your view, what measures or policies would address the 
discrimination/untouchability problem to solve in Nepal?  
8. Do you think that there have been changes in terms of discrimination pattern and 
level in comparison to now and in the past? 
9. What are other problems/issues apart from discrimination/untouchability 
(Social/economic/educational/Political)?  
 
Policies, Implementation and Barriers  
1. Do you know are there any legal provision against discrimination/injustices? Do you 
believe these provisions have been implemented to the local level?  
2. Have you ever experienced the bias attitude of police administration by not registering 
FIR and not helping Dalit for other problems? In your opinion, why do these things 
happens?  
3. Are there any other Government policy which is helping Dali at rural level such as for 
education, income generation, skill development, political participation, and 
empowerment? Have these provision benefited to you and your community? Are these 
sufficient?  
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4. What about legal provision for caste based discrimination/untouchability? Is the 
penalty system sufficient?  (Do you think that there are other systems of penalty that 
would be better? Are there other reform efforts that would help?) 
5. What are the main barriers, in your opinion, to formulate and implement the policy? 
How would these be solved? 
 
Socio-political and legal reform for Dalit  
1. What are main issues (socio-economic, educational and political) do you want to be 
included in new constitution and in other laws?  
2. Do you think Dalit have been able to raise their voice jointly? What are the main 
weakness of Dalit?   
3. What institutional reform do Dalit want? (Do they need any Dalit Desk in Police/ Dalit 
Teacher in school and?) Central to local level.  
 
State Restructuring, Federalism and Dalit Minority Rights   
1. What do you know about Nepalese state restructuring and federalism process?  
2. Do Dalit need their own separate federal units?  
3. What do Dalit community want like single ethnic based federalism or multiple 
identities or mix model federalism? 
4. What about non-territorialfederal unit for Dalit?  
5. Do you believe current reform process will bring substantial changes in Nepal for 
Dalit?  
 
Identity Politics and Dalit 
1. Do you think that there is such a thing as an identity for this community? Is that 
widely accepted or contested in your community?  
2. Do you think that it is a stigmatized Identity?  
3. Do youthink that a common Dalit identity is useful for promoting justice for members 
of Dalit communities? What do youthink about the arguments that it would be better 
not to argue on the basis of Dalit identity but simply to integrate?  
4. What measures could be taken to reduce the stigma associated with 'Dalit identity'? 
Is there anything else you would like to share etc?     
Thank you. 
 
